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ABSTRACT 
In recent times there has been a spate of reporting on the counterproductive 
behaviour of individuals in both private and public organisations. As such, research 
into insider threat as a form of such behaviour is considered a timely contribution. 
The Australian Government now mandates that public sector organisations protect 
against insider threat through best practice recommendations and adopting a risk 
management approach. Whilst non-government organisations and private 
businesses are less accountable, these organisations can also benefit from the 
efficiencies, performance, resilience, and corporate value associated with an insider 
threat risk management approach.  
Mitigating against Intentional Insider Threat (IIT) is an organisational priority which 
requires new ways of thinking about the problem, especially in terms of a 
multidisciplinary approach that holistically addresses the technical, individual, and 
organisational aspects of the problem. To date, there has been limited academic and 
practical contribution and a dearth of literature providing recommendations or 
practical tools as a means to mitigate IIT. 
The purpose of this study is to develop a set of diagnostic inventories to assess for 
Organisational Vulnerability to Intentional Insider Threat (the OVIT). In order to 
achieve this overall purpose, the study sought to answer three research questions:  
Research Question 1: What are the main organisational influences on Intentional 
Insider Threat (IIT) based on available literature? 
Research Question 2: What are the main organisational influences on IIT based on 
expert opinion? 
Research Question 3: How is organisational vulnerability to IIT operationalised by 
the study? 
 
The methodology adopted by the study assumes a pragmatist paradigm and mixed 
methods design. There were three phases to this research: 
 Phase One - a thorough review of the extant literature to determine the status 
of research and applied knowledge and identify factors and variables of IIT. 
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 Phase Two - conduct of a Delphi study to gather expert opinion on IIT and 
combine this professional knowledge with the literature review outcomes to 
enhance the factors and variables associated with IIT.  
 Phase Three - operationalise IIT diagnostic instruments utilising multivariate 
statistical techniques to determine the validity of the inventories and develop 
a framework of organisational vulnerability to IIT.  
 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis procedures were used throughout the research. 
The final survey data of phase three was analysed using multivariate statistics. The 
results from Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) demonstrate the underlying factors of 
each of the three dimensions (individual, technical, and organisational) which 
operationalise the construct of organisational vulnerability to IIT. The exploratory 
results indicate that diagnostic inventories of organisational vulnerability to IIT can 
validly and reliably measure each of the three dimensions. These were triangulated 
with the Delphi panel results and indicated alignment while further developing the 
IIT construct. 
A reflection on additional contributions is an important aspect of pragmatic research. 
The literature available on insider threat highlights the emerging focus on the topic. 
Gaps in the literature indicate a number of limitations which were addressed in the 
current research beginning with the development of a conceptual framework 
illustrating the relationships of the construct, dimensions, and factors of 
organisational vulnerability to IIT. Whilst this work-based study had three very 
specific research questions to operationalise IIT, additional contributions from the 
research emerged as follows: 
The research enhanced knowledge through: (1) study of IIT from an Australian 
perspective, utilising Australian expert opinion and Australian samples; (2) 
demonstration of the utility of the Delphi method in the study and further 
development of the insider threat construct; (3) an Australian definition of IIT; (4) 
integration of risk management standards with the available literature on insider 
threat; and, (5) contribution to the foresight and futures study of IIT.  
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While this research study has proved beneficial in addressing gaps in current 
literature, it is not without limitations. The generalisability of findings is hampered by 
the size and nature of an Australian sample and the study’s exploratory approach. 
The ability to generalise findings and assert causality is restricted in this research, and 
this can be overcome by undertaking future longitudinal research or other future 
studies based on the findings of this study.  
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1 Introduction and Overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
As an Organisational Psychologist, the study of insider threat has been of long-term 
interest to the researcher. An attraction to this field led the researcher to seek out a 
postgraduate program to further education and research on Intentional Insider 
Threat (IIT). The current thesis is the result of work based research undertaken as a 
practitioner researcher in the Doctor of Professional Studies (DPRS) program at the 
University of Southern Queensland (USQ).  
 
In the researcher’s professional practice, the scientist-practitioner model has been a 
strong influence through training and application. The ideology behind this research 
undertaking is that psychologists and their professional practice should be grounded 
in both research and scientific practice. The integration of research and practice is an 
important component allowing psychologists to gain knowledge and skills that 
facilitate effective psychological services and, in turn, develops a greater body of 
research literature that is relevant in the real world (Jones & Mehr 2007).  
 
Being able to reduce organisational vulnerability to IIT is an important academic and 
applied contribution to knowledge. Research suggests that as much as 75 percent of 
corporate value can be tied to intangible assets (Shaw et al. 2009) including 
intellectual property, and so, protection of organisational assets is becoming 
increasingly important. IIT actions such as espionage, sabotage, theft and terrorism 
can cause significant damage to organisations.  
 
The Australian Government now mandates, through its Protective Security Policy 
Framework (PSPF) that public sector organisations protect against insider threat by 
adopting a risk management approach to security management (Attorney General's 
Department 2016). No such mandate exists for the private sector, although a 
consistent approach to the management of insider threat would assist with 
benchmarking and developing a greater understanding of the micro (organisation 
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specific) and macro (the entire study of insider threat) position. Such benchmarking 
can demonstrate how and where organisations have reduced vulnerability to insider 
threat and, in a broader sense, contribute to insider threat knowledge. 
There is a gap in the academic literature to aid organisations in their endeavours to 
protect and mitigate against IIT.  In the applied sense, there is no current validated 
or reliable diagnostic measure to inform potential insider threat risks. As such, 
research is necessary to help further the field and guide practice through informed 
strategies and diagnostic tools that protect organisations against IIT. 
 
1.2 Background 
The study of IIT has gained increasing attention in recent years. The issue of 
espionage within and across Governments and private enterprises is encouraging 
researchers and practitioners to reassess potential insider threat detection and 
management. Furthermore, the significant advancements in technology are revealing 
new insider attack and threat vectors (for example social media, BYOD (Bring Your 
Own Device), Internet of Things). 
 
Despite these advancements, our understanding of insider threat is hampered by a 
variety of factors: practice reveals a tendency to be reactive rather than forward 
thinking and protective, and understanding is hampered by organisational 
underreporting, ignorance, and fear. The literature available on insider threat is 
narrow in focus due to its complexity and difficulty to study; the predominant focus 
on IIT, both in practice and academic literature, is at the individual or technological 
(mainly ICT) level. Despite these hampering factors, a multidisciplinary approach to 
research and practice of IIT is increasing and showing promise. There is potential for 
Australian based researchers and practitioners to further contribute to the IIT 
narrative, which is on the rise but has, to date, been limited. There is potential to 
benefit from a broadening scope and inclusion of a greater focus on the 
organisational context and influence while further developing the field of risk 
management beyond its currently constrained scope related to IIT.  
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A work-based study which focuses on IIT is necessary due to gaps in the literature, 
especially around organisational factors of influence on IIT, but also to address the 
lack of available tools to aid practitioners in reducing organisational vulnerability to 
IIT. In response to the limitations in the current research and in the application of 
knowledge, especially in Australia, a rigorous research study can positively contribute 
to the field of IIT. Pursuing this work-based research through fully accredited Higher 
Degree Research Program provides the researcher the opportunity to engage in a 
well-balanced, rigorous, and methodologically sound approach to the investigation 
of IIT.  
 
1.3 Work-based Research 
Undertaking work-based research through the DPRS has several benefits. The more 
obvious academic contribution is the completion of a thesis that helps to contribute 
organisational knowledge and understanding of IIT. Another benefit is the 
advancement of professional practice through the operationalisation of IIT. Finally 
the work-based research encourages personal development consistent with the 
approach to lifelong learning and advances the scientist-practitioner model in the 
field of psychology.   
 
The three phases of the research provide a consecutive and accumulative approach 
to the study of IIT. Phase one is a thorough review of the extant literature to 
determine the status of research and applied knowledge in IIT. The identification of 
factors and variables of IIT available in open source literature is then utilised in phase 
two. In the second phase a Delphi study is conducted to gather expert opinion on IIT 
that combines this professional knowledge with the literature review outcomes to 
develop an expanded diagnostic inventory. Finally, phase three operationalises the 
dimensions of IIT, utilising multivariate statistical techniques (exploratory factor 
analysis) to determine the validity of the inventory and determine a simple, yet 
comprehensive, working model of organisational vulnerability to IIT.  
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1.4 Scope 
This study aims to develop a diagnostic inventory to assess for Organisational 
Vulnerability to Intentional Insider Threat (the OVIT). As discussed earlier there is a 
growing interest in the field of insider threat and an associated increase in literature 
on the topic. However, contemporary research is limited by a lack of Australian 
representation therein. There is need to broaden the scope of the research by 
thoroughly investigating the organisational influence of IIT in the Australian context.  
In order to reduce the scope of the work-based research, a number of delimitations 
are imposed. Limiting the current work-based research to intentional insider threat 
reduces the scope of the project by focusing on the trusted insider (a person with 
legitimate access to an organisations information and systems) causing damage to an 
organisation rather than on the broader definition of insider threat encompassing 
accidental and negligent behaviour or external agents gaining access and causing 
harm to an organisation. The researcher recognises the strong representation and 
influence of the United Kingdom and the United States of America in IIT research field 
and contributes to its scope by providing an Australian perspective. 
 
The scope of this project includes: 
 Conducting an extensive literature review to comprehensively understand the 
research problem and identify gaps in the available research 
 Designing a sequential mixed methods research project which explores 
organisational vulnerability to IIT, resulting in a diagnostic inventory and 
conceptual model that operationalises and contextualises IIT 
 Examining the operationalisation of IIT within a risk management framework 
(AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009) 
 Analysing data from phase one and two of the study through exploratory 
factor analysis 
 Presenting the data analysis and interpretation of results in a logical sequence 
 Developing the diagnostic inventory and working model of IIT with evidence--
based results obtained from all three phases of the research 
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 Evaluating the validity and reliability of the resulting diagnostic inventory 
 Compiling and presenting the research findings. 
 
1.5 Research Questions  
There are two main aims of the current study. The first is to develop a diagnostic 
inventory to assess organisational vulnerability to IIT and, secondly, based on these 
findings of this work-based research, present a preliminary model of organisational 
vulnerability to IIT with both practical and academic utility. 
 
In order to address these aims there are three research questions presented for the 
current research: 
Research Question 1: What are the main organisational influences on Intentional 
Insider Threat (IIT) based on available literature? 
Research Question 2: What are the main organisational influences on IIT based on 
expert opinion? 
Research Question 3: How is organisational vulnerability to IIT operationalised by 
the study? 
 
1.6 Methodology 
In order to reach the aims of the work-based research the methodology of this project 
will be underpinned by a pragmatist paradigm.  The pragmatic paradigm is chosen as 
it does not have a focus on antecedent conditions and it “is not committed to any 
one system of philosophy or reality” (Creswell 2009, p. 4). Instead, the pragmatic 
paradigm focuses on knowledge claims being a result of action orientation, and the 
consequences of action and change, in order to find solutions to current problems 
(Creswell 2009).  
 
The pragmatic paradigm determines the problem as the most important factor and 
allows the introduction of a variety of approaches to understand the problem (or area 
of investigation). Given that insider threat risks are statistically rare (Shaw & Fischer 
2005) quantitative methods alone are not considered sufficiently able to provide a 
                                                P a g e  | 6 
 
comprehensive picture. Therefore a mixed methods research design, consistent with 
the pragmatist paradigm, was employed to respond to the three research questions, 
thus including depth of meaning by utilising a qualitative approach.  
 
This work-based research follows an exploratory sequential design. Phase one is a 
thematic analysis of the literature that is already available on insider threat and risk 
management (as it applies to insider threat). Phase two of the research employs the 
Delphi method to achieve both qualitative and quantitative outcomes. Phase three is 
the development and validation of a diagnostic inventory utilising multivariate 
statistics in order to operationalise organisational vulnerability to intentional insider 
threat. A full justification of the research approach and design can be found in 
Chapter 3. 
 
As already explained the current research is exploratory in nature. In Phase one, a 
literature review was conducted to identify, organise, and distil concepts associated 
with intentional insider threat (Rowley & Slack 2004). The outcomes of the content 
analysis of the literature then formed the basis for further exploration and provides 
direction for the second phase of the research. 
 
Phase two was a Delphi study, an iterative process to gather opinions from subject 
matter experts whilst attempting to discover new insight and gain consensus. Experts 
were chosen based on a priori criteria for inclusion. Participants were recruited 
through convenience sampling and snowball techniques. Predetermined questions 
and free-text responses allowed the panel members to provide feedback and 
important insights. Quantitative analysis in Phase Two used Frequencies and P-P plots 
to assess the responses from the Australian panel experts and to determine 
consensus. Classical content analysis of qualitative data was used to determine 
emerging themes from responses to open ended questions in all the Delphi rounds. 
The outcomes of the Delphi analysis, including the dimensions and variables 
associated with IIT, were then used to construct the items for the diagnostic 
inventory. 
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Phase Three included the development of an organisational diagnostic inventory 
from the information obtained during phases one and two and its statistical 
validation. This phase of the study employed a quantitative cross-sectional approach 
to the research and the use of a survey as a valid form of enquiry (Creswell 2009, 
2014). Due to the nature of the construct of organisational vulnerability to intentional 
insider threat the inventory was constructed to examine the three dimensions 
(individual, organisational, and technical) as elucidated in the literature and Delphi 
process. A pilot study was conducted to improve the instrument and reduce the 
length of the inventory. Based on pilot feedback changes were made to the inventory.  
 
Responses to the final inventory were collected online through Questionpro™. Again, 
the use of convenience, purposive, and snowball sampling techniques were 
employed. Descriptive and multivariate statistics was performed on the inventory 
data. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was used to aid the construction, refinement, 
and evaluation of the inventory (Williams et al. 2010). The multivariate analysis 
techniques for this research are described in greater detail in Chapter 3. Finally, this 
rigorous exploratory research culminated in the operationalisation of organisational 
vulnerability to intentional insider threat. A working model of organisational 
vulnerability to IIT was also presented.  
 
1.7 Anticipated Contributions of the Study 
If high-level competence is achieved by combining both research- and practice-based 
knowledge, then the integration can provide the most advantageous outcomes, 
especially in terms of adapting and forming new perspectives (Nilsen et al. 2012a). 
The DPRS provides the opportunity to undertake workplace research which values 
the broader contribution of a research study. The value in the chosen higher degree 
program was that it allows students the opportunity to contribute to theory, 
professional practice, and the self. It is anticipated that engagement in the DPRS will 
lead to the following academic, professional, and personal contributions. 
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1.7.1 Academic Contributions 
 An Australian based study that expands the current knowledge base on IIT 
 A thesis contributing to the academic environment 
 Articles and conference presentations contributing to the growing knowledge 
base on IIT 
 Enhanced understanding and knowledge of organisational vulnerability to 
intentional insider threat 
 A model that operationalises organisational vulnerability to IIT 
1.7.2 Professional Practice 
 A diagnostic inventory that provides organisations with information on their 
vulnerability to IIT 
 Transform research outcomes into educational resources for businesses 
 Through use of the diagnostic inventory provide a means of education and a 
way to demonstrate trends in organisations that can lead to IIT behaviour 
 A simple and comprehensive model of organisational vulnerability to IIT 
1.7.3 Personal Development 
 Enhanced theoretical knowledge by developing greater understanding of risk 
management and insider threat 
 Enhanced professional knowledge, tolerance for ambiguity and critical 
judgement by increasing understanding of insider threat through use of high 
level research skills 
 Enhanced objective judgment, analytical skills, and research techniques, to 
develop and validate an inventory to help organisations assess vulnerability 
to IIT 
 Enhanced collaboration and professional knowledge by developing greater 
networks in risk management and with experts in CWB/Insider threat 
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 Subject matter expertise through superior communication skills including in-
house presentations and articles for publication 
 Improved subject positioning, status and expertise in the field of insider 
threat.  
 
1.8 Outline of the Research Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is presented with six content chapters, followed by references and 
appendices. Each chapter is set out according to the higher degree presentation 
schedule. Further, the chapters provide a brief introduction and conclusion to guide 
the reader. The chapters are presented in order of the work-based research process, 
beginning with the introduction to the research, followed by a comprehensive 
literature search and review, then the design of the mixed-methods study to address 
the aims of the research and research questions, next an examination and analysis of 
the data, culminating in the discussion and ending with the overall work-based 
research conclusion.   
 
1.9 Summary 
Chapter 1 provided an overview of the intention for study as well as an introduction 
to the specific topic area. Through completion of the work-based research it is 
intended that positive and significant contributions will be made to academia, 
professional practice, and the personal development of the research practitioner. 
The following chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature on insider threat 
and risk management, addresses limitations in the current research, and identifies 
gaps whereby the current work-based research can provide a valuable contribution 
to the existing body of knowledge.  
Chapter 1
Introduction 
Chapter 2
Literature 
Review
Chapter 3
Methodology
Chapter 4
Data Analysis & 
Interpretation
Chapter 5
Discussion
Chapter 6
Conclusion
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2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an introduction and overview to the thesis which 
included a summary of the significance of the research and the proposed original 
advancement to professional practice, the researcher’s personal development, as 
well as important contribution to the organisational community of practice. The first 
chapter provided an overview and outline of the thesis which will now be explored in 
greater depth beginning with Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 2 is a comprehensive literature review which provides the foundational 
knowledge on insider threat and risk management (including security risk 
management) required to advance understanding of organisational vulnerability to 
intentional insider threat.  This chapter will explore the state of knowledge, 
limitations to research and practice, and provide foundation for the progression of 
the research study. 
 
2.2 Management and Organisational Studies 
Management and organisational studies is a broad discipline which involves the 
“examination of how individuals construct organizational structures, processes, and 
practices, and how these, in turn, shape social relations and create institutions that 
ultimately influence people” (Clegg & Bailey 2008, p. xliii). The discipline of 
management and organisational studies therefore explores the challenges around 
employment and the workplace in a manner that addresses theory, strategy, and 
policy.  
 
Mullins (2010, p. 1) expressed a “multiplicity of interrelated factors that influence the 
decisions and actions of people as members of a work organisation”. As such, the 
study of management and organisations requires a multidisciplinary position and 
cannot be undertaken in isolation or in terms of a single discipline or approach to 
research (Clegg & Bailey 2008; Mullins 2010).  
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Insider threat fits neatly under the parent discipline of management and 
organisational studies. The ability to draw upon multiple related disciplines and 
concepts is essential in the study of this complex topic.  
 
2.3 Insider Threat 
2.3.1  Background 
In 1999, a former Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) officer, Jean-
Phillipe Wispelaere, was arrested for attempting to sell highly classified material 
(Williams 2000). Whilst this is not the first, or only, case of espionage in Australia, it 
certainly highlighted that insider threat was not just something that other countries 
experienced. No longer could Australian Government ignore that they may be the 
target of internal sinister activity. A review (Blick Review) was instigated by 
Government, followed by an effort to try and reduce potential espionage in the 
future through psychological assessment, vetting of staff, improved physical and 
personnel security practices, and strengthened security programs (Williams 2000).  
 
Outside of government there appears to be less emphasis on organisational 
protection against industrial espionage and other insider threats. Whilst 
organisations recognise the potential insider threat there has been more emphasis 
on combatting external and generally technological risks (Cyber Security Division 
2009). This is a concern given the evidence for insider threat is significant and the 
cost of compromise is expensive (Australian Cyber Security Centre 2015). Surveys 
indicate that as much as 81% of fraud (Kroll 2015), 28% of electronic crime (CSO 
Magazine et al. 2014), and 58% of organisational security incidents (Clearswift 2013) 
are a result of insider actions. In an Australian survey of major Australian businesses 
(Cert Australia & Australian Cyber Security Centre 2015) sixty percent of respondents 
indicated that insiders are the most concerning cyber actors. Further, a Deloitte 
report (Deloitte 2015, p. 5) recognises the increasing sophistication and challenge of 
insider threats stating that “the combined power of an insider threat allied to 
organized crime is most dangerous”.  Of course survey data has its limitations - 
including convenience sampling and lacking statistical rigour (Hunker & Probst 2011) 
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– and whilst it cannot be relied upon as absolute, the trends and opinions remain 
relevant and compelling. 
 
Government and private sectors are all at risk (Greitzer & Hohimer 2011; Hewes 
2016) and this includes Australian government, private enterprise and not-for-profit 
agencies. Those businesses most likely to be a target are those that control data and 
information that is useful to others. This may be highly classified Defence material, 
confidential product development details, trade secrets, or personal identity 
information. However, with the proliferation and growth of technology (including the 
Internet of things) and the growing interdependencies of businesses, even small and 
previously untargeted businesses are now at risk (Fenz et al. 2014). 
 
Of concern is that our understanding of insider threat is hampered by a lack of 
reporting and preference for many organisations to handle insider incidents through 
internal mechanisms (Cyber Security Division 2009; Sarkar 2010; Shaw et al. 1998). 
Therefore prevalence may actually be higher and more widespread than we currently 
understand. Sarkar (2010) provides an overview of the reasons why insider threat 
information is not readily available and is even ignored. He explains that fear of 
negative publicity, difficulty in identifying culprits, ignorance of attacks, overlooking 
less damaging insider threat, and potential loss of reputation are contributing factors 
to a lack of reporting. Williams (2008) extends these to also include small 
organisations that may not have sufficient resources to investigate or monitor insider 
threat potential.  
 
The reasons for participation in insider threat behaviour are vast and, because of this, 
the industry of corporate espionage is reportedly growing (Vashisth & Kumar 2013). 
The ability to gain strategic and competitive advantage is a strong corporate 
espionage influence (Vashisth & Kumar 2013). In some countries, for example India, 
research indicates the sectors most at risk include financial services, information 
communication and entertainment, telecommunications, real estate and industrial 
markets (KPMG 2012). In Australia, the ASCS threat report (2015) reveals that cyber 
risk incidents are reported more frequently by Energy, Banking and Financial Services, 
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Communications, Defence Industry, and Transport. Whilst this report is more broadly 
focused (i.e. not just insider threat reporting) it highlights the sectors most often the 
target of sinister cyber activity. 
 
2.3.2 Definition 
In order to define insider threat a definition of insider is necessary. There is debate in 
the literature around the definition of an insider with a number of definitions 
proffered (for a review of the definitions see Pfleeger et al. 2010). Neumann (2010) 
and Chinchani et al. (2005) also argue that the process of distinguishing between 
insiders and outsiders can be difficult given its multidimensionality. Even so, for some 
academics categorising insiders has been important. For example, Cole (2006) 
classifies insiders as either a Pure insider, an Insider associate, an Insider affiliate, or 
an Outside affiliate. Other definitions have been narrow in focus, for example 
Pfleeger et al. (2010, p. 170) defined an insider as “A person with legitimate access 
to an organization’s computers and networks”; limiting the definition of an insider to 
be more technically-focused rather than more broadly relevant.  
 
Probst et al. (2008) offer a cross-disciplinary definition that “an insider is a person 
that has been legitimately empowered with the right to access, represent, or decide 
about one or more assets of the organization’s structure.” Of course even the most 
comprehensive definition of insider threat will have its shortcomings (Crampton & 
Huth 2010). Additionally some researchers argue that there is no benefit in 
determining degrees of “insiderness” (Crampton & Huth 2010, p. 183) such as that 
offered by Cole (2006). Given it is generic and cross-disciplinary, the definition by 
Probst et al. (2008) underpins this study. 
 
Armed with a common, albeit imperfect, understanding of the definition of an 
insider, the next stage is to define insider threat. Costa et al. (2014) suggest that 
defining insider threat is difficult due to variations in interpretation and scope. Whilst 
there are many definitions Hunker and Probst (2011, p. 4) express there to be “no 
uniform or widely accepted definition”.  
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Insider threat is defined by Shaw et al. (2009, p. 1) as “…any activity by military, 
government, or industry employees whose actions or inactions, by intent or 
negligence, result (or could result) in the loss of critical information or valued assets”. 
However, this definition is limited to persons considered employees. Catrantzos 
(2012, p. 4)  defined insider threat “[as] an individual and, more broadly, the danger 
posed by an individual who possesses legitimate access and occupies a position of 
trust in or with the infrastructure or institution being targeted”. The limitation of this 
definition is that it does not extrapolate on the types of danger or risks and how these 
might present. 
 
Another commonly referenced definition is presented by the CERT program at 
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). They define insider threat as a “current or former 
employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access to 
an organization’s network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused 
that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the organisation’s information or information systems” (Cappelli et al. 
2012, p. xx). This is a more complex and lengthy definition but it does extend beyond 
a single focus on employees and clearly articulates where the vulnerability exists and 
how the organisation may be negatively affected. As far as the researcher can 
ascertain, there exists no Australian based definition on insider threat. Whilst a 
specific definition for the Australian context may not be a necessity, a more precise 
definition for Australia may provide assistance to alleviate the fragmented 
conceptions which exist. Further, an Australian based definition can assist in 
operationalising insider threat in the Australian context. The current research will aim 
to determine a relevant and comprehensive definition of insider threat from 
Australian experts. However, in the absence of such, the definition proposed by 
Cappelli et al. (2012), for its comprehensive, and direct focus on intent, underpins 
this study.  
 
2.3.3 Intentional versus unintentional insider threat 
As indicated above there is a distinction in the literature, including definitions, 
between those who maliciously and intentionally cause harm to an organisation and 
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those who accidentally or inadvertently cause harm, perhaps due to naïvety, 
ignorance, or accidents (Sarkar 2010). The current thesis focuses on intentional 
insider threat, where a person is motivated and acts to deliberately cause harm to an 
organisation. Those insiders who represent an intentional insider threat have also 
been described in the literature as hostile insiders, malicious insiders or trust 
betrayers (Catrantzos 2012).  
 
In some ways the distinction is arbitrary, as organisational protective measures and 
mitigation strategies are likely to be of benefit regardless of the insider’s intent 
(Cappelli et al. 2012). As Pfleeger et al. (2010, p. 175) write “the set of preventative 
responses is likely to be the same whether or not intention is malicious”. Still, the 
distinction helps to delimit the research and provide an operationalised focus. The 
attention on intentional insider threat remains important especially given reporting 
indicates that as much as 90% of breaches by insiders are the result of intentional 
actions and behaviour (Verizon and U.S. Secret Service 2010). 
 
2.3.4 Past research  
An exhaustive review of the published works available on insider threat, presented in 
this thesis with selective citation (Cooper 1988), reveal a growing body of literature 
on the topic, especially since 2000. According to Google Ngrams the term ‘insider 
threat’ has been gaining in popularity since the 1990s with a significant increase from 
2000 to the present time. The discourse on insider threat has been promulgated in 
many ways. Whilst a thorough review of all publications has been pursued, the main 
focus of this thesis has been on publications that extend beyond a general 
commentary. Only those that have extended our knowledge of insider threat in some 
way - empirically, practically or theoretically - are presented in this thesis. 
 
The Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) has focused on the 
study of insider threat since its establishment in 1986 (Band et al. 2006). It was in 
1999 that RAND conducted workshops to better understand the research required to 
address the insider threat problem (Brackney & Anderson 2004; Hunker & Probst 
2011; Pfleeger et al. 2010). The U.S Department of Defense embarked on its own 
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search for policy and research to reduce the insider threat (Hunker & Probst 2011; 
Pfleeger et al. 2010). Since then large and long term projects on insider threat have 
been pursued (predominantly in the United States and the United Kingdom) by the 
Software Engineering Institute’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and 
U.S. Secret Service and Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI 2013). 
In addition, smaller academic research studies have emerged. The result is that there 
is a rich and diverse literature on insider threat, albeit lacking in full 
comprehensiveness and coverage including a limited contribution from Australia.  
 
Reporting on insider threat covers theoretical understanding, practice, and 
application in the field. Consistent with previous reviews of the literature (for 
example, Festa (2012a) and Catrantzos (2012)), the current literature review has also 
determined that the focus of research has predominantly been on the individual 
(personality, characteristics, motivations), societal and environmental influences, 
and cyber security. There has been less emphasis on specific organisational factors 
associated with insider threat although there is a growing interest in perspectives 
including personality characteristics, organisational environments and the 
interaction between these (Kraemer et al. 2009; Vashisth & Kumar 2013). 
 
Much of the reporting on insider threat agrees that the focus of historical research is 
narrow in perspective. There is a strong concentration on computer hackers, 
disgruntled employees, ex-employees and consultants (Brackney & Anderson 2004). 
Whilst it is acknowledged that the study of insider threat is complex (Sarkar 2010; 
Williams 2008), it has failed to provide significant recommendations or practical tools 
as a means of countermeasure (Catrantzos 2012). Furthermore, psychological 
approaches to the insider research have been embedded in personality and 
motivational theories (Catrantzos 2012). Whilst the focus of the growing body of 
literature and research on individualistic aspects of insider threat is useful, it has to a 
large extent ignored or undervalued broader organisational influences.  
 
Given this gap in research on insider threat there is potential to expand our 
understanding of the insider threat phenomenon. It requires a more rigorous focus 
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on organisational predispositions and vulnerabilities (Band et al. 2006). In response 
to this gap in the current literature, the present study aims to distil organisational 
vulnerabilities and strengths and develop an inventory to assess the potential for 
intentional insider threat from a broader organisational perspective. 
 
A brief overview of the main areas of insider threat research, including the individual, 
technical and organisational foci, is provided below. These approaches to the study 
of insider threat demonstrate potential biases in research and application. Whilst the 
study of insider threat is still in the formative stages, addressing potential bias and 
specificity in the research is important for increasing our understanding of intentional 
insider threat. It also helps to guide further research in a more balanced and 
considered way. 
 
2.3.5 Individual Focus 
2.3.5.1 Demographical 
Demographic approaches to the study of insider threat look at historical cases in 
order to identify common characteristics or traits of the perpetrator (Festa 2012a). 
Earlier research into insider threat, mainly based in the United States of America, 
used this approach to draw statistical conclusions about the common demographical 
characteristics across espionage cases (one type of insider threat).  
 
In the USA, the Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) 
undertakes research to improve personnel suitability, security, and policy and 
practice (PERSEREC 2016). Based on statistical interrogation of the PERSEREC 
database information, researchers established that those who have committed 
espionage in America, since the Cold War, are more likely to be well-educated 
heterosexual males, who hold security clearances and are over the age of 30 years 
(Herbig 2008). These findings are consistent with outcomes of other studies on 
intellectual property theft. Research in this area indicates the majority of intellectual 
property theft in the USA is committed by males at approximately 37 years of age 
holding engineering, science, management, sales and programming positions (Shaw 
& Stock 2011).  
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Whilst a useful approach to develop greater understanding of the demographical 
influence on insider threat, there are limitations to this approach. The main drawback 
is a lack of predictive ability evidenced by the large number of people who are 
represented by the same demographical profile (e.g. educated males over 30 years 
of age) who have not participated in insider threat behaviour (Festa 2012a). So, whilst 
the above findings show some similarities in offender demographical information, 
other studies have found insiders to be demographically diverse (Keeney et al. 2005; 
Kowalski et al. 2008). Even those that have determined demographic characteristics 
to be significant have cautioned against focusing on demographics alone. For 
example, Cappelli et al. (2012) in discussing IT sabotage suggest that it is more 
important to attend to developing understanding of positions at risk for the crime, 
influential behavioural and organisational factors, as well as implementation of 
mitigation strategies.  
 
2.3.5.2 Motivational 
Motivation is defined in the online Oxford Dictionary (Oxford Unviersity Press 2016b) 
as ‘a reason or reasons for acting or behaving in a particular way’. Shaw et al. (2009, 
p. 1) note that individuals participating in negative insider behaviours are ‘frequently 
driven by the same motivations – greed, disgruntlement, conflicting loyalties, [and] 
ego-satisfaction’. Such motivations are consistently reported in other writings as well 
(Civiello 1999; Fischer 2000; Vashisth & Kumar 2013).  
 
However, research elaborates that motivation differs based on the type of insider 
crime. For example, Cappelli et al. (2012) report, based on large scale research, that 
IT sabotage is usually motivated by revenge whilst insider fraud is motivated by 
financial need or greed. Further, Fischer (2000) demonstrates that money is a larger 
motivation in volunteer spies and those recruited by foreign intelligence, but 
ingratiation is more evident in those recruited by family or friends.  
 
Interestingly data from PERSEREC shows a shift in individual motivations over time 
and that a number of spies have mixed motives for engagement (Fischer 2000); A 
finding that Randazzo et al. (2005) also report in their research in the finance sector. 
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Sokolowski et al. (2016), suggest that as a generalisation, motive is associated with 
some type of “gain”; financial gain, competitive advantage, and/or retaliation.  
Research on insider threat focusing on individual motivations has included loyalty and 
allegiance (Herbig 2008; Shaw et al. 2009), response to boredom (Civiello 1999), 
professional setbacks or unmet expectations (Shaw & Stock 2011), as well as an 
interest in hacking (Civiello 1999). Research has indicated that individuals may not be 
motivated by their work environment or by the purpose of the organisations in which 
they work. Additionally, professional setbacks or unmet expectations are highlighted 
as having the potential to accelerate an individual from intent to action (Shaw & Stock 
2011). 
 
Even where employees are aligned with the values of their organisation, this may not 
supersede personal drivers and values. Certainly in research that focuses on loyalty 
it is cautioned that an employer may not be at the top of the loyalty chain; falling 
behind that of family, religion, and faith (Shaw et al. 2009). Reduced loyalty in the IT 
profession has also been challenged by the high demand for IT services and high rates 
of turnover in IT roles (Shaw et al. 1998). Loyalty and allegiance may also be affected 
by globalisation (Herbig 2008). Cappelli et al. (2012) caution that foreign allegiance is 
a necessary consideration where organisations are expanding outside their own 
country. Organisational commitment is not guaranteed and the research elucidates 
that there are many factors (including globalisation, mismatched values) which have 
an influential role (Safa et al. 2018).  
 
As with the demographic approach there are limitations in the study of motivation 
and insider threat. Whilst motivation has been found to be a significant factor in 
insider threat based on case studies (Munshi et al. 2012) there is a challenge in 
robustly determining insider motivation (Pfleeger et al. 2010). This is especially 
relevant given it is difficult to verify self-reported motivation and historical data is 
from offenders whose reasons for providing motivational information may be 
questioned (Sokolowski et al. 2016). Further motivation is not static and can change 
over time (Sokolowski & Banks 2015).  
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Additionally, there is also no controlled research to understand why people with the 
same drivers respond differently with respect to action (Shaw & Stock 2011). For 
example, it is recognised that whilst many insiders may be predisposed to 
disgruntlement most do not participate in negative insider activity. The act requires 
that the insider moves beyond having intention (Shaw & Stock 2011) to acting or 
behaving on the intent. Hence, targeting motivation as a primary source of data to 
assess potential for insider threat may lead to false positive errors. In criminology the 
theory of planned behaviour suggests that both motive and opportunity must be 
present for a crime to be committed (Hunker & Probst 2011). Therefore, at least with 
respect to this theory, opportunity must also be included in data sources.  
 
2.3.5.3 Psychological 
A review of the published literature on insider threat shows that a large portion of 
research focuses on individual characteristics that may lead to insider threat 
behaviour. For some researchers the main aim is to identify psychological 
predispositions which can indicate higher potential to participate in insider threat 
activity.  One of the earliest research projects on espionage, a form of insider threat, 
was an Intelligence Community sponsored project conducted in the United States of 
America. Known as Project Slammer (Director of Central Intelligence 1990), this 
research examined espionage through interviews and psychological assessment of 
convicted espionage subjects. Interviews of known associates (co-workers, 
supervisors and family members) were also undertaken to identify personal 
characteristics along with events that led to their actions (Shaw et al. 1998). Among 
other findings, outcomes suggest that those involved in espionage considered 
themselves as special and deserving and that security procedures did not apply to 
them. 
 
Ongoing research continues to demonstrate similar findings and expands our 
understanding of psychological predispositions that are linked to insider threat. 
Personality vulnerabilities identified in the research includes psychopathy, malignant 
narcissism, and borderline personality organisation (Liang & Biros 2016; Shechter & 
Lang 2011), as well as personal predispositions such as medical or psychiatric 
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disorders that affect judgment and social skill problems (Shaw et al. 1998; Shaw & 
Sellers 2015). Greitzer and Hohimer (2011) identify that disgruntlement, anger 
management, disengagement and disregard for authority as important tendencies 
toward insider threat.  
 
Further ethical flexibility, entitlement, and lack of empathy are also identified as 
personal predispositions that can trigger insider threat (Shaw et al. 1998). More 
recently in a proof of concept study, Liang and Biros (2016) presented more positive 
individual characteristics associated with insider threat. Acknowledging the 
limitations of a pilot study (including a small test set of cases and related low power) 
Liang and Biros (2016) discovered that cognitive ability, dedication, and being well-
educated, were characteristics of their group of cases.  
 
When it comes to insider threat, much of the research notes that psychological and 
personality predispositions are not enough on their own. It is the interaction of the 
vulnerability, with a current stressor, which can lead to poor judgment, especially 
where no social support is available for effective intervention.  This is an important 
consideration given the prevalence of exposure to psychosocial risks by the 
workforce. Surveys and research indicate that as much as one third of the workforce 
is exposed to psychosocial risks and therefore “could conceivably pose a significant 
threat to the enterprise’s prosperity” (Frangopoulos et al. 2013, p. 55). 
 
As with the demographic and motivational approaches to the study of insider threat, 
the predictive potential of psychological characteristics is a limitation of this 
approach. Shaw (2006) cautions that data obtained from interviews of insiders (or 
their co-workers, supervisors, family) may be skewed due to bias in reporting. He 
further acknowledges the danger of ‘false positives’ in focusing on personal 
characteristics. Personal traits on their own are not considered predictors of insider 
threat (Shaw & Fischer 2005). In practice a sole focus on the individual may also be 
limiting and “screening for specific personal characteristics paint an imperfect 
picture” (Pfleeger et al. 2010, p. 174). As Catrantzos (2012) notes submitting 
individuals to further scrutiny may also be alienating for the average employee.  
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A review of practice following an espionage case in Australia recommended that 
greater attention and priority be given to heightening awareness of security 
arrangements in the public sector through a greater focus on the individual (Williams 
2000). One of the main recommendations in the review was that “staff of intelligence 
agencies be subject to psychological testing and accept a more detailed inquiry into 
their personal affairs than is required for employment in other areas” (Williams 
2000).   
 
The improvement of personnel security practices as recommended was implemented 
but again the focus was more directed towards the individual level, rather than 
broader organisational level. Such an approach has received criticism due the 
expectation that vetting processes are able to establish an individual’s character and 
from this make predictions of future actions (Young 2017). As Catrantzos (2012) notes 
focusing solely on an individual, without broader context, may be self-limiting and it 
is the multidisciplinary approach to research and countermeasure that is promising. 
Hence the importance of the current study which explores an understanding of the 
organisational context and influence to a greater level, extending the purview beyond 
the individual focus. 
 
2.3.5.4 Organisational Focus 
More recently a focus on organisational context and environmental influence has 
emerged within insider threat research. Whilst research on insider threat often 
considers the above foci (demographical, motivational, psychological), it provides 
guidance on how a positive and secure work environment can be achieved (Festa 
2012a). The Organisation is important as Pfleeger et al. (2010, p. 173) report “[t]he 
organization plays several roles in enabling an inappropriate insider action”. The 
organisation does this by deciding who can have legitimate access, determining 
organisational boundaries, setting security policy, and determining central goals and 
strategies.  
 
Consistent with this, Theoharidou et al. (2005) determines that a sole focus on the 
individual without reference to their organisational environment is ineffective in 
                                                P a g e  | 23 
 
addressing insider threat. Shaw et al. (2009) acknowledge that organisational and 
situational factors can contribute to (and mitigate) insider threat. The way employers 
hire, train and manage staff are important considerations to overall organisational 
security (Shaw & Fischer 2005) especially given that effective management can 
reduce risk and strengthen competitive position (CPNI & PA Consulting Group 2012). 
Further, organisational culture (Shaw & Stock 2011; Tang et al. 2016), working 
conditions and pressures on organisations can also be relevant considerations when 
it comes to insider threat (Shaw & Stock 2011). 
 
Research by the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI 2013, p. 5) in 
the UK note that organisational level factors are exploited in insider cases and that 
vulnerability to insider threat may be reduced by identifying organisational level 
factors and ensuring “a strong, on-going personnel security regime, establishing 
effective management practices and recognising that the insider threat can come 
from anyone with access to an organisation’s assets”.  
 
Given the link between psychosocial risks and insider threat (as discussed earlier) it 
is important to recognise that organisations can place demands on their workers that 
can lead to greater stress, and therefore potentially result in negative workplace 
behaviour. Research in employee behaviour and occupational health has consistently 
shown that, among others, restructuring, temporary work conditions, job insecurity, 
high workloads and working hours, poor workplace relationships, poor working 
conditions, and lack of work-life balance can all contribute to greater stress in 
individuals. 
 
Shaw et al. (2009) published an ‘insider risk evaluation and audit’ to help address 
specific vulnerabilities to insider threat. Based on previous studies of insider threat 
they define several areas that may mitigate (or magnify) insider threat potential. 
These include policies and practices, recruitment, pre-employment screening, 
training and education, continuing evaluation and policy implementation, and 
employee intervention (Shaw et al. 2009, pp. 10-1). These authors suggest that 
improvement to personnel security practices and effective management intervention 
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can help minimise damage to organisations posed by insider threat cases. Other 
findings indicate that insufficient and inappropriate management intervention can 
actually contribute to insider activity (Shaw & Sellers 2015).    
 
It is established that organisation specific sources of risk can escalate insider threat 
behaviour. An organisations response to its staff may increase or decrease the 
likelihood of insider threat (Band et al. 2006) and make matters worse through some 
action or failure to act (Shaw & Stock 2011). In a 2005 review study, 92% of insider 
cases were found to follow employment related events such as termination, 
demotion, or conflict within the workplace (Keeney et al. 2005).  Shaw et al. (2009, p. 
9) report that the following can increase insider threat: competitive nature of the 
business; reputation; overseas locations; technological dependence; and difficulty 
monitoring employees.  
 
Kraemer et al. (2009) discuss how a variety of studies have found that a high workload 
can affect security behaviour. In addition, according to Vashisth and Kumar (2013) 
globalisation (including inter-company collaboration) and the internet have 
contributed to an increase in insider threat.  
 
Colwill (2010) suggests that outsourcing can fragment or dilute protection controls 
leading to an increase in third party access and privilege akin to the insider. Whilst 
these authors raise concern, empirical evidence does not appear to support 
outsourcing or the use of contractors as a significant factor in insider threat (Munshi 
et al. 2012). 
 
Reports on unethical behaviour in organisations is increasing with informal norms 
contributing to negative employee behaviour (Vashisth & Kumar 2013). Research 
finds that organisational environments can influence employee expectations. For 
example, organisations which ignore stealing can set an expectation that this 
behaviour is socially acceptable (Sauser 2007). Vashisth and Kumar (2013) write in 
their article about the ‘Bad Barrel’ approach, which hypothesises that unethical 
behaviour (such as insider threat) is more a function of organisational and societal 
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factors. As such it is assumed organisational factors strongly influence insider threat 
behaviour (including leadership, policy and process and culture) and that some 
organisational environments will encourage insider threat activity (Vashisth & Kumar 
2013). Further, the behaviour of leaders and their ability to model sound security 
practices may assist in developing a positive security culture (Theoharidou et al. 
2005).  
 
The employment of specific types of employees, such as hackers, may also have 
important implications for organisational culture (Civiello 1999). Whilst 
organisational factors are a strong consideration, creating opportunity, an 
individual’s characteristics and social networks cannot be overlooked (Vashisth & 
Kumar 2013). Furthermore, creating a culture of ethical conduct is an important 
consideration for mitigation (Vashisth & Kumar 2013).  
 
Whilst it is acknowledged that a critical pathway may exist and that personal 
predispositions, societal and technical factors play an important role in insider threat 
(Shaw & Sellers 2015), organisational factors may be easier to address with many 
organisations. A focus on organisation specific ad targeted solutions provides a 
rudimentary and initial engagement in addressing insider threat problems, especially 
for those that have been afraid, ignorant, or looking for cost-effective solutions.  
 
2.3.5.5 Technical Focus 
As previously discussed, the most significant amount of research available on insider 
threat is in the information technology and cyber fields. For example, it has previously 
been mentioned that cyber security research has dominated over other forms of 
insider threat research (Catrantzos 2012) despite being a technically hard problem 
(Cyber Security Division 2009). A library search on insider threat, using the University 
of Southern Queensland database, demonstrates a strong representation of journals 
focused on technology and computers. Whilst not a comprehensive list these 
publications include (in order of appearance), IET Information Security, International 
Journal of Computer Applications, Computational and Mathematical Organization 
Theory, IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine, International Journal on Artificial 
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Intelligence Tools, International Journal of Information Security, Network Security, 
European Journal of Information Systems, ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, 
Advanced Computing : an International Journal, and International Journal of Network 
Security & Its Applications.  
 
Research focuses on how the insider threat problem can be addressed by 
implementing technological solutions. As Shaw et al. (1998, p. 1) explain “it is not 
surprising that overwhelming attention has been devoted by computer security 
experts to technological vulnerabilities and solutions”. Especially since these 
solutions are often preferred by business, emphasised by organisational uptake and 
acceptance (Kraemer et al. 2009).  
 
Whilst preventing insider threat is the ultimate aim; detection, analysis, and 
identification of misuse has dominated the research (Neumann 2010). The study of 
insider threat from a technical perspective can be difficult as threats span an IT 
system’s life cycle; through design, development, operation, and decommissioning 
(Cyber Security Division 2009). As examples, publications on technological solutions 
cover denial of access, fraud detection technology (Flegel et al. 2010), access control 
(Crampton & Huth 2010; Cyber Security Division 2009), decoys (Bowen et al. 2010), 
anomalous pattern detection (Gelles 2016), automated detection (Magklaras & 
Furnell 2010), use of big data (Festa 2012a), and data mining, profiling, monitoring 
and multilevel security (Cyber Security Division 2009). As well, more specific 
programmatic and cyber tools outside the scope (and technological sophistication) 
of this thesis are ongoing avenues of study. 
 
Whilst there is a heavy emphasis on technological solutions to insider threat, a shift 
in focus has occurred over the past ten years. For example there has been a move to 
cover the importance of information security management (Coles-Kemp & 
Theoharidou 2010) and policy (Colwill 2010; Hunker & Probst 2011; Kraemer et al. 
2009; Pfleeger et al. 2010; Probst et al. 2010b). Recently there has been a visible shift 
to integrate human aspects along with technological considerations.  
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Our understanding of insider threat, especially the multifactorial influence which 
includes the individual and organisation, continues to grow. Computer technology on 
its own is not enough to combat insider threat and high level of computer 
sophistication is not necessarily a risk factor (Mouton et al. 2016; Sarkar 2010). 
Cappelli et al. (2012) discovered through their research on insider threat that IT 
sabotage requires a level of technical sophistication and was often carried out by 
those in IT roles (e.g. system administration, database administration, programmers). 
 
However, other insider crimes did not necessarily require high level technology skills. 
For insider theft of intellectual property, scientists, engineers, and sales people are 
amongst the highest offenders. In the case of fraud, lower-level employees in a 
variety of roles (and presumably with a variety of IT skill) are the biggest offenders. 
Randazzo et al. (2005) provide further support from their review of case examples in 
the financial services sector, concluding that insider threats are not technically 
sophisticated and often exploit business processes and policies (organisational level 
factors) rather than technical vulnerabilities. 
 
Catrantzos (2012) reflects that most cyber security attacks occur after termination of 
employment which suggests a fundamental difference between cyber security/IT 
sabotage and other insider threat cases. In fact, according to the CERT Guide to 
Insider Threats, IT sabotage occurs following termination or during suspension from 
duties in the majority of cases, a finding not repeated in other insider cases (Cappelli 
et al. 2012).  
 
What is consistent, however, is the growing acknowledgement in cyber security 
research that personal predispositions contribute to an increase in risk and 
observable behaviours in the workplace can represent concern (Band et al. 2006).  
Cappelli et al. (2012) identify in their research personal predispositions as: conflict 
with co-workers; bullying and intimidation; personality conflicts; unprofessional 
behaviour; inability to conform to rules; anger management concerns; and 
disgruntlement. Hence, combining psychosocial data along with the more traditional 
cyber security audit data may enhance the predictive capabilities of models of insider 
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threat (Greitzer et al. 2009). Whilst the emphasis beyond technological vulnerability 
and countermeasures is growing, limited research reflects a more holistic approach 
to insider threat with respect to psychosocial and organisational risks (Frangopoulos 
et al. 2013).  
 
Colwill (2010) agrees that a focus on cyber security and information technology alone 
does not provide a balanced solution, overlooking important individual and 
organisational interventions. Whilst security can be improved by technological 
assistance and advancement (e.g. passwords, data analytics, and multi-factor 
authentication) it does not address the full spectrum of insider threat. Employers can 
become comfortable and perhaps overly reliant on technology, missing the 
opportunity to embrace other proactive forms of addressing the insider threat (e.g. 
security awareness programs and personality testing). This is probably why surveys 
across industry consistently find that insider threat programs often lack direct focus 
on the suspicious non-technical behaviours of insiders (Intelligence and National 
Security Alliance 2013). 
 
Sarkar (2010) suggests that assessing insider threat requires a focus on technological, 
behavioural and organisational components. Randazzo et al. (2005) emphasise the 
importance of looking at the interplay between technology and overall business 
processes to ensure a comprehensive approach to insider threat. Gelles (2016) 
concurs that policy, processes, communications, and training are critically important 
aspects of evaluating an insider threat program. Human factors, education and 
awareness, and after care amongst the top priorities of consideration in the research 
effort (Colwill 2010). Further, Green (2014) discusses in his article that while research 
in insider threat has increased, it has largely ignored the existing body of literature 
available on workplace deviance, especially as it relates to information and 
communication technologies (that is, cyber deviance). 
 
It is the combination of technical controls along with psychosocial considerations and 
organisational factors, that hold the most promise for understanding, detecting, and 
preventing insider threat (Borrett et al. 2013; Gelles & Mitchell 2015; Greitzer et al. 
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2009; Kraemer et al. 2009). A variety of disciplines contribute to the study of 
computer and information security (CIS). While individual and organisational factors 
have been a focus, further research is still an important consideration in extending 
knowledge and understanding of the interplay between individual, organisational, 
and information security (Safa et al. 2018). Kraemer et al. (2009) provide an overview 
and examination of human and organisational factors in CIS research. They conclude 
that streams of research have included usability and users’ role, user perceptions and 
behaviours, organisational policies, security culture, management support, employee 
training and awareness. Their specific study also expands to include lack of funding, 
inadequate staffing, lack of CIS knowledge, and lack of CIS policies, among others, as 
contributing to security vulnerability, which is a precursor to insider threat.  
 
The traditional and function based reporting of organisations creates an opportunity 
for insider threat and therefore, working more closely, collaboratively, and 
intentionally is seen as a proactive preventative measure against insider risk (Pace 
2016; Safa et al. 2018). Hence, the recommendations from a number of authors, 
researchers, and the CERT team are that in order to detect and/or prevent insider 
threat a multidisciplinary effort and understanding of the psychological, 
organisational, and technical aspects of the problem is required (Moore et al. 2008). 
It is through this multidisciplinary approach that the current research progresses the 
narrative of insider threat. It develops an inventory that specifically addresses 
individual, organisational, and technical vulnerabilities, to reduce insider risks within 
organisations.      
 
2.3.6 Models and Frameworks of insider threat 
Schultz (2002) identifies that research into insider threat is in its infancy and, as such, 
the ability to detect or predict insider attacks is limited. He examines a number of 
insider threat models, however, these are mostly attack-focused, interested in an 
insider’s capability, motive, and opportunity (Schultz 2002). Since then there has 
been a shift in focus to extend beyond the attention on individuals and an increase in 
the number of models and frameworks that attempt to explain insider threat with 
more dimensionality. Models to detect and prevent insider threat are heavily focused 
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on technical factors (see, Munshi et al. 2012). Importantly, there has been a shift to 
a broader and multidimensional focus. For example, Pfleeger et al. (2010) present a 
framework for insider action that describes the role of the individual, the 
environment, the system, and the organisation.  
 
Legg et al. (2013) provide a summary of models and frameworks that are commonly 
referenced in insider threat literature. In their commentary Legg et al. (2013) 
acknowledge many models focusing on insider attributes and different types of 
insider actions. Other models focus on prediction and detection of insider threat. 
Additionally, many frameworks are limited as they do not focus on the complexity of 
interactions between individuals, behaviour, and environmental (including 
organisational) aspects of the problem.  
 
More recently models have appeared in the literature that help explain how insider 
threat happens and what organisations can do to intervene at various risk points 
(Greitzer et al. 2009; Legg et al. 2013; Pfleeger et al. 2010; Sokolowski et al. 2016). 
One of the earliest and most published models is that of the Critical Pathway, which 
presents a more holistic approach to explain insider threat, (see section 4.5.1; Band 
et al. 2006; Cappelli & Moore 2010; Cappelli et al. 2012; Nurse et al. 2014a; Shaw & 
Fischer 2005).  
 
2.3.6.1 The Critical Pathway Approach 
Based on case studies, the critical pathway approach seeks to demonstrate that there 
are common factors, including individual and organisational behaviours, which 
increase the risk of counterproductive behaviours (e.g. rule violations, 
disgruntlement) and insider threat (Shaw & Sellers 2015). The critical pathway 
approach considers the complex nature of insider threat and moves away from the 
idea of fixed profiles of perpetrators (Shaw & Stock 2011). In the literature there are 
several researchers who employ the critical pathway approach to study insider 
threat, including sabotage, espionage, and/or theft of intellectual property (see Band 
et al. 2006; Cappelli & Moore 2010; Cappelli et al. 2012; Director of Central 
Intelligence 1990; Shaw & Fischer 2005).  
                                                P a g e  | 31 
 
The first research to discuss a critical pathway appears to be that of ‘Project Slammer’ 
which examined convicted espionage subjects (see Section 2.1.5.3) and 
demonstrated that insider activity results from predisposing personal traits, an acute 
stressor, an emotional fallout, problems with decision-making and judgement, and 
finally a failure of peers and supervisors to intervene effectively (Shaw et al. 1998). 
Band et al. (2006) demonstrate that an individual engaging in insider threat behaviour 
travels down a critical pathway which is influenced not only by individual factors but 
also the interaction with their environment. They identify six commonalities between 
IT sabotage and espionage cases including common individual predispositions, 
experience of stressful events, observable behaviours of concern, technical activity, 
organisations failing to detect (or just ignoring) rule violations, and lack of physical 
and/or electronic access controls that influence insider threat behaviour. 
 
There are four elements of the critical pathway model (see Figure 1): (1) personal 
predispositions, (2) stressors, (3) concerning behaviours, and (4) organisational 
responses. Vulnerabilities across all of these critical points lead to an increased risk 
of an insider threat.  
 
Figure 1: The progression of events along the critical pathway 
 
Source: Shaw and Stock (2011, p. 8). 
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This model emphasises how personal predispositions can affect judgment and 
reliability, resulting in a greater propensity to travel along the critical pathway. 
Personal predispositions in this model include not only medical, personality, and 
psychiatric disorders but extend to social-skills problems, biases in interpersonal 
decision-making, social-network risks, a history of rule violations, and travel history 
as potential indicators of concern (Shaw & Sellers 2015; Shaw & Stock 2011).  
 
Of course, these predispositions on their own are not the only factors to increase 
insider threat. Personal, professional and financial stressors also contribute to an 
individual’s progression towards insider threat activity. Shaw and Stock (2011) 
explain personal problems to include financial problems, relationship difficulties, 
legal concerns, medical issues, and even relocation can create substantial stress for 
at-risk individuals. Further, professional stressors include conflict in the workplace, 
demotion, role changes due to mergers or acquisition, and disappointing 
performance reviews.  
 
The model suggests that concerning behaviour follows stressful events and that these 
behaviours are often observed by others in the workplace or are known to other 
associates (Cappelli et al. 2006; Director of Central Intelligence 1990; Fischer 2000; 
Shaw & Sellers 2015). Such counterproductive behaviour can include, but is not 
limited to, professional misconduct, absenteeism, poor performance, policy 
violations, conflict with co-workers, and security breaches (Shaw & Stock 2011).  
Finally, the last factor along the critical pathway that leads to a hostile act is the 
problematic organisational response. When “at-risk” insiders are exposed to 
problematic organisational responses such as inaction, inattention, and indifference, 
the likelihood of participating in a hostile act increases. Ineffective actions can also 
increase risk. Shaw and Sellers (2015) suggest that aggressive investigations, 
undertaking action without an appreciation of psychological vulnerability, and 
actions during termination can promote insider threat behaviour.  
 
As can be seen by the graphic above, this model has a strong emphasis on the 
individual. This is consistent with the literature review presented above that suggests 
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a greater focus on individual factors (compared with organisational) in the insider 
threat domain. The critical pathway model does represent an organisational context, 
noting that problematic organisational responses (e.g. inattention, inadequate 
investigation, etc.) contribute to insider threat actions. However, the model does not 
extend beyond maladaptive organisational responses and therefore loses the 
potential for organisationally driven protective measures.  
 
Stock (2008, cited in Shaw & Stock 2011) described an approach called the 
Pathological Organizational Affective Attachment (POAA), the critical pathway 
model. This conceptual framework suggests four variables which can influence an 
offender’s trajectory down the critical-pathway. These include: employee/subject 
variables, extra-work variables, workplace variables, and target characteristics. 
According to Stock’s framework, addressing these variables can decrease risk of 
insider threat action. Not all four components of the framework need to be addressed 
equally (Shaw & Stock 2011), however the framework is more robust than that of the 
critical pathway approach in acknowledging the importance of organisational factors. 
 
An article by Shaw and Sellers (2015) suggests that the critical pathway model may 
be a useful empirical framework for insider threat. However, there is lack of 
controlled studies using the critical pathway model which is one of its limitations 
(Shaw & Stock 2011). Correspondingly, there is a lack of understanding on how 
mitigating factors may reduce or even prevent trajectory along the critical pathway. 
Finally, a lack of controlled research reveals the gap that exists in our understanding 
of persons who commit insider attacks and do not demonstrate the characteristics of 
the critical pathway (Shaw & Stock 2011).   
 
2.3.6.2 CERT’s MERIT Models of Insider Threats 
Since 2000 the CERT Insider Threat Center has been researching the insider threat 
problem (Cappelli et al. 2012; Legg et al. 2013) and is recognised as providing 
extensive and comprehensive contribution into insider threat (Nurse et al. 2014a). 
“The objective of the CERT Insider Threat Center is to assist organizations in 
preventing, detecting, and responding to insider compromises” (Cappelli et al. 2012, 
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p. 13). Using a system dynamics approach and their database of case studies, CERT 
researchers present models focusing on sabotage, theft and fraud. They term these 
as the Management and Education of the Risk of Insider Threat (MERIT) models.  
The MERIT Models were developed to simulate the complex nature of insider threat 
(Cappelli et al. 2012). There was initially one main model (see Figure 2). Over time 
and through the course of research the CERT team recognised that not all insider 
threats were alike, hence they presented three main models; theft of intellectual 
property, IT sabotage, and fraud (see Cappelli et al. 2012).  
 
The system dynamic method was chosen for its ability to capture the dynamic 
complexity of insider behaviour and allow for continuous feedback (Cappelli et al. 
2012). It allows for the inclusion of soft factors (policies, procedure, culture) as well 
as hard factors (Cappelli et al. 2012). Graphically these models are represented as 
balancing and reinforcing feedback loops that underlie insider threat and 
demonstrate how the problem temporally unfolds (Cappelli et al. 2012).  
 
The CERT team has modified the system dynamic presentation to some degree for 
practitioner ease. The all-encompassing model is presented below although 
publications since have presented models specific to each insider threat under 
research (sabotage, fraud, theft; see Band et al. (2006); Cappelli et al. (2012); Moore 
et al. (2011); Moore et al. (2008); Carnegie Mellon University (2016). 
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Figure 2: MERIT model Extreme Overview 
 
Source: Cappelli et al. (2006). 
 
Perhaps one potential weakness of the CERT’s MERIT models is that they began from 
the identification of a specific insider-threat problem (sabotage, fraud, theft) and 
greater influences were incorporated potentially reducing its effectiveness with 
novel attack vectors (Legg et al. 2013). The MERIT models are essentially an 
organisation-centric viewpoint of the problem (Nurse et al. 2014a). The MERIT 
models were born out of an attempt to address individual, organisational, contextual 
and technical inputs (Band et al. 2006), however, the organisational focus is 
somewhat limited compared to the focus on technical and individual factors.  
 
In the MERIT models, organisations are represented by perceived risk, trust of insider, 
and in their failure to recognise or detect problems (such as identifying technical 
precursors) and lack of controls. Band et al. (2006) state that future research can 
include factors such as management errors, organisational culture, and effectiveness 
of security awareness training to add breadth and depth to the organisational 
influences on insider threat.  
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A further limitation of this model is that system dynamics require accurate 
quantification of attributes and impacts that may not be available in the study of 
insider threat cases (Nurse et al. 2014a). Furthermore, from an applied perspective, 
the MERIT models can be seen as cumbersome and challenging for practitioners to 
use (Nurse et al. 2014a).  
 
2.3.6.3 Cyber Security Centre, Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford 
Legg et al. (2013) recognised the inadequacies of any model or reasoning structures 
to understand the entire picture of insider attacks. In response, they proposed a 
framework for modelling insider threat detection that they believe extends beyond 
previous models, including the MERIT models identified above. Legg et al. (2013) 
identified the opportunity to also extend beyond the technical to include behavioural 
and psychological characteristics leading to an “all-encompassing organisational view 
of the problem” (p. 21). It is commonly accepted that insider threat research has 
provided significant evidence on the importance of psychosocial factors and 
therefore any useful models must incorporate this focus (Greitzer et al. 2009).  
 
The model (see Figure 3) proposed by Legg et al. (2013) consists of three tiers 
(Hypothesis, Measurement, and Real World) and draws on four ‘lanes’ to model the 
insider threat problem. They define each of these lanes as follows (Legg et al. 2013, 
p. 26): 
(1) Enterprise – elements that constitute the enterprise on an operational level 
(2) People – elements describing an insider, his motivations and his behaviour 
within the enterprise 
(3) Technology and Information – elements relating to hardware and software in 
the enterprise and the digital activities that can be recorded 
(4) Physical – elements that capture physical components (e.g. locations) that 
exist within the enterprise 
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Figure 3: Elements diagram that represents the Real World Level of the Legg et 
al. conceptual model 
 
Source: Legg et al. (2013, p. 25). 
 
By focusing on four lanes in the model, Legg et al. (2013) have been able to extend 
over other models to consider additional aspects of insider threat. The model allows 
for inter- and intra-tier reasoning across psychological, social, and technological 
domains. It also allows for both a top-down and bottom-up reasoning process (Legg 
et al. 2013).  
 
The benefit of this model is a direct representation of the Organisation and its 
capacity to influence insider threat (both positively and negatively). Organisational 
relationships, reputation, and culture for example are represented and allow for 
greater understanding of insider threat as a multifaceted problem. Further, Legg et 
al. (2013) propose that strategies or “remedies” can be implemented across the four 
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lanes demonstrating how an organisation can intervene to deter insider threat. Still, 
the model is not without criticism, for example, Sokolowski et al. (2016) suggest that 
the model’s reliance on subjective conclusions rather than mathematical outputs is a 
limitation. 
 
Extending on the Legg et al. (2013) model, Nurse et al. (2014a, p. 214) developed ‘a 
grounded framework’ for characterising and understanding insider attacks in a simple 
yet comprehensive way (see Figure 4). These researchers included; (1) technical and 
behavioural indicators (2) human factors and motivations, and (3) the range of 
attacks possible, in their framework that considers both intentional and unintentional 
insider threat (Agrafiotis et al. 2015; Nurse et al. 2014a).  
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Figure 4: Framework for characterising insider attacks 
 
Source: Nurse et al. (2014b, p. 216). 
 
As can be determined from Figure 4 the framework has several elements across four 
areas – Catalyst, Actor Characteristics, Attack Characteristics, and Organisation 
Characteristics. Dotted lines represent potential relationships whilst solid lines 
indicate a definite relationship between elements. Not only does the model account 
for individual factors (psychological state, personality, behaviour, motivation, etc.) 
and broader actor characteristics (e.g. role, skills, relationship status) but extends to 
consider the catalyst and the environment as well as the types of attacks possible.  
 
Of most interest to the current thesis is the clear emphasis on organisation 
characteristics - Assets (items of value) and Vulnerabilities (weaknesses in assets or 
protections). The framework provides a means to incorporate the type of asset the 
organisation has but also the myriad of vulnerabilities that could be present, including 
lack of security awareness training, limited employee support, inadequate security 
and technological controls, and lack of staff training and supervision among others 
(Nurse et al. 2014a). There remains, however, a lack of emphasis on protective 
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measures within this model. It also places organisational characteristics at the back 
end of the model potentially de-emphasising the influence of organisational 
characteristics as a catalyst for insider threat action.  
 
As with the other models presented above, the limitation of this framework is the 
lack of available research using the framework and looking at detection and 
prediction of insider threat actions. It also does not address practical concerns of 
implementation. As Nurse et al. (2014a) cautioned, a great challenge in using this 
framework (as well as others identified above) lies in ethical and legal considerations 
regarding the use of information, especially employee information. Greitzer et al. 
(2009) outlined that whilst personal information may be useful in the insider threat 
space it is unlikely to be legal or appropriate. However, use of organisational 
information and observational data provides a legal means of information gathering, 
including employee records and organisational feedback processes (Greitzer & 
Hohimer 2011; Greitzer et al. 2009). Despite the restraints outlined, this framework 
does provide a multidisciplinary view of the insider threat problem in a simplistic 
model that should be easy for practitioners to use.  
 
2.3.7 Limitations of insider threat research 
Whilst the limitations of insider threat research have been elucidated throughout this 
thesis, it is a worthwhile exercise to revisit the main concerns. Insider threat is a 
complex and difficult subject to study and because of this there are general flaws and 
limitations in the studies addressing insider threat. Festa (2012) describes the overall 
body of research on insider threat as biased, insufficient, and lacking. For example, in 
the USA the majority of research has been funded or directed by the Department of 
Defense. There has been a lack of attention to broader government, private 
enterprise and not-for-profit organisations have been insufficiently researched. In 
addition, applied research on insider threat in other parts of the world has been 
limited (Festa 2012), especially in Australia.  
 
Many of the available studies have a high level of specificity and focus on one type of 
problem in a specific organisation. As such few empirical studies exist which are 
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publicly accessible (Schultz 2002). There is also a lack of controlled research (Shaw et 
al. 2009) with the majority of publications being descriptive and policy oriented 
rather than explanatory or predictive (Band et al. 2006).  
 
Research is anecdotal, speculative (Greitzer et al. 2009; Hunker & Probst 2011), rich 
in case studies (Band et al. 2006; Liang & Biros 2016), and uses convenience samples 
(Randazzo et al. 2005) raising questions regarding the generalisability of the results. 
There is also a domination of demographic and psychological approaches showing 
correlation but not causation (Festa 2012a). This can prevent organisations from 
pursuing observed behaviour that may be suspicious given that the activity may be 
correlated but not causally linked with insider threat concerns (Hunker & Probst 
2011). It can also lead to false positive results (Shaw 2006). As such further research 
is required to compare prevalence of predispositions with occurrence rates in 
employee population in order to validate the hypothesised relationships (Greitzer et 
al. 2009; Hunker & Probst 2011). 
 
As Shaw and Stock (2011) discuss understanding the insider threat phenomenon is 
limited by access to insider threat information and the likely underreporting of insider 
threat cases. This results in data that is skewed and potentially biased. Hunker and 
Probst (2011) describe that the fundamental challenge in researching and gaining a 
greater holistic knowledge of insider threat is due to the lack of real data. Post hoc 
investigations are also speculative in predictive value (Hunker & Probst 2011). For 
example, as Shaw (2006) expresses information provided by convicted insiders (and 
known associates) is fraught with bias and questionable motivations.  
 
From an applied perspective, the literature is growing and does provide insight into 
insider threat. However, current practice tends toward reactive and detection focus 
rather than predictive (Greitzer & Hohimer 2011; Greitzer et al. 2009) or protective 
outcomes. This is not a surprise given that detection is difficult and prediction is 
harder (Greitzer et al. 2013). Although one could argue that protective measures can 
be easily implemented and matched to organisational needs.  
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Whilst past research explores insider threat from a variety of perspectives there is 
more traction in recent times to explore insider threat through models that 
incorporate a multidimensional focus. A promising perspective that is limited due to 
its infancy and scarcity of controlled research and application of these models. As 
such, there is a limited amount of evidence that these models work. Some of these 
models also overemphasise the individual and/or technical aspects, and generally 
there is an absence of organisational protective measures within the frameworks. 
There is also argument that many models are statistically focused representing past 
activity and providing unsatisfactory representation of likelihood for future insider 
threat risk (Sokolowski & Banks 2015). Finally, several of the models are considered 
cumbersome and difficult to apply in practice.   
 
It appears that legal and ethical considerations that were overlooked are gaining 
greater attention and will begin to filter through the study of insider threat. Legal, 
ethical and privacy related questions are being raised and some authors have begun 
to explore these topics further (Carpenter et al. 2018; Greitzer et al. 2009; Hunker & 
Probst 2011; Huth 2013; Nurse et al. 2014b; Reid 2018; Williams 2008; Young 2017). 
In a practical sense, at least in the United States of America, organisations have 
started implementing ethics and integrity hotlines (Gelles 2016). This may provide an 
avenue to capture suspicious behaviour but also help address the gap in research 
surrounding ethical and moral implications. Consideration of the legal ramifications 
of employing a formalised insider threat program will need greater review (Huth 
2013). Also the implementation of such programs will be made more difficult by the 
variation in legal frameworks across countries.  
 
Finally, the difficulty in researching and responding to intentional insider threat is 
that by its definition it is behaviour undertaken by an individual with the intention 
that it will not be discovered. The hidden nature of the offense makes it difficult to 
predict but also difficult to research in any way that is not retrospective in nature. In 
an applied and practical sense, organisations looking to protect themselves from 
potential insider threat activity will need to accept that pinpointing a specific insider 
actor is difficult and identifying all insider risk potential is virtually impossible. 
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However, reducing risk and mitigating efforts can be assisted by the implementation 
of a risk management approach to insider threat.  
 
Thus far this thesis has provided a background to insider threat, an overview of past 
research and relevant models, as well as an exploration of limitations to insider threat 
research. Next, the thesis introduces the topic of risk management and how risk 
management can be applied to insider threat research and application.  
 
2.4 Risk Management – Overview 
2.4.1 Defining Risk 
In his seminal book ‘An Anatomy of Risk’, Rowe (1977) discusses the complexity of 
the concept of risk. He defines risk as “the potential for realization of unwanted, 
negative consequences of an event” (Rowe 1977, p. 24). The online Oxford dictionary 
defines risk in a number of ways including a “situation involving exposure to danger” 
(Oxford Unviersity Press 2016a). Both of these definitions emphasise the negative 
consequences of risk and historically risk management has focused on ways of 
managing negative risk.  
 
However, the definition of risk, and application of risk management, has evolved over 
time. Now, the term risk is associated with negative consequences, positive 
outcomes, and uncertainty of outcomes (Hopkin 2014a). Within risk management the 
definition of risk concentrates on risks as events. This is exemplified in the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) which defines risk as the “effect 
of uncertainty on objectives” where an effect can be both positive and/or negative 
(Standards Australia 2009, p. 1). Given that there is not a universally accepted 
definition of risk (Andretta 2014) the definition presented by the ISO underpins the 
current thesis.  
 
2.4.2 Defining Risk Management 
Risk management is an integrated approach to the assessment and evaluation of risk. 
The ISO defines risk management as the “coordinated activities to direct and control 
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an organization with regard to risk” (Standards Australia 2009, p. 2). Hopkin (2014a) 
states that organisations that take a proactive approach to risk and its management 
can expect improvement across strategy, tactics, operations, and compliance. The 
level of acceptable risk differs across organisations depending on their risk attitude 
and risk appetite. Personality and situational characteristics can also affect 
propensity to take risks (Rowe 1977). According to Dionne (2013) the absence of 
defining executive risk appetite was one of the underlying problems resulting in 
significant financial loss during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. As such, it is 
important that organisations define risk and implement risk management 
approaches tailored for purpose.  
 
2.4.3 Development of Risk Management 
Risk management has a long history with influence from a number of unrelated 
disciplines (Clarke & Varma 1999). The structured and organisationally driven 
approach to risk management reportedly began as an insurance management 
function in the United States in the 1950s (Dionne 2013; Hopkin 2014a). It continued 
to develop with the growing interest in business continuity planning during the 
1960s. It was then applied to risk financing and risk control in Europe during the 1970s 
and simultaneously gathered momentum in the field of occupational health and 
safety (Hopkin 2014a). Risk management gained commercial and corporate status in 
the late 1990s with the application of risk management to project management, 
credit and financial risk, and eventually Enterprise Risk Management (ERM; Dionne 
2013). 
 
It is not surprising that the influence of various disciplines led to a fragmented 
approach to risk management and a number of different approaches and frameworks 
for operation (Clarke & Varma 1999). Traditional approaches to risk management 
therefore tend to address a specific risk, one at a time, in a silo technique (Grace et 
al. 2015). 
 
However, with the growth of risk management the focus has shifted to a more holistic 
and integrated approach to risk management across the organisation (Clarke & 
                                                P a g e  | 45 
 
Varma 1999; Grace et al. 2015; Hopkin 2014a). The shift from a more fragmented 
approach to an integrated risk management approach has been important as the 
latter is linked with superior cost and revenue efficiency (Grace et al. 2015), better 
stock performance (Clarke & Varma 1999), greater organisational resilience (Hopkin 
2014b), as well as greater protective function and maximisation of organisational 
value (Dionne 2013). 
 
Risk management is now an established discipline that is applied across many 
professions and disciplines. It continues to develop, evolve and be applied to protect 
organisations in much broader scope. Whilst historically protection from hazards was 
the main focus, risk management in the 21st century has developed to include focus 
on control risks and opportunity risks (Hopkin 2014a). It has also sparked specialist 
areas of risk management such as health and safety, disaster recovery, business 
continuity planning, financial risk management, and IT risk management among 
others (Hopkin 2014a). It is not too far a stretch to consider that employee or HR risk 
management and more specifically insider threat may continue to grow as a specialist 
field of risk management.  
 
2.4.4 Risk Management Frameworks and Standards 
There are a number of risk management frameworks and standards that can be 
employed by organisations. A risk management framework is chosen based on 
specific organisational needs and alignment with concepts such as risk attitude and 
tolerance.  According to Hopkin (2014a) a risk management standard contains both 
the risk management framework and risk management process. The framework is 
fundamental to the implementation and support of the risk management process. 
The framework has been represented in a multitude of ways, although Hopkin 
(2014a) offers a simplified version that demonstrates how components of the risk 
management framework (including risk architecture, risk strategy, and risk protocols) 
can support and enhance the risk management process (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Components of a risk management framework 
 
Source: Hopkin (2014a). 
 
2.4.4.1 AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 
From an historical perspective the first risk management standards were developed 
in Australia in 1995 (Hopkin 2014a). Other countries, national standards bodies, and 
government agencies around the world followed (Hopkin 2014a). However, 
Australian standards have been long respected and widely recognised. It was the 
AS/NZS 4360:2004 that acted as the first draft of the international risk management 
standard and resulted in the ISO 31000:2009 (Standards Australia 2009).  
 
The AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009 is a generic guide for managing risk which can be utilised 
by both public and private enterprise. It is an international standard that is not 
specific to any industry or sector (Leitch 2010). The AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009 (Standards 
Australia 2009, p. iv) provides a systematic and logical process and describes the 
“relationship between the principles of managing risk, the framework in which it 
occurs and the risk management process” (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Relationships between risk management principles, framework and 
process 
 
Source: Standards Australia (2009). 
 
The AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009 is a risk management framework that can provide the 
foundation for designing, implementing, monitoring, reviewing and continually 
improving insider threat management throughout an organisation. Within the 
framework, risk management is covered by (1) implementing the framework for 
managing risk, and (2) implementing the risk management process (Standards 
Australia 2009). Of particular interest in this thesis is the risk management process 
and specifically the risk assessment component (that is, identification, assessment, 
and evaluation of insider threat). The risk management process as defined in the 
AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009 is a seven step process (see Figure 7 below).  
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Figure 7: Risk Management Process 
 
Source: Standards Australia (2009). 
 
The AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 (Standards Australia 2009, p. 3) defines the risk 
management process as a “systematic application of management policies, 
procedures and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting, establishing 
the context, and identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and 
reviewing risk”. Risk assessment is defined as the overall process of risk identification, 
risk analysis and risk evaluation (Standards Australia 2009, p. 4). The risk assessment 
component has not changed significantly to that presented over 40 years ago where 
the elements of risk assessment included risk identification, risk estimation, and risk 
evaluation (Rowe 1977).  Hopkin (2014a) suggests that it can be argued that the risk 
management process of the AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009 contains elements of the risk 
management framework along with the key stages of the risk management process. 
 
2.4.5 Risk Management and Insider Threat 
As has already been described in the previous chapter there are limitations to the 
study of insider threat. Catrantzos (2012) explains that insider threat is heavily 
represented by cyber research and technological approaches. The representation of 
other disciplines is growing with influence from information management, 
organisational behaviour, and risk management. The diversity in approach to the 
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study of insider threat has resulted in multiple and distinct perspectives with a lack 
of an underlying systematic framework (Liang & Biros 2016). There appears to be a 
fundamental lack of an underpinning multidisciplinary framework to guide insider 
threat research, application, and delivery. As described in the previous chapter, there 
are models and frameworks to guide research in specific disciplines, with those that 
have a specific emphasis on organisational factors described in more detail, there is 
no commonly accepted risk management framework or policy to manage the risk of 
insider threat (Hunker & Probst 2011). 
 
It is understood that insider threat is a complex issue and as such should sit within a 
multidisciplinary context rather than depend on a single discipline of study. In finding 
a multidisciplinary approach it was discovered that the risk field is “strongly 
multidisciplinary, thus involving many communities of scientists and practitioners” 
(Aven & Zio 2014, p. 1170). A full and comprehensive risk process which promotes 
best practice fits within the broader risk management framework. This is consistent 
with conclusions by Theoharidou et al. (2005) that insider threat mitigation can 
benefit from a multiparadigm and multidisciplinary approach. And Shaw and Stock 
(2011) that risk assessment (a component of risk management methodology) is best 
made by a multidisciplinary team. 
 
In September 2016 a search for “insider threat and risk management” on the USQ 
library search function revealed fewer than 11,500 peer-reviewed journal articles. 
Not surprisingly many of these were related to technical solutions and cyber security. 
There was a distinct lack of integration of risk management principles in the study of 
insider threat; rather the two terms appeared in the literature often separately in an 
unrelated sense. At the same time, a more specific search on “insider threat” and 
“risk management” produced only 136 journal articles. Consistently many of these 
publications failed to discuss in any great detail the relationship between insider 
threat and the risk management process or the importance of the nexus between the 
two. In fact in the library database there were a very limited number of publications 
that directly focused on risk management as an underlying framework or 
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multidisciplinary approach to better understand insider threat and apply mitigation 
strategies.  
 
Perhaps the limited focus on an integrated study of insider threat relates to the 
greater investment that organisations make in protecting themselves from external, 
rather than internal, attacks. Gelles (2016) indicates that it is common for 
organisations to deprioritise investment in an insider threat mitigation program 
reasoning that insider attacks are less common than external attacks. Even though it 
has been argued that the insider can, through exploiting their knowledge and 
abilities, cause more damage than an external adversary (Bishop et al. 2010). In 
addition, the ability of an organisation to manage risk in the workplace is related to 
insider threat behaviour (Gelles 2016). 
 
Positioning insider threat within a risk management framework, though not a unique 
contribution, is not well explored in the literature. As expressed by Cho and Lee 
(2016, p. 405) although there are few studies integrating risk measurement and 
insider threat, “[t]he insider problem can be approached in terms of risk 
management”. In the limited publications positioning insider threat within a risk 
management framework, the majority are from overseas hardly any specific to 
Australia. Two relevant and widely referenced overseas publications which 
specifically focus on insider threat and risk management methodology provides 
direction for organisations to assess, protect, respond and recover from employee 
risk (CPNI & PA Consulting Group 2012) and focus on how to prevent, detect, and 
respond to various information technology crimes (Cappelli et al. 2012). 
 
Within Australia there appears to be only one publication that specifically addresses 
insider threat in the risk management context. The Protective Security Policy 
Framework (PSPF, Protective Security Policy Section Attorney-General’s Department 
2010, p. 12) mandates Australian Government to “adopt a risk management 
approach to cover all areas of protective security activity across their organisation, in 
accordance with the Australian Standard for Risk Management AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009 and the Australian Standards HB 167:2006 Security Risk Management”.   
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However, there is no such guidance or mandate for private and Not-for-Profit 
enterprises. Gelles (2016, p. 1) suggests that this lack of mandating makes it difficult 
for non-government agencies “to assess where they stand relative to peers and to 
make decisions regarding their insider threat mitigation capabilities”. The PSPF 
focuses on protecting people, information, and assets. It provides coverage for 
managing the insider threat and people of security concern (Attorney General's 
Department 2016).  
 
Applying risk management standards to the study of insider threat allows for a 
consistent approach which can help to systematically dissect insider threat. It may 
also work to provide organisations with a consistent language in addressing insider 
threat. Risk management standards provide organisations the ability to meaningfully 
determine what can happen, how often it is likely to happen, and with what 
consequences (Luko 2013). Gelles (2016) explains that whilst many organisations 
have an enterprise risk management strategy, few address insider threat. The 
Intelligence and National Security Alliance (2013) reports that 25-50% of the surveyed 
organisations have formal insider threat programs. This low rate of insider threat 
program uptake is a concern given that successful prevention and/or mitigation of 
insider threat relies on organisations addressing their vulnerabilities as part of their 
enterprise risk management strategy (Gelles 2016; Intelligence and National Security 
Alliance 2013; Stafford et al. 2018).  
 
2.4.6 Risk Management Standards and Insider Threat 
Colwill (2010) reports that a proactive approach to insider threat, that includes 
assessment, prioritisation, and action, is required.  He notes that while organisations 
are coming to accept the risk of insider attack they are not in a position to effectively 
identify, measure, monitor, assess or quantify their risk level. The argument of this 
thesis is that in order to prevent, detect, deter, and mitigate insider threat, a holistic 
framework is relevant. It is not the intention that the risk management framework 
should replace all existing models, but that it complements other models and 
provides the relevant multidisciplinary focus.  
                                                P a g e  | 52 
 
The Risk Management Standard – AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 - can be applied to the 
study and practice of insider threat. The Australian Government requires an approach 
to manage insider threat that is consistent with the AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 
guidelines, however, as previously mentioned this is not enforced by non-
government entities. Despite some objections and concerns regarding the AS/NZ ISO 
31000:2009 (see Leitch 2010) an insider threat risk management approach that is 
based on the Australian Standard is considered, by the Australian Government, as 
integral to organisational processes and may be enhanced by the additional focus on 
security risk management. 
 
2.4.7 Security Risk Management and Insider Threat 
When applying risk management to insider threat the Handbook of Security Risk 
Management (HB 167:2006; Standards Australia 2006, p. 3) provides additional 
support through guidance on “fundamental assessment, control and treatment 
processes”. The HB 167:2006 is a broad approach that covers the critical elements to 
be covered in a security risk management process as provided in Figure 7. The 
structure of the security risk management process is further elaborated in Table 1. 
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Table 1: The structure of security risk management. 
Communicate and 
consult 
communicating and consulting with internal and external stakeholders 
within each of the security risk management stages 
Establish the context the external context,  
the internal context,  
the security risk management context,  
structuring the security risk management activities,  
developing evaluation criteria 
Identify risks determining the threats,  
identifying critical organisational and community elements under threat  
determining the vulnerability of those elements to the threats identified,  
identifying specific events and scenarios that might affect individuals, 
organisations, or communities, and their possible consequence 
Analyse risks evaluating existing controls (security and emergency systems),   
determining the consequence should the risk eventuate,  
determining the likelihood of such a risk with that consequence occurring,  
defining a level of risk based on a combination of consequence and 
likelihood 
Evaluate risks determining the tolerance to individual risks,  
evaluating the need for any further treatment of those risks 
Treat risks developing recommendations and strategies for the treatment of priority 
risks,  
assigning accountabilities, responsibilities and budget for risk treatment 
activities 
Monitor and review monitoring of the external and internal security environments to detect 
change,  
review of the risks and their treatment strategies,  
monitoring and reviewing progress and outcomes of each of the steps of 
the process. 
Source: Standards Australia (2006). 
 
2.4.8 Applying Risk Management Process to Insider Threat 
Colwill (2010) reports that organisations have started accepting the risk of insider 
attack but are not in a position to effectively identify, measure, monitor, assess or 
quantify their risk level. The risk management process (see 2.2.4, and Figure 7), along 
with guidance from the security risk management process (see 2.2.7 and Table 1), 
can be applied to insider threat and help to address this limitation.  By systematically 
and logically applying the risk management methodology discussed above, 
organisations can effectively and efficiently identify and begin to manage the risk of 
insider threat.  
 
Using the risk management process provides a standardised approach to 
identification, assessment, and evaluation of insider threat. A standardised approach 
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allows for comparisons within and across organisations, enhances shared 
understanding and facilitates decision making and judgment (Homeland Security 
2011).  
 
The use of a risk-based approach to insider threat may also assist to justify an 
organisation’s investment in an insider threat program. It is understood that standard 
risk management principles offer broad guidance to effectively address insider 
threat. However, tailoring risk management principles to the specific needs of an 
organisation creates the most benefit (Homeland Security 2011).  
 
To date, it appears there is limited literature that has explicitly expressed insider 
threat through use of risk management process as defined by the Australian 
Standards (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009). This is a unique contribution made by the 
current thesis. Section 2.2.8.1 through 2.2.8.3 discusses the seven-step risk 
management process. The discussion allows the reader to understand the current 
literature on insider threat and how it can be applied to or support risk management 
methodology. Whilst all components of the risk management process are explored, 
particular attention is given to the risk assessment section (see Figure 7 and Table 1). 
The risk assessment process underpins the current research providing the 
importance of the utility of assessment of organisational vulnerability to insider 
threat.  
 
2.4.8.1 Communicate and consult 
Communication and consultation with all stakeholders, internal and external, is the 
first stage and an important consideration in combatting insider threat. During this 
stage, issues relating to insider threat risk, its causes, its consequences and any 
measures currently in place to mitigate insider threat, should be addressed. By 
adapting the AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 (Standards Australia 2009) and relating it 
specifically to insider threat the following objectives may be achieved: 
• Ensuring that interests of all stakeholders are understood and considered; 
• Ensuring that insider threat risks are adequately identified; 
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• Bringing together a multidisciplinary team of experts to analyse insider threat 
risks; 
• Allowing different views to be considered when defining insider threat risk 
criteria and evaluating insider threat risks; and 
• Securing endorsement and support for an insider threat program. 
 
The HB 167:2006 (Standards Australia 2006, p. 16) states that ensuring the 
participation and commitment of senior management is a “fundamental 
requirement” in the success of any risk management program. Such a commitment 
is essential to an insider threat program as it will result in outcomes for which 
management will be responsible, including time, costs, and resources. Support and 
commitment of management to risk management also provides a consistent message 
on the priority (Clarke & Varma 1999; Dionne 2013; Standards Australia 2006) of 
insider threat management and can also affect organisational culture.  
 
Hu et al. (2012) determined that management participation in information security 
initiatives positively influences organisational culture, employee attitude, and 
compliance with security. Insider threat programs are not able to succeed if 
executives are not fully engaged in the program (Intelligence and National Security 
Alliance 2013; Sarkar 2010).  
 
In addition, engagement and participation of staff can help to further integrate 
insider threat management into the organisation (Standards Australia 2006). 
Research outcomes suggest that networks of insider threat actors are often aware of 
insider threat activity (Randazzo et al. 2005; Shaw & Stock 2011). As such employees 
are a strong alliance to an insider threat program and implementation of strategies 
such as confidential reporting can increase organisational awareness of suspicious 
incidents (Intelligence and National Security Alliance 2013). Staff can contribute 
across stages including the identification and assessment of risk as well as participate 
in risk treatment arrangements (Standards Australia 2006).  
 
                                                P a g e  | 56 
 
Building strong partnerships internally is key to an effective insider threat 
management program (Intelligence and National Security Alliance 2013).Engagement 
of staff can facilitate the transfer and communication of risk information within the 
organization. Improving employee awareness through training, security awareness 
programs and communication (Alavi et al. 2014) and ensuring employees know how 
to report suspicious behaviour are recommended as insider threat risk management 
strategies (Farahmand & Spafford 2013; Randazzo et al. 2005). Involving staff in the 
various layers of the risk management process, including design and implementation 
of insider threat controls, is encouraged (Theoharidou et al. 2005).  
 
As described in Chapter 1, the definition of an insider includes any person with 
knowledge and access. Therefore, in the communication and consulting phase, 
external stakeholders, vendors, and suppliers should be included. External 
communication is considered integral to effective risk management by Homeland 
Security (2011). The Standards Australia (2006) recommends that a security risk 
management approach that includes such stakeholders can benefit the organisation 
through developing partnerships, building shared understanding, gaining additional 
perspectives, and understanding how an insider threat program may affect 
stakeholders. Research has also found that satisfactory collaboration and 
communication may play a role in insider threat prevention. If insider threat experts 
can learn from incident response research, then collaboration is important to obtain 
knowledge, rely on stakeholder notification of threats, and verify actual threats 
(Werlinger et al. 2010). 
 
2.4.8.2 Establish the context 
The context in which an organisation operates will determine its objectives, 
parameters and scope with relation to insider threat. Not all organisations operate 
within the same context and that is why establishing the context is one of the most 
important activities in developing any security risk management process (Standards 
Australia 2006). The AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 (Standards Australia 2009, p. 3) 
describes establishing the context as “defining the external and internal parameters 
to be taken into account when managing risk”. Establishing the context requires 
                                                P a g e  | 57 
 
taking into consideration the type of organisation, its relationship to other 
organisations, and organisational culture. It involves a review of the external and 
internal environment in which the organisation operates and seeks to achieve its 
objectives (Standards Australia 2009). Further the establishment of the objectives, 
strategies, and scope of the process is determined (i.e. establishing the context of the 
risk management process). In addition defining risk criteria in terms of evaluating the 
significance of risk is undertaken (Standards Australia 2009). Information gathering 
can involve interviews, questionnaires, document reviews, and use of other 
monitoring tools (Sarkar 2010). 
 
As HB 167:2006 (Standards Australia 2006) expresses, the risk management process 
describes the external context, internal context, and risk management context 
separately, however, the utility of such a distinction is not necessary. In practice, all 
three tiers relate to each other, will inform the other, and will influence insider threat 
risk management. In order to represent the literature on insider threat, each of the 
contexts has been separated out below, keeping in mind that the danger of doing so 
in practice may underrepresent the interdependencies and interfaces between the 
contexts (Standards Australia 2006). 
 
External context 
AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009  (Standards Australia 2009, p. 15) defines the external 
context as “the external environment in which the organization seeks to achieve its 
objectives”. It is an important step in determining how the external environment can 
affect the way an organisation does business (Standards Australia 2006). A consistent 
monitoring process allows organisations to be aware of all the risks they face (Clarke 
& Varma 1999). When considering the external context in relation to insider threat 
there are three main shifts that occur; (1) heightened political attention, (2) 
introduction and continued development of technology, and (3) the growing 
consideration of legal/ethical understanding.  
 
Policy requirements have altered the state of insider threat management. 
Organisations, certainly within government, across the world are expected to 
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implement relevant and necessary insider threat controls and develop a greater level 
of security consciousness (Sarkar 2010). For example, in the USA the National Insider 
Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, 
directs government departments and agencies to establish insider threat programs 
with emphasis on risk management principles of deter, detect, and mitigate. As has 
previously been discussed the Australian Government also mandates government 
entities, through the PSPF, to adopt a risk management approach to insider threat.  
 
In his book on insider threat, Gelles (2016) discusses how insider threat has been 
changed by the introduction of information technology. He argues that insider threat 
activity is significantly enhanced by technology and that traditional methods of 
countermeasure, namely physical security, are no longer effective. Gelles suggests 
that the external context has changed – destructive behaviour is more easily 
performed and societal norms have shifted. However, the threat of insider behaviour 
remains. Further, from a technology perspective the proliferation of the Internet of 
Things (IoT) – increasing the connectivity of everyday devices - is challenging 
organisations to consider new insider threat attack vectors (Choo et al. 2018; Nurse 
et al. 2015).  
 
Finally, a discussion of the external context and insider threat is not complete without 
consideration of the legal and regulatory environment. As discussed in the previous 
chapter challenges in addressing insider threat relate to ethical and legal 
considerations regarding the use of employee information. Whilst organisational 
data may be an appropriate way to address insider threat concerns, use of specific 
employee information is likely to be inappropriate and perhaps illegal. There is a 
requirement to balance the protection of employee privacy against organisational 
insider threat protection (Gelles 2016). Unfortunately, current guidance is limited by 
a lack of research and applied focus on legal and ethical implications. Further legal 
responses have been described as “confusing” (Ford et al. 2015). Legal, ethical and 
privacy related questions are being raised and some researchers have begun to 
explore these topics further (Carpenter et al. 2018; Greitzer et al. 2009; Hunker & 
Probst 2011; Huth 2013; Nurse et al. 2014b; Reid 2018; Williams 2008). Certainly the 
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discussion is made more difficult by the variation in legal frameworks across 
countries. A review of Australian law and insider threat is outside the scope of this 
thesis. However, to date, there does not appear to be easily identifiable legal advice 
or substantial commentary in relation to legal, ethical, and privacy issues as it relates 
to insider threat in Australia.  
 
Internal context 
Each organisation will have a different internal context to consider. It is important 
that an organisation’s culture, processes, structure and strategy are considered when 
establishing the internal context (Standards Australia 2009) of an insider threat risk 
management process. In the insider threat literature there are many case studies and 
sector specific research that can contribute to understanding insider threat in terms 
of the internal context and risk management. As a result there is a growing body of 
literature determining how organisational culture, including security culture, 
contributes to (or mitigates) insider threat.  
 
For example, research into the banking and finance sector by Randazzo et al. (2005) 
found that 15% of insider attacks were motivated by dissatisfaction with company 
management, culture, and policies. An Australian study by Parsons et al. (2015) also 
found that improving security culture can lead to positive employee behaviour. In 
reviewing the literature Renaud and Goucher (2014) found that security culture is 
tied with security behaviour. However, empirical research is limited and future 
longitudinal studies are needed to assist understanding the effect of implementing 
and fostering security cultures.  
 
Location of business sites is an area that is explored under the internal context 
(Standards Australia 2006). It is important to note that while work-life balance and 
employee engagement practices promote flexible work arrangements, including 
working from home; this can raise insider threat risk. Randazzo et al. (2005) found 
that remote access is a source of vulnerability and that strategies to lower risk should 
be employed such as layered security, access only to non-critical data, and closer 
logging and auditing of remote transactions. Sarkar (2010) states that organisations 
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that outsource operations need to be alert to differences in culture, values, and 
serviceability that may affect insider threat and its assessment.  
 
Insider threat risk management context 
Organisations need to understand what they are trying to achieve from applying an 
insider threat risk management process. Therefore, it is important that “objectives, 
strategies, scope and parameters” are established (Standards Australia 2009, p. 16). 
Successful insider threat management must move beyond the concept of ‘one size 
fits all’ and look directly at bespoke strategies and organisational circumstance 
(Borrett et al. 2013). 
 
Defining insider threat is an important consideration here. It is thought that few 
organisations have an operationalised definition of insider threat, without which an 
insider threat program cannot be fully formulated (Gelles 2016). As discussed in the 
previous chapter there are many definitions of insider threat and organisations 
should work to use (or develop) one that best fits their specific risks and 
circumstance.  
 
After defining insider threat organisations are better placed to understand their 
objectives, scope of interest, and any parameters of the insider threat risk 
management approach and determine who is responsible for risk management in the 
organisation. Also, who is accountable and what resources are to be deployed 
(Standards Australia 2006). Gelles (2016) recognises the importance of determining 
not only who is accountable but also the cross-functional key stakeholders who are 
responsible for implementing risk mitigation measures.  
 
Organisations must also understand their tolerance to risk. Understanding the risk 
tolerance of the organisation, as well as key stakeholders, will provide direction to 
the insider threat program. What level of risk is the organisation willing to accept 
when it comes to insider threat? What are the critical assets it is protecting? And, 
how can the organisation balance security and efficiency (Gelles 2016)? Responses to 
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these questions will help determine which insider threat management tools and 
approaches will be utilised (Standards Australia 2006). 
 
Defining risk criteria 
The way insider threat risk is evaluated should be considered during stage one, 
establishing the context. Criteria to be used in the evaluation of the significance of 
insider threat risk are established during this stage and should “reflect the 
organizations values, objectives and resource” (Standards Australia 2009, p. 17). It 
should also be consistent with the organisations broader risk management policy. 
Generally risk criteria cover consequence, likelihood, measurement, and treatment 
(Standards Australia 2006, 2009).  
 
2.4.9 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is defined as “the overall process of risk identification, risk analysis 
and risk evaluation” (Standards Australia 2009, p. 17). According to Rowe (1977) 
formal assessment of risk is not only possible but something that should be pursued. 
Risk assessment is the third stage and an integral component of insider threat 
management. Insider threat assessment should incorporate technical, people, and 
organisational vulnerabilities (Sarkar 2010). Bishop et al. (2010) indicate that insider 
threat assessment should include an appreciation of who has the capability to attack 
but also who is likely to attack. However, this is difficult to measure and has been 
indicated as a limitation of insider threat research, application and management by 
a number of authors (Hunker & Probst 2011; Sarkar 2010).  
 
Organisations perform basic tasks through the lifecycle of employment. It is during 
these interactions that organisations can mitigate or magnify insider threat 
behaviour, but also “act to prevent, deter, detect, and manage insider threat risk”.  
with Shaw et al. (2009, p. 4). For example, both work overload and perceived invasion 
of privacy can result in employee stress. However, organisations may be able to 
mitigate these stressors through improving attitude towards compliance with 
information security policy and increasing staff security knowledge (Lee et al. 2016). 
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Webb et al. (2014b) noted, that with regard to information security risk management, 
opportunities are being missed due to perfunctory and occasional risk assessment.  
Flowerday and Tuyikeze (2016) found that when it comes to security information 
policy, the risk assessment stage is the most important in identifying threats and 
vulnerabilities.   
 
Previous research suggests that insider threat is misperceived due to limited 
measurement tools and that a good assessment methodology may advance insider 
threat assessment and focus (Chinchani et al. 2005). Hence the utility of developing 
an insider threat assessment inventory focused on organisational vulnerability.  
It is the risk assessment stage of the risk management process that is directly relevant 
to the current research. A diagnostic inventory is being developed to assist 
organisations to understand their own potential insider threat vulnerabilities. The 
inventory will assist organisations to identify areas of vulnerability, gain a baseline 
assessment of potential insider threat risk, and provide information to evaluate 
whether to treat identified insider threat risks.  
 
2.4.9.1 Identify risk 
A thorough exploration of potential insider threat risk is undertaken during the risk 
assessment stage of the risk management process. According to the ISO Standards 
Australia (2009, p. 17) identifying risk includes identification of “sources of risk, areas 
of impacts, events … and their causes and their potential consequences”. Use of up-
to-date information and involvement of subject matter experts can help identify risks 
(Standards Australia 2009). It is also recommended that identification of threats is an 
on-going process due to the dynamic nature of threat agents (Sarkar 2010). 
 
The HB 167:2006 (Standards Australia 2006) describes that the interaction between 
a threat and something or someone else, creates risk. Applied to insider threat it is 
the ‘insiders’ interaction with someone or something (organisational structure, 
supervisor, culture, personal stress, etc.) that causes an event (theft of IP, fraudulent 
transactions, etc.) and results in consequences (disruption to organisation services, 
investment losses, etc.).  
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This interplay can be demonstrated by the critical pathway approach described in an 
earlier chapter (see section 4.5.1). The model (Figure 1) portrays how personal 
predispositions and stressors can affect judgment and reliability leading to 
concerning behaviours. If these behaviours are met with maladaptive organisational 
response then a hostile event is more likely.  
 
The identification of risks can be determined through a variety of data and 
information sources, including organisational loss and incident data, employee 
satisfaction surveys, IT specific data, and exit interviews. A broad approach to 
identifying risks should be undertaken and include the viewpoints of varied 
stakeholders (both experts and staff). The team must be able to assess, challenge, 
integrate, and progress insights obtained from these stakeholders (Aven & Zio 2014). 
The potential sources of risk in the HB 167:2006 (Standards Australia 2006) that 
appear most relevant to insider threat include people, technology, strategy, 
leadership, stakeholder management, processes, and competition. When 
considering intentional insider threat the threat type is malicious. A malicious threat 
is one that includes, among others, sabotage and unauthorised disclosure. It is 
“usually a specific direct attack on the targeted organisation and is often motivated 
by revenge, fame, association or challenge” (Standards Australia 2006, p. 53). As 
explained earlier very few organisations have a working definition of insider threat, 
even though it is an important first step to mitigating risk.  
 
Threat can be understood in terms of intent (motivation) and capability, with some 
also including opportunity (Sarkar 2010; Standards Australia 2006; Theoharidou et al. 
2005). Rowe (1977) discusses motivation, in terms of risk, as being the avoidance of 
an undesirable state or the pursuit of a desired position.  It is not surprising therefore 
to find research in the insider threat space on intent/motivation and capability (skills, 
knowledge, access; see previous chapter). As Nurse et al. (2014a, p. 226) write 
“[f]oundational work in risk management suggests that if an individual has motive, 
capability and opportunity, then they are likely to conduct an [insider] attack”.  
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Still, the likelihood of an insider threat is difficult to determine as there is a large 
degree of uncertainty around occurrence. Some authors argue that assessment of 
likelihood is flawed (Funston & Wagner 2010) and in the case of intentional insider 
behaviour, offenders are likely to adapt their tactics in response to controls and 
countermeasures. Several researchers raise concerns regarding the limitations posed 
by underreporting (Randazzo et al. 2005) and the lack of real (not anecdotal) data 
(Hunker & Probst 2011). Limited reporting of insider threat is not necessarily confined 
to incidences and events but organisations also demonstrate a reluctance to discuss 
their own specific insider threat programs (Intelligence and National Security Alliance 
2013). 
 
There remains debate as to whether current prevention and detection responses are 
effective in reducing the insider threat (Hunker & Probst 2011) or whether they are 
generally an inconvenience (Chinchani et al. 2005). Regardless, identifying potential 
vulnerabilities using risk assessment and implementing relevant countermeasures is 
recognised as a necessary organisational activity (Sarkar 2010). Mitigation strategies 
and countermeasures can reduce the likelihood of a successful insider threat event 
when applied appropriately. Merely the presence of a security measure or an 
enforced policy can lead to deterrence of insider threat behaviour (Chinchani et al. 
2005). 
 
In order to mitigate threats organisations can introduce controls that can reduce the 
likelihood of occurrence (Baracaldo & Joshi 2013). Research consistently 
demonstrates that a greater likelihood of detection and consequence reduces the 
attractiveness of insider threat activity. For best outcomes, controls are encouraged 
to be customised to the organisational needs (Vaidyanathan & Berhanu 2012). Such 
tools may be technical or non-technical (Borrett et al. 2013) and include data leak 
prevention systems (Epifantsev et al. 2016), auditing and monitoring (Bishop et al. 
2010; Hunker & Probst 2011; Randazzo et al. 2005; Sarkar 2010; Stafford et al. 2018), 
role based access control and separation of duties (Baracaldo & Joshi 2013; Dorminey 
et al. 2012; Hunker & Probst 2011; Randazzo et al. 2005; Sarkar 2010; Theoharidou 
et al. 2005), pre-employment screening (Chinchani et al. 2005; Randazzo et al. 2005; 
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Shaw & Stock 2011; Theoharidou et al. 2005), active education and training regarding 
policies (Randazzo et al. 2005; Shaw & Fischer 2005; Theoharidou et al. 2005), 
security awareness programs (Chinchani et al. 2005; Randazzo et al. 2005; Sarkar 
2010; Shaw & Stock 2011), and whistle-blower hotlines and protections (Dorminey et 
al. 2012) among others.  
 
The usefulness of up-to-date, relevant, and enforced organisational policies should 
not be discounted. As Randazzo et al. (2005, p. 10) indicate, based on their research 
in the financial sector, “inadequate or non-existent practices, policies, and 
procedures” are often exploited. In addition, Vaidyanathan and Berhanu (2012) 
emphasise the importance of organisations sharpening their security policies to 
ensure a successful security program. Further, Zafar et al. (2014) conducted a case 
study looking at security risk management in healthcare and discovered that a risk 
management program can be rendered ineffective if not all employees are fully 
committed and aware of risk management policies.  
 
It must be acknowledged that even the most sophisticated insider threat controls 
may be seen as a challenge by some insiders who will not be deterred (Theoharidou 
et al. 2005). There is a growing acceptance that not all risks, including insider threat 
risks, can be easily identified or understood (Funston & Wagner 2010); Hence the 
importance of a multifaceted approach to insider threat and its management.  
 
An organisation’s ability to respond to insider threat can be improved by incident 
management capability. According to Funston and Wagner (2010) efficiency and 
effectiveness of an organisation’s recovery is directly related to its crisis response 
capability. That is why embedding insider threat management within risk 
management is of importance. It allows consideration of existing controls such as 
critical incident management capability and security planning and response 
capability. The existence of crisis management is suggested by Rowe (1977) to 
directly and positively influence a group’s ability to deal with negative events. 
Organisational resilience may also be positively affected by such capabilities. In 
practice less than half of the organisations surveyed by the Intelligence and National 
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Security Alliance (INSA) indicated having formal incident management plans 
(Intelligence and National Security Alliance 2013). The INSA (2013) described that a 
formal insider threat mitigation program should have authority to conduct 
investigations and enquiries.  
 
Understanding vulnerability is an important component of the current study. 
Assessing an organisations vulnerability level provides organisations with an 
understanding of strengths and weaknesses when it comes to existing controls. It also 
provides a focus for future development of countermeasures and mitigations that 
can be put in place to further protect the organisation. Hence, the aim is to elucidate 
the effectiveness of controls against insider threat risk by determining an 
organisations ability to deter, delay, detect, respond, and recover from an insider 
attack. Insider threat control elements (adapted from Standards Australia 2006) may 
include: 
 Deter: bag checks, security awareness training, codes of conduct, vetting, 
physical and procedural security controls 
 Delay: physical barriers, password protection, biometrics/iris scanners 
 Detect: CCTV, automated IT programs, database mining, staff vigilance, 
security awareness 
 Respond: security breach response, organisational intervention – noting that 
organisational response can both magnify and mitigate risk 
 Recover: Provision of employee assistance programs, repair/rework, staff 
training, and an insider threat management plan. 
 
2.4.9.2 Analyse risk 
Risk analysis is part of stage three of the risk assessment process that allows a greater 
understanding of the risks (Standards Australia 2009). This is an important stage given 
the correct analysis and understanding of causes of risks is a highly valuable position 
providing a sound foundation for successful risk management (Paté-Cornell & Cox 
2014). With respect to insider threat the risk analysis stage is a consideration of the 
causes of insider threat, the consequences of an insider threat attack (e.g. financial 
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loss, damage to reputation, loss of IP), and how likely a consequence is to occur. It 
also allows organisations to determine which risks need focusing on.  
Bishop et al. (2010) describe there are too many possibilities of insider threat risk and 
organisations need to find a way to prioritise their focus. Use of risk rankings is one 
way to achieve this, recognising the potential issues of quantitative and qualitative 
ranking systems (see Rozell 2015). Managerial review and judgement may also be 
required in order to make decisions on any data available (Aven 2013).  
 
It is, however, argued that in the case of intentional insider threat, where by 
definition the offence is undertaken in a veil of secrecy, a full risk analysis may not be 
possible. Not all intentional insider risks are foreseeable to an organisation and hence 
difficult to analyse and to fully understand their consequences. Intentional insider 
threat analysis is a challenging function as many risks are likely to be a low occurrence 
but with potentially high consequence (Chinchani et al. 2005; Lundberg & Willis 
2015). Some industries and sectors face a greater risk level as the victim of insider 
threat and receive heightened attention, for example, banking and finance, 
information and telecommunications, energy and transport (Australian Cyber 
Security Centre 2015; KPMG 2012; Randazzo et al. 2005). 
 
In the literature, insider threat reportedly occurs at a low rate compared to external 
threats, however, the consequences of an insider threat event can be more 
deleterious (Schultz 2002). For example the actions by Aldrich Aimes and Robert 
Hansson (two well-known betrayers of their Government) demonstrate that insider 
threat actions can have significant consequences, including the loss of lives (Shaw & 
Sellers 2015).  
 
Risk analysis allows organisations to better understand the controls already in place 
including their “effectiveness and efficiency” (Standards Australia 2009).  Appropriate 
selection and enforcement of controls can provide protection against insider threat. 
For example, Bishop et al. (2010) discuss how abuse of computer systems and 
information can be prevented with properly specified security policies.  
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Still, there are flaws even when controls, such as security policies, are in place. For 
example, gaps that exist within or between policies, rigidity of security systems, 
security practice which can be different to security policy, and the imprecision of 
detection mechanisms. Further, Flowerday and Tuyikeze (2016) found in their 
research that poorly thought-out, incomplete, irrelevant and redundant policies are 
not supported by employees and relevant users. Results of an Australian study found 
that employee knowledge of policy and procedures influences their attitude. Hence 
improving employee knowledge, expectations, and understanding is positively 
related with compliance to policy and procedures (Parsons et al. 2014). 
 
Hunker and Probst (2011) also discuss that policy language needs consideration and 
should be chosen to match the organisation and its needs. They explain that when it 
comes to insider threat, best policy should (1) regulate some part of the organisations 
workflow, and (2) monitor and enforce important aspects of the organisation and the 
insider threat policy. From a socio-technical perspective policy should set boundaries 
for behaviour that are permissible and not-permissible. Building effective policies and 
ensuring these are periodically reviewed, are compliant, and legally upstanding 
provides organisations one way to prevent misconduct (Ford et al. 2015).  
 
Another outcome of this stage is for organisations to better understand their level of 
vulnerability to insider threats. Insider threat may be a low likelihood event for some 
organisations, it appears to be a growing concern especially since the introduction of 
computers. Trends in social networking, cloud computing, and businesses offering 
‘bring your own devices’ (Webb et al. 2014a) as well as the Internet of Things (Nurse 
et al. 2015) are presenting new avenues for insider threat. 
 
In undertaking this stage a business case can be developed regarding the value of 
protection against insider threats and whether increasing or decreasing resource 
input is required. When it comes to insider threat, Shaw and Stock (2011, p. 26) 
suggest that organisations understand if they are at greater risk due to “remote 
offices, suppliers, or subcontractors where differences in cultures, policies, or 
language could lead to potential conflicts”. Clarke and Varma (1999) note that while 
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greater opportunities are available from engaging with suppliers and customers 
around the world, it comes with the need for increased risk consideration. 
 
The measurement of risk, as it applies to insider threat, can be difficult. As already 
discussed insider threats are rare events, that are attempted to be concealed, and 
not all insider threats can be identified. Still, the importance of considering 
organisational factors in addressing insider threat is considered one way to increase 
sophistication of risk measurement (Cho & Lee 2016), assessment (Shaw & Stock 
2011) and management. By developing a diagnostic organisational assessment tool, 
which is the aim of the current study, a broad understanding of controls can be 
established by organisations. The inventory will allow organisations to easily measure 
identified organisational vulnerabilities based on literature review and expert 
opinion. The inventory will not be a measure of the likelihood and consequence of 
insider threat and associated risks (as this is an organisationally specific undertaking 
and may have minimal utility under a risk intelligent approach for likelihood). The 
value of the tool will be in how it is applied through a risk management process where 
outputs can be tailored to specific organisational needs. Organisations that have not 
included insider threat as part of their risk management will at least have some level 
of understanding of their vulnerabilities and strengths when it comes to insider threat 
through implementation of the organisational vulnerability inventory. 
 
2.4.9.3 Evaluate risk 
Risk evaluation as described by the Australian Standards assists decision making by 
identifying those risks that require treatment and the priority that should be assigned 
to treat each risk (Standards Australia 2009). Risk evaluation is related to an 
organisations risk attitude/tolerance (as discussed above) but should also be made 
with consideration of any “legal, regulatory and other requirements” (Standards 
Australia 2009, p. 18). The outcome of an evaluation may result in a decision: that a 
risk is tolerable; that treatment is not required; to maintain existing controls; to 
improve/implement further controls; and/or to complete further analysis (Standards 
Australia 2006, 2009). In describing a risk intelligent organisation, Funston and 
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Wagner (2010) also identify that risks can be exploited, creating value and 
opportunity for organisations.  
 
Within insider threat consideration also needs to be given to whether proactive 
mitigation can be viewed as excessive and invasive by employees and inadvertently 
lead to greater risk (Hunker & Probst 2011). Or alternatively whether inaction and 
lack of attention could increase insider threat activity (Hunker & Probst 2011; Shaw 
& Sellers 2015; Shaw & Stock 2011). 
 
2.4.9.4 Treat risk 
Rowe (1977) suggested that technology development aided the control of risk but 
also created new risk. Whilst he was not talking specifically about insider threat he 
recognised how technology could increase risk to individuals and organisations. He 
had the foresight to acknowledge the potential for technology misuse and the 
constraints in our capacity to control such misuse. Rowe (1977) began the discussion 
and emphasis on the nexus between technology and risk management. Forty years 
later his sentiments remain relevant and there has been some effort to begin 
research and more direct focus on controlling technological risk associated with 
insider threat.  
 
Noting that removal of all forms of insider risk is not possible, organisations must 
decide on what controls are modified or implemented in order to manage risk (Paté-
Cornell & Cox 2014; Standards Australia 2006). The AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009 (Standards 
Australia 2009, p. 19) describes the treatment of risks as a cyclical process of 
assessing a risk treatment, deciding on the tolerability of residual risk levels, 
considering new risk treatments where tolerability is assessed as low, and cycling 
back to assessing the effectiveness of the new treatment.  
 
Risk treatment options vary and selection of the most appropriate risk treatment will 
require a cost benefit analysis (Khan & Khan 2014; Standards Australia 2006). As 
discussed by Lundberg and Willis (2015) an understanding of the expected damages 
is useful to determine and weigh up against the cost of any risk reduction strategies. 
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Reducing risk at the lowest possible cost (Fenz et al. 2011) and ensuring 
countermeasures do not exceed the expected loss of an asset (Fenz et al. 2014) are 
important, and sometimes overlooked, considerations.  
 
Identifying risk treatment alternatives, challenges in implementation, and the 
difference each treatment makes is an important step (Paté-Cornell & Cox 2014). Risk 
treatment options include avoiding the risk, increasing the risk, removing the risk, 
changing the likelihood and/or consequences of the risk, sharing risk with another 
party, accepting the risk, or any combination of these (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič 2013; 
Homeland Security 2011; Standards Australia 2006, 2009). Identifying the priority of 
risk treatment options is also an important consideration in this step. So too is the 
consideration of whether risk treatment itself produces further risk.  
 
Possible insider threat treatments have already been described above when 
discussing controls. In defining the difference between a treatment and control, the 
HB 167:2006 (Standards Australia 2006, p. 83) described ‘treatments’ as “controls 
that are to be introduced” and therefore are the same countermeasures and 
mitigation strategies previously discussed. These include pre-employment screening, 
policies and practices, and training and education among others.  
 
Whilst many strategies are available to strengthen insider threat response, Homeland 
Security (2009, p. 30) report that for various reasons strategies are not “consistently 
and stringently applied”. Further the use of physical, technical, and organisational 
countermeasures is important (Fenz et al. 2014). Hunker and Probst (2011) declare 
that the effectiveness of controls and countermeasures in reducing insider threat and 
insider risks remains unclear. Notwithstanding, evidence in the literature on security 
management suggests that proactive approaches are more beneficial than reactive 
approaches (Hunker & Probst 2011). In the insider threat space this would suggest 
that prevention controls such as employee screening and establishing a robust 
security culture have longer-term promise over detect and respond controls and 
punitive approaches. Although the combination of proactive and reactive approaches 
perhaps provides the best security response (Hunker & Probst 2011). 
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An output of the risk treatment step is the risk treatment plan. Rowe (1977) discusses 
through planning and implementation of controls, systemic control of risk can be 
achieved. According to the Standards Australia (2009, p. 20) a risk treatment plan 
involves describing the treatment options and reasons for selection, who is 
responsible and accountable for the plan, proposed actions, resource requirements, 
performance measures and constraints, reporting and monitoring requirements, and 
timing and schedule.  
 
2.4.10 Monitor and review 
Regular review is an important part of the risk management process and is used to 
determine the effectiveness of controls, improve risk assessment, learn from 
experience, detect changes in contexts, and identify emerging risks (Standards 
Australia 2009). As Shaw and Stock (2011) report, insider threat can escalate when a 
lapse in compliance results from a lack of on-going monitoring and enforcement. In 
order to move away from reactive and conformance based risk management, 
performance based organisations will become increasingly more agile and learn from 
security breaches, look to improve on performance and prevent future security 
incidents. The implementation of active testing of assumptions and systems is a key 
principle for effective risk management (Paté-Cornell & Cox 2014). This is consistent 
with a risk intelligent approach to risk management and the development of greater 
risk leadership. 
 
The insider threat landscape is undergoing change. Sarkar (2010) encourages on-
going monitoring and review due to the dynamic attributes of insider threat and 
threat agents. As already described the introduction of technology and the internet 
has had a great effect on the type and amount of insider threat activity. As such 
monitoring and review practices need to be on-going. Within security risk 
management there are four levels of monitoring practice including continuous 
monitoring, line management reviews (periodic), centralised reviews (audits), and 
scanning (reviewing the environment for changing or emerging risk; Standards 
Australia 2006).  
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Standards Australia (2006) suggests a number of triggers for the review of security 
risk and these can be adapted and applied to reviewing insider threat risk also. Such 
triggers include: organisational restructures, change in management, mergers or 
acquisitions; significant changes to organisational premises; changes to critical 
assets; changes in the local security environment; changes to national security threat 
levels; changes in vendors/suppliers, changes in technology; increased security risks 
identified by other similar industries/sectors/markets; and development of 
significant new intellectual property. The execution of the organisational 
vulnerability inventory (an outcome of the current study) during the monitoring and 
reviewing stage may provide benefit. Given there will be initial baseline of responses 
any future reapplication of the inventory will allow organisations to understand 
positive and negative change in organisational vulnerability.  
 
2.5 The Future of Insider Threat Risk Management 
The International Standards for Risk Management have proven to be useful tools in 
addressing risk in many organisational settings. Certainly there is promise in 
underpinning an insider threat inventory with the International Standards. As it 
currently stands many public and private organisations refer to, and perhaps rely 
upon these standards in their approach to risk management. Further, the Australian 
Government has mandated public departments, and recommended private 
enterprises, to develop an approach to manage insider threat that is consistent with 
these guidelines. As such the ISO remains a relevant consideration. 
 
However, there has been some criticism about the utility of the standards generally 
and specifically with regard to insider threat. For example, insider behaviour is not 
well explained by traditional methods of risk analysis (Farahmand & Spafford 2013). 
Reliance upon traditional corporate risk processes is no longer viewed as supporting 
business decision making and other management functions (Leitch 2017). Further 
new forms of risk, including cyber risk, will require the evolvement of current risk 
functions (Harle et al. 2016). 
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Organisations will continue to be challenged by the ever changing risk of insider 
threat. As previously discussed, there is growing recognition that not all insider 
threats can be identified or forecasted and therefore the mitigation of all risk is an 
unrealistic expectation. Further, it is acknowledged, at least with respect to cyber 
threats, that such threats are dynamic, evolving, and adapting (Borum et al. 2015).  
 
Concurrently, in risk management there is growing acceptance that in the absence of 
being able to recognise all risks, a risk leadership or risk intelligent approach shows 
promise. Organisations that are best able to consider how risk elements relevant to 
insider threat interact, obtain more diverse and foresightful results. Even more so, 
organisations are judged on how well they respond to unexpected crises and this 
include insider threats. Insider threat is not commonly referred to as a crisis; 
however, it often requires a response akin to a crisis. What will benefit organisations 
will be a move from, an old paradigm of risk management to a new paradigm of risk 
leadership and intelligence and integration of current international standards. In fact, 
some in the risk field suggest that risk management over the coming decade will see 
more transformation and change than seen in the previous decade (Harle et al. 2016). 
 
In order to be able to identify unexpected risk, such as that with insider threat, a close 
look at Futures Studies seems appropriate as a framework for informing a more 
proactive and realistic approach to IIT mitigation. The use of foresight theory can add 
value moving an organisation beyond its ability to identify short-term risk and 
implement capabilities of creativity and innovation to identify unexpected and 
emerging risk. Traditional risk management will pave the way for risk leadership and 
intelligence, where a close focus on risk appetite, strategic direction and disruption 
will be key factors of success.  
 
2.5.1 What is Futures Studies and Foresight? 
van der Laan (2008, p. 25) discussed that “[t]he future is not linear but is the result of 
possible trajectories that are formed in the past and the present”. In risk 
management it is these possible trajectories that are of keen interest. Being able to 
mitigate against future threats by applying what we currently know and fathom, 
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underpins many organisational risk processes. However, as has already been posited, 
in the field of insider treat there are many ‘unknowns’ which create an environment 
of instability and uncertainty. It is in this ambiguous and ever-changing environment 
that Futures Studies can pave a path forward providing insight and foresight to what 
may be.  
 
Futures Studies allow organisations to understand change and the complexity of their 
environment, through the use of a foresight process, resulting in an appreciation of 
possible, probable and preferable futures (van der Laan 2008; van der Laan 2014; van 
der Laan 2010). As defined by Horton (1999, p. 5), “[f]oresight is the process of 
developing a range of views of possible ways in which the future could develop, and 
understanding these sufficiently well to be able to decide what decisions can be taken 
today to create the best possible tomorrow”.  Foresight processes therefore offer 
organisations the opportunity to create and prepare for future scenarios by exploring 
alternatives and possible futures (van der Laan & Yap 2015). 
 
According to Horton (1999), in practice there are three phases of a successful 
foresight process (see Figure 8). The first phase involves the collection, collation, and 
summarisation of foresight knowledge. The second phase requires the translation 
and interpretation of foresight knowledge. The third results in the assimilation and 
commitment to the future.   
 
Figure 8: A Successful Foresight Process 
 
Source: Horton (1999, p. 6). 
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2.5.2 Applying Foresight to Insider Threat 
2.5.2.1 Insider threat - the present 
According to Horton (1999) the first phase of the foresight process requires the 
collection, collation, and summarisation of available sources of data. Information is 
gathered through various means including research, surveys, literature, government, 
and networks. This results in foresight knowledge which is then presented in 
manageable form (van der Laan 2008). The current research successfully contributes 
to this narrative by addressing the first phase of the foresight process. The gathering 
of relevant source material and presentation of the current state of insider threat 
provides a sound basis for greater understanding of the future of insider threat.  
 
In summary there are a number of important factors which have influenced the 
narrative on insider threat and will continue to affect the future of insider threat 
study and activity. These include: 
1. Insider threat is an ongoing concern for public and private enterprise; 
2. The Australian Government has instigated measures to attempt to reduce 
insider threat and associated vulnerabilities, including the mandating of 
Government Departments to apply risk management methodology to address 
the issue; 
3. Many definitions of insider threat exist and tend to distinguish between 
intentional and unintentional insider behaviour; 
4. There are several frameworks and models that describe insider threat; 
5. Research and response to insider threat is becoming increasingly multi-
disciplinary in approach; 
6. Vulnerabilities within organisations continue to be leveraged by means of 
variety of insider attack vectors; 
7. Individual, Technical, and Organisational countermeasures are important; 
8. There are significant limitations to the current research on insider threat; and 
9. Approach to risk management is evolving and our approach to insider threat 
should also. 
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These summary points are a simplistic overview of the current knowledge of insider 
threat and are well attended to in the preceding chapters. The points serve as a broad 
reminder of the available information providing context to the possible futures of 
insider threat as discussed below. 
 
2.5.2.2 Insider threat – the future 
The available literature on insider threat has discussed the possible future of the field. 
A search for specific articles applying futures studies, and foresight processes, along 
with Insider Threat yielded no results. To the author’s knowledge, recommendations 
and possible futures and recommendations within the available information sources 
have not been specifically based on an exercise in future studies or foresightedness 
as per the foresight process (Figure 8), however, there have been attempts to discuss 
what the future might hold (Cappelli et al. 2006; Gelles 2016; Nurse et al. 2014b; 
Sarkar 2010). These expert opinions and research outcomes offer a view of the 
possible, and perhaps probable, future of the insider threat. 
 
One of the more obvious and most published outcomes is that insider threats will 
continue to be cause for concern in the future (Agrafiotis et al. 2015; Cappelli et al. 
2012; Gelles 2016; Probst et al. 2010a). This concern may be amplified by the growing 
freedoms afforded to insiders such as the increasingly flexible work arrangements 
and options such as bring your own device (BYOD). The rate at which technology 
changes and affects how people work remains a challenge for the management of 
insider threat. As such, experts in the field of risk management and insider threat 
management are likely to find it difficult to keep up with the evolving technological 
landscape. The increasing technical knowledge of insiders, through general use and 
education, is likely to result in an increasing sophistication of cyber related insider 
threats. Positively, technological advancement will help to reduce risk through 
mechanisms such as data analytics and machine learning. However, these are likely 
to be informed by forecasts and patterns of change in the past and are unlikely to 
detect possible system breaks that have no precedence. 
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In future, the technology generation will hold the majority of employment positions 
and eventually, power. The power holder’s attitude and practices to technology will 
filter through and change policy and process. There is much discussion on the ease 
with which younger generations provide information online. This will continue to 
create challenges for organisations as they attempt to balance security (and reduce 
vulnerability) with increasing employee demands such as BYOD, working away from 
the office, and flexible work arrangements (Borrett et al. 2013). 
 
The most intelligent organisations of the future will gain advantage by their ability to 
create a seamless connection between technology-enabled insights, understanding 
of human decision making (Schoemaker 2015), and the development of foresight 
contribution. The future of insider threat management is likely to see organisations 
work more collaboratively internally and with external stakeholders. There will be a 
rise in strategic and senior level influence (Borum et al. 2015) and more organisations 
will have a Board member dedicated to security, including insider threat issues. 
  
There is an increasing expectation that organisational leaders will be more 
responsible for security (Borrett et al. 2013). Training organisational leaders in risk 
management decision capabilities is considered to offer sound risk mitigation 
(Eastburn & Sharland 2017).  From a general leadership perspective, initial 
investigations by van der Laan (2008) reveal that in an environment of uncertainty 
leadership competencies in futures thinking are connected to organisational 
performance. Therefore, enhancing the competence of organisational leaders, by 
including foresight education in professional development, may contribute successful 
countermeasure against insider threat.   
 
The increasing regulation and implementation of strategies to reduce insider threat 
will continue. The Australian Government, since 2000, has required more of its public 
departments to engage in threat reporting. It has also required more of its 
employees, especially those working in sensitive areas, to go through vetting and 
psychological assessment. It is likely that a stronger focus on improving compliance 
will result in benchmarking initiatives. Harle et al. (2016) suggest that, within the 
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banking sector, the enhancement of risk culture will be critical to the success of its 
risk functions. This is considered a desirable outcome for organisations and broader 
sectors looking to reduce their insider threat vulnerability. Enhancing organisational 
culture, assessing security culture, and implementing strategies to promote cultural 
enhancements will blossom if this approach is followed.  
 
There is already an increasing interest and expectation from the public around 
privacy and information sharing (Pulver & Medina 2018). There will be a growing 
expectation from the public that organisations are giving due attention to their 
privacy and the use of personal data.  Within organisations the increasing acceptance 
of a multidisciplinary approach to insider threat will allow for greater cross-
departmental collaboration. Working together, security teams along with Human 
Resources and Legal departments can ensure that employee privacy is not infringed 
upon, that ethical action is promoted, and that whistle-blower protection is afforded.  
The growing body of literature on insider threat does elucidate a growing focus on 
cyber and IT threat vectors and countermeasures. This appears to create a future 
vulnerability as organisations experience tunnel vision, focused solely on technical 
threats, and losing sight of more “traditional” insider threats. Perhaps mundane 
when compared to the rapidly evolving and ever-changing technological threat, 
historical insider threat activity (espionage) through placement of ‘moles’ and ‘spies’ 
could see resurgence.  
 
Finally, there has been little discussion in the insider threat literature regarding how 
insider threat opportunities may be more positively integrated in the risk 
management process. Within the fields of risk management, risk leadership, and risk 
intelligence there is an expectation that vulnerabilities can be exploited to the benefit 
of organisations. Further research and expert commentary on how this may be 
achieved is an exciting avenue of future study. Where vulnerability lies, opportunity 
exists. 
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2.6 The Organisational Vulnerability to Intentional Insider Threat Inventory 
(OVIT) 
The purpose of the current study is from an academic and applied perspective and is 
two-fold: develop an inventory which helps organisations diagnose their vulnerability 
to intentional insider threat; and, positively contribute to the growing narrative on 
insider threat. It is commonly recognised that intentional insider threats are difficult 
to detect and that all insider risks cannot be discovered. However, this should not be 
a deterrent to improving our understanding of insider threats nor to implementing 
ever-improving strategies to try to reduce vulnerability to such threats. Organisations 
require tangible, reliable, and valid means in order to better protect themselves. A 
benchmark and baseline opportunity to determine current vulnerability and assess 
future progress can be achieved. An organisational vulnerability inventory is one that 
is derived from the literature, incorporates expert opinion, is able to measure 
vulnerability in an efficient, reliable and valid way, and contributes to growing 
understanding of insider threat is the outcome of the current research. Given this 
intention, the current section will explain how the OVIT is underpinned by the 
research, addresses frameworks and models relevant to insider threat, and provides 
future benefit to the field both in theoretical and practical sense.  
 
2.6.1 Redefining insider threat 
In the absence of an Australian definition of insider threat, the current research is 
underpinned by the commonly referenced definition of the CERT program at 
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU).  
A “current or former employee, contractor, or other business 
partner who has or had authorized access to an organization’s 
network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused 
that access in a manner that negatively affected the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organisation’s 
information or information systems” (Cappelli et al. 2012, p. xx).  
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Building on this the current research determines a relevant and comprehensive 
definition of intentional insider threat from Australian experts. This is an important 
contribution to the existing research of insider threat. Gelles and Mitchell (2015) 
state, a critical first step in formulating an insider threat program requires a specific 
internal working definition of insider threat. In the current study the development of 
an Australian definition also helps to determine the scope and parameters of the 
development of the OVIT. The opportunity to provide a working definition, based on 
the Australian context and developed by Australian experts, is a unique contribution 
of the current study and will be posited in the discussion of results (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3.1).  
 
2.6.1.1 Intentional versus unintentional insider threat 
As already discussed in Section 2.1.3, the current thesis focuses on intentional insider 
threat, where a person is motivated and acts to deliberately cause harm to an 
organisation. This particular emphasis on intentional insider threat has delimited the 
research. However, the organisational vulnerability inventory that is developed 
provides invaluable understanding of the vulnerability to all forms of insider threat 
and more broadly to general counterproductive workplace behaviours. This is due to 
the strong overlap in the etiology of all forms of intentional and unintentional 
counterproductive behaviour in the workplace. The absence of countermeasures and 
protective strategies in an organisation results in vulnerability to various forms of 
counterproductive behaviour. By identifying areas of organisational vulnerability 
related to intentional insider threat there is greater opportunity to develop 
appropriate interventions and countermeasures for both intentional and 
unintentional insider threats.  
 
2.6.2 A Holistic Conceptual Model of Insider Threat 
Given the current status of research on insider threat there is potential to expand our 
understanding of the insider threat phenomenon. There is a growing recognition of 
the multi-factorial contribution to insider threat. Organisations, and experts in 
security, risk management and insider threat, are moving towards a more holistic 
appreciation of the threat. Understanding that the intersection of vulnerability across 
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individual, organisational, and technical factors is the point of greatest risk can be 
conceptualised and visually presented (see Figure 9). Given that insider threat 
involves multifactorial risk indicators, and is a multidisciplinary concern, it requires a 
holistic approach for effective identification and countermeasure. This is the purpose 
of the OVIT; to provide a diagnostic inventory that addresses the individual, 
organisational, and technical risk areas and determines potential vulnerability of an 
organisation to intentional insider threat.  
 
Figure 9: A conceptual model of insider threat 
 
Source: Developed for this study. 
 
As Gelles (2016) indicates developing an insider threat program requires the conduct 
of an organisational assessment. The outcome of this thesis is an inventory intended 
to improve the capacity of organisations to diagnose organisational vulnerability to 
intentional insider threat. The study is also based on the conceptual model 
represented in Figure 9. The findings of the study will further serve to validate or 
adapt the model. Through a collaborative effort, this tool can help organisations 
assess potential organisational vulnerabilities and strengths related to individual, 
organisational, and technical factors. 
 
It is recognised that whilst intentional insider threat is perhaps a rare event, the 
outcomes are potentially catastrophic. The negative effects expand beyond the event 
itself and can have significant repercussions within the assaulted organisation. A 
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multidisciplinary approach is required that includes a thorough investigation of 
organisational vulnerabilities and protective factors, where no immunity exists, to 
provide the best response. Whilst the resulting inventory does not offer specific risk 
management advice it provides guidance towards relevant interventions, protective 
actions, treatments and controls, to manage and reduce the risk of intentional insider 
threat. 
 
2.6.3 Application of the OVIT across current models and frameworks of insider 
threat 
The effort required to better understand organisational vulnerabilities to intentional 
insider threat is well worth the investment. Through this thesis, outcomes can 
contribute to the growing advancement in threat assessment and specifically in the 
insider threat space. The OVIT can provide a systematic means for assessment and 
understanding of relevant insider threat vulnerabilities (as well as mitigation 
strategies). The OVIT is theoretically and empirically derived and is able to 
complement insider threat frameworks and tools so that organisations can be 
proactive in insider threat assessment and management. The OVIT itself is not 
married to one specific model or framework. Rather it allows for the implementation 
of the inventory across organisations with different methods and models for 
addressing the insider threat.  
 
2.6.4 OVIT and risk management 
The continual exploration and discussion of insider threat, including its causes and 
controls, is important for effective risk management. This study is underpinned with 
the ISO 31000:2009 and therefore the OVIT is aligned with this generic risk 
management methodology. Focusing on the generic approach to risk management 
as per the ISO 31000:2009 allows the OVIT to be applied to a broad range of 
organisational risk management methodologies (Fenz et al. 2014) and expands its 
utility and applicability to all organisations. Moreover, the alignment of the OVIT with 
the ISO 31000:2009 and Australian Standards HB 167:2006 Security Risk 
Management ensures that it is an appropriate tool to implement within Government 
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departments. The OVIT adheres to the Australian Government mandate that public 
departments “adopt a risk management approach to cover all areas of protective 
security activity across their organisation, in accordance with the Australian Standard 
for Risk Management AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 and the Australian Standards HB 
167:2006 Security Risk Management”.   
 
The OVIT contributes to an organisation’s risk management framework, risk 
assessment, and risk management plan by addressing one area of risk, which is the 
intentional insider threat. This is consistent with the AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009 Standards 
Australia (2009, p. iv) which states that “risk management can be applied … to specific 
functions, projects, and activities”. The OVIT therefore helps reduce an organisation’s 
risk by anticipating, understanding, and deciding whether to act on potential insider 
threats; with the ultimate aim to protect vital assets and/or critical information.  
 
2.6.5 The OVIT addresses limitations in insider threat 
Insider threat is a complex and difficult area of study. Certainly there has been 
concern that it is flawed by bias, government funding, and lack of attention to all 
organisational forms. Further, the majority of research on insider threat appears to 
be generated by the USA and the UK. The current research is the first Australian based 
research focusing on establishing an inventory to address intentional insider threat 
that includes individual, technical, and organisational components. 
 
Current research has its limitations due to being speculative, case driven, and lacking 
in predictive ability. The retrospective nature of investigation has raised concern 
about the applicability of research outcomes. Whilst the current research project is 
not able to provide predictive ability, the implementation of the OVIT can result in a 
baseline from which future incidents can be measured. The continued use of the 
OVIT, allows a temporal overview of change in an organisation (and more broadly 
across industry). Should there be an insider threat incident, revisiting the information 
obtained from the inventory may provide invaluable information and greater 
understanding of the potential to develop a range of possible insider threat changes.    
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The caution around legal, ethical, and privacy concerns related to the application of 
insider threat countermeasures is not specifically addressed by the OVIT.  However, 
when completed by organisational members, with an understanding of 
organisational processes and positioning, the inventory can identify a baseline of 
vulnerability. The results present organisational level vulnerability and do not target 
specific individuals. The OVIT can demonstrate to organisations where vulnerabilities 
may exist and therefore provide real-time feedback on how organisations can 
address deficiencies in intentional insider threat risk management.  
 
2.6.6 The OVIT and futures studies  
Employing a futures perspective is an essential component of the current study. The 
use of foresight theory enhances this research by providing creative and innovative 
approaches to identify unexpected and emerging risks. Futures studies is necessarily 
associated with a meaningful study of IIT as it posits that multiple possible futures 
exist and that an awareness of these multiple alternate futures, rather than 
predicting ‘a future’, is what differentiates its utility from traditional risk 
management approaches. 
 
The development of the OVIT has required a thorough investigation of the existing 
research and understanding of the extant literature. Consistent with Future Studies 
the collection, collation, and summarisation of literature is a direct contribution to 
stage one of a successful foresight process (Horton 1999; van der Laan 2008). Aside 
from the review of available literature, foresight knowledge may also be attained via 
other methodologies. As Horton (1999) stated, the employment of Delphi surveys is 
another mode of input to the foresight process. In the current study the Delphi 
technique is implemented, providing an avenue for Australian experts to provide 
input to the OVIT and also to contribute to the growing knowledge base on insider 
threat and how it may evolve into the future.  
 
Finally, the OVIT itself, when deployed in an organisation will provide direct and 
organisationally specific contribution to foresight knowledge as part of Horton’s 
Phase 1 (inputs) and Phase 2 (foresight interpretation). The use of the OVIT can 
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provide organisations real-time understanding of the scope of their vulnerability to 
intentional insider threat. It also delivers a means of collecting and collating a large 
volume of information so that it is presented in a manageable form.  
 
Horton (1999) encouraged organisations to carry out (or at least manage) stage one 
of the foresight process. Horton (1999, p. 7) suggested that doing so creates “some 
sense of ownership and credibility of the resulting knowledge”. She also 
acknowledged that third parties are useful contributors to phase one, helping 
organisations unfamiliar with the subject matter (in this case intentional insider 
threat) and/or preventing narrow sightedness. The OVIT demonstrates its utility in 
providing a means of evaluating organisational vulnerability to intentional insider 
threat regardless of the organisation’s (or staff) expertise in the area or any bias in 
assumptions (such as the insider threat only being of technical concern). 
 
2.7 Summary - Research Questions 
This chapter provided an overview of the current status of insider threat research, a 
comprehensive discussion of the available extant literature on insider threat, as well 
as the related discipline of risk management and their limitations. In reviewing the 
core concepts of insider threat a conceptualised approach to the assessment of 
vulnerability, with a multidisciplinary overview, emerged.  Australian Government’s 
approach to insider threat, existing risk management standards, models and 
frameworks of insider threat, and the future of both insider threat and emergence of 
new paradigms of risk intelligence, have guided the approach to the development of 
the OVIT.    
 
There are two main aims of the current study. The first is to develop a diagnostic 
inventory to assess organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat and, 
secondly, based on these findings present a preliminary model of organisational 
vulnerability to intentional insider threat with both practical and academic utility. In 
order to address these aims the research proposes three research questions. Chapter 
3 discusses the research design, methodology, research questions and proposed 
analysis of the data.  
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3 Research Design and Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided the foundational knowledge on insider threat and the 
risk management required to advance a conceptual framework for the development 
of an Organisational Vulnerability to Intentional Insider Threat inventory (OVIT). This 
chapter describes the research design and methodology of the study. The purpose of 
this chapter is to demonstrate the theoretical underpinnings that inform the research 
design and to provide an overview of the relevant stages of enquiry and the 
systematic research process of the research methodology.  
 
3.2 The Research Questions 
The previous chapter provides a comprehensive review of the literature on insider 
threat and risk management as it relates to the study of insider threat. The aim of the 
literature review is to provide a summary of existing knowledge of a subject of 
interest which supports the identification of specific research questions through 
identifying and organising the relevant concepts (Rowley & Slack 2004). The literature 
review demonstrates that insider threat is a multidisciplinary concern but is 
oftentimes studied and managed with a singular focus (predominantly technological).  
More recent literature encourages both an academic and applied shift in support of 
collaboration and refocuses on individual, organisational, and technical means for 
prevention, detection, deterrence, and management. While there is an increasing 
interest in the study of insider threat, there remain limitations and clear gaps in the 
available literature that relate to its specificity, poor generalisability, lack of 
controlled studies, and limited access to insider threat data. There is scarce 
contribution to the field from an Australian perspective. There is also no clear valid 
and reliable assessment tool that comprehensively addresses the multifactorial 
nature of the insider threat problem for organisations. 
 
The Australian Government mandates that public departments address insider threat 
in accordance with the ISO31000:2009 risk management methodology (Protective 
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Security Policy Section Attorney-General’s Department 2010). This directive creates 
an opportunity for empirical and applied studies to better assess current 
organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat, as well as set a baseline of 
organisational functioning and positioning that can be compared across organisations 
(and even across industries/sectors).  
 
A simple conceptual model to understand the insider threat from a multidimensional 
view has been presented (see Figure 9). This simplified view of the insider threat 
provides a framework to empirically derive a valid and reliable assessment of 
organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat. Therefore the general aim 
of this research is to develop an inventory that can be employed regardless of the 
many different insider threat models and frameworks, as well as the uptake of 
different risk management methodologies within organisations.  
 
The state of the current literature on insider threat underpins the questions which 
aim to address the identified limitations and development of an inventory to assess 
organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat. 
 
Research Question 1: What are the main organisational influences on intentional 
insider threat (IIT) based on available literature? 
Research Question 2: What are the main organisational influences on IIT based on 
expert opinion? 
Research Question 3: How is organisational vulnerability to IIT operationalised by the 
study? 
 
3.3 The Research Design and Strategy of Enquiry 
When undertaking research, Creswell (2014) encourages the researchers to make 
explicit the framework for the research which includes their worldview. In doing so, 
the researchers are better able to explain their approach to the research, the 
research design, and research methods (see Figure 10). This section explains the 
philosophical worldview that underpins the research, the research design, the 
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research approach, and research methods as they apply to the development of the 
OVIT. 
 
Figure 10: A Framework for research 
 
Source: Creswell (2014, p. 35) 
 
3.3.1 Research design 
In order for the research to achieve its goals it is important to identify the most 
suitable research design, strategy for enquiry, as well as tools and techniques (Romeu 
2006). Providing justification of the research design and investigative strategy is an 
important component to demonstrate the approach to meeting the aims and 
objectives of the research as well as the research questions.  
 
It is important to note that the current research is designed in three phases. The first 
phase answers Research Question 1, which is a review of the literature and extraction 
of the main influences of intentional insider threat. This information is then used to 
inform the second phase of the research design, the Delphi Study, aimed at 
addressing Research Question 2; the main influences of intentional insider threat as 
agreed by Australian experts. The research design then progresses to the third phase 
which addresses Research Question 3, the development and validation of the OVIT 
and a working conceptual model of organisational vulnerability to IIT.   
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3.3.2 Research Paradigm 
Creswell (2014) encourages researchers to make explicit the worldview - that is the 
epistemology, ontology, and methodology - proposed by any study. According to 
Creswell (2014) there are four widely discussed worldviews in the literature. These 
include: post-positivism, constructivism, transformative, and pragmatism. The 
researcher’s choice of worldview is often influenced by the discipline of study, 
previous research experiences, and, in the case of students, the influence of 
supervisors (Creswell 2014). 
 
In determining an appropriate research paradigm to underpin the current project, 
both the post-positivist and pragmatist knowledge claims were considered. 
According to Creswell (2014) postpositivism represents the more traditional form of 
undertaking scientific research. As such it suits quantitative methods of enquiry in 
which the researcher aims to explore cause and effect relationships. In contrast to 
the post-positivist worldview which focuses on antecedent conditions and therefore 
an empirical response, the pragmatic paradigm considers actions, situations, and 
consequences and employs pluralistic methods which can offer best solutions and 
application to a particular problem (Creswell 2014).  
 
The pragmatic paradigm was chosen for the current research as it does not have a 
focus on antecedent conditions and “is not committed to any one system of 
philosophy or reality”(2009, p. 4). Instead it focuses on knowledge claims being a 
result of action orientation and consequences in order to find solutions (Creswell 
2009). It further provides for the inclusion of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods and as such captures both elements of the constructivist and post-
positivists approaches. 
 
Utilising a pragmatic approach requires that the research problem itself is held 
central and that data collection and analysis techniques are chosen based on their 
ability to provide insight to the research question (Mackenzie & Knipe 2006). By 
determining the research problem as the most important factor, any approach to 
understanding the problem may be introduced. Rowe (1977) discusses that any 
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methodology is proven by its pragmatic acceptance, ability to solve real problems, 
and adaptability to application.  
 
It is acknowledged within the pragmatist paradigm that there is not one absolute 
truth (Creswell 2009) and therefore reality can and does change. Pragmatic 
approaches help facilitate human problem-solving and deal with problems as they 
arise (Powell 2001). As Pansiri (2005, p. 197) explains “pragmatists refute the idea 
that ‘truth’ can be determined once and for all”. Given this, pragmatists are not 
committed to one research paradigm, system, or reality (Mackenzie & Knipe 2006). 
Instead, pragmatists favour methods that provide the most benefit and insight.  
 
The pragmatic paradigm underpins the current research as it aims to provide 
solutions to real-world problems without the influence of a specific worldview and 
underlying paradigm assumptions. In choosing the pragmatic paradigm there is an 
acceptance of the use of mixed methods design. In fact, Creswell (2014) promotes 
mixed method design and encourages researchers to draw liberally from qualitative 
and quantitative assumptions.  
 
3.3.3 Quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods research approaches 
Creswell (2011) identifies the importance of the research approach in determining 
the most relevant procedure for the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data. 
Further, a clear template and justification of the data collection method provides a 
means of establishing reliability (Hair et al. 2010). Within the pragmatic framework, 
mixed methods approaches are considered appropriate, if not necessary. However, 
Creswell (2014) cautions that in choosing a mixed method approach, providing the 
reasons why quantitative and qualitative data are being mixed remains important.  
 
3.3.3.1 Qualitative research 
Qualitative research aims to provide construction of social reality and meaning and 
is underpinned by the constructivist worldview as discussed by Creswell (2014). The 
purpose of qualitative research is to explore and describe complex phenomena 
through designs that seek to gain a deeper understanding of a phenomenon (Creswell 
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2014). Qualitative research can develop deeper meaning through content based 
analyses and interpretation (Creswell 2009). In contrast to quantitative research, 
qualitative approaches tend toward small samples sizes that are targeted and chosen 
for purpose. Given this, limitation of small sample size makes it difficult to validate 
and generalise the findings.   
 
3.3.3.2 Quantitative research 
Creswell (2014) suggests that the identification of inherent relationships between 
variables is most appropriately studied with quantitative methods. Quantitative 
approaches are aligned with post-positivist knowledge paradigms as they attempt to 
explain and describe relationships between variables (Creswell 2009, 2014). The use 
of experimental or survey methods are common strategies of enquiry that rely on 
statistical analysis (Creswell 2014). In quantitative research, samples are selected to 
represent a greater population through large sample sizes and random selection 
processes. The primary aim of quantitative research in social sciences is to be able to 
predict human behaviour. 
 
3.3.3.3 The current study – mixed methods 
The objectives of both qualitative and quantitative approaches satisfy the aims of the 
current study and have ability to contribute valuable insight to intentional insider 
threat. However, it seems that the strength is in combining the two approaches as 
part of a mixed method design. Here the limitations of one approach are minimised 
by the strength in the alternative approach. As such a mixed method design is able to 
provide the best response to the research problem; contributing depth, and unique 
insight, to the underrepresented aspects of insider threat whilst also providing an 
empirical basis for the resultant OVIT.  This rationale is consistent with the teachings 
of Creswell (2014) that mixed methods are gaining in popularity as a way to 
understand research problems by contributing to the depth of meaning as well as 
providing an empirical basis for any claims.  
 
A number of typologies of mixed methods research designs have been developed and 
inform data collections procedures (Hanson et al. 2005). Based on four decision 
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criteria – implementation, priority, integration, and theoretical perspective - Creswell 
et al. (2003) determined a typology for classifying mixed method research designs. 
The authors specified six types of mixed method designs; three sequential and three 
concurrent designs (a full overview of the typology for classifying mixed method 
research designs is outside the scope of the current thesis, however, further 
information can be found in Creswell et al. 2003 and Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003). 
 
Following the decision criteria provided by Creswell et al. (2003) the current research 
fits a sequential mixed method research design, specifically the sequential 
exploratory design. In the sequential exploratory design both qualitative and 
quantitative data are collected and analysed (Creswell et al. 2003; Hanson et al. 
2005). This option does not use an explicit advocacy lens (Hanson et al. 2005), allows 
for the collection of qualitative and quantitative data, is used to develop instruments, 
and may utilise surveys and factor analysis (Creswell et al. 2003, see Tashakkori & 
Teddlie 2003 for further discussion on mixed method typologies).  
 
Under the pragmatic paradigm the research approach should relate to the purpose 
of the study and be equipped to answer the research questions. The aim of this study 
is to understand the influences on organisational vulnerability to intentional insider 
threat and use these insights to develop an inventory that can measure the strengths 
and limitations of an organisation as it relates to the individual, organisational, and 
technical factors associated with insider threat.  In the current research, content 
analysis of the extant literature, the Delphi method, and surveys are the chosen 
methods of enquiry (Armsby 2000).  
 
3.4 Phases of research 
In addressing the research aims and questions an exploratory sequential design is 
considered appropriate. For the current research this began with content analysis of 
the extant literature, before progressing to the Delphi method, and finally survey 
development and validation. 
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Figure 11: Phases of Research 
 
 Source: Developed for this study. 
 
3.4.1 Phase One - The literature review 
A literature review is defined as “the selection of available documents (both 
published and unpublished) on the topic, which contains information, ideas, data and 
evidence written from a particular standpoint to fulfil certain aims or express certain 
views on the nature of the topic and how it is to be investigated, and the effective 
evaluation of these documents in relation to the research being proposed” (Hart 
1998, p. 13). The aim of the literature review, as it relates to the current study, is to 
identify and organise the concepts associated with intentional insider threat (Rowley 
& Slack 2004). Identifying, organising, and distilling the concepts, theories, and 
empirical support in the literature can help identify any limitations as well as point to 
specific research questions (Rowley & Slack 2004).  
 
The current research commenced with a comprehensive review of the literature on 
insider threat. Consistent with the recommendations of Creswell (2014) a priority for 
selecting literature began with a broad synthesis of the literature, followed by more 
targeted review of journal articles, appraisal of relevant books, an exploration for 
recent conference papers, and a search for web-based materials.   
 
The existing literature on relevant key word searches (including but not limited to 
“insider threat” and “insider risk”) resulted in a range of academic articles, books, 
research projects, whitepapers, conference proceedings, journal articles, and 
government documents relevant to the topic area.  
 
Literature 
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3.4.1.1 Phase One – Data capture and analysis 
Phase one of the data collection addressed RQ1 (What are the main organisational 
influences on Intentional Insider Threat (IIT) based on available literature?) and was 
a thematic analysis of the literature that is already available on insider threat. The 
purpose of the literature review is to determine the pertinent factors and dimensions 
related to the relationship between organisational vulnerability and IIT which can 
then be further validated by the Delphi process.  
 
As previously mentioned, the literature review presented an opportunity to 
qualitatively analyse available publications to determine the main influences on 
organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat. As Elo and Kyngäs (2008) 
discuss, content analysis can allow for concepts to be derived from the available data 
and is especially useful in research where there is limited contribution to the topic 
under investigation – such as the study of insider threat. 
 
Each article was reviewed for potential variables related to intentional insider threat 
from strength or vulnerability based perspective. These variables were extracted 
from the literature and recorded on a spread sheet. Any potential influences on 
intentional insider threat were recorded in Phase One.  
 
The variables were grouped according to the main aims of the current research 
resulting in the following categories: (1) words related to the definition of intentional 
insider threat; (2) variables considered to increase intentional insider threat; (3) 
variables considered to decrease insider threat; and finally, (4) organisational 
conditions that may moderate or mitigate IIT. The outcomes of the literature review 
and content analysis were then used in the initial development of the Delphi Study.  
Based on the literature review, a basic conceptual framework to understand and 
further explore intentional insider threat was developed (see Figure 9). Consistent 
with the conceptual model, the variables ascertained from the literature were 
presented under each concept category (individual, organisational, and technical) 
throughout the Delphi study. 
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3.4.2 Phase Two - The Delphi study 
The Delphi method philosophically underpins the paradigm of pragmatism (Brady 
2015). Given the emphasis on pragmatic worldview, the Delphi method is favoured 
in this pragmatic research. The Delphi method has the ability to contribute to and 
inform real-world problems especially those which relate to intentional insider 
threat. According to Brady (2015) the Delphi method is underpinned by the pragmatic 
paradigm in the following ways: it is flexible and able to utilise qualitative and 
quantitative forms of data enquiry; it is affordable and can be conveniently and 
efficiently distributed via email; it is able to eliminate response bias; it does not 
require generalisability,  it rather focuses on participants with specific expertise; and, 
can be employed across a diverse range of industry and practical applications as it 
does not require specialised education.  
 
The original Delphi method was introduced in the research conducted in 1950s by 
the RAND Corporation (Von der Gracht 2012). It involved a structured survey 
presented to a panel of seven specialists to reach consensus on the topic of bombing 
requirements. According to Dalkey and Helmer (1963) in the first Delphi method, the 
technique involved a series of questionnaires and interviews, interspersed with 
controlled feedback, in order to obtain a reliable consensus of opinion. The structure 
of the Delphi method resulted in both qualitative and quantitative outcomes.  
 
Since the introduction of the Delphi method it has been modified in subsequent 
research studies. Given these changes, researchers refer to the Classical Delphi 
method and the Modified Delphi method to distinguish those that are more 
consistent with the original reference of study. Some of the more obvious changes 
include the deletion of the interview component, the varied ways of beginning the 
survey from open-ended question/s through pre-determined and constructed items, 
as well as the increasing uptake of modern technology (including email and online 
survey tools).  
 
Skulmoski et al. (2007) report that the Delphi method is an attractive tool for 
graduate students as it is a flexible research technique that is suited to addressing 
                                                P a g e  | 97 
 
problems or phenomenon where limited information exists. It is a versatile method 
for exploratory study (Okoli & Pawlowski 2004), and, as is the case with insider threat, 
where the topic is delicate, sensitive or undocumented (Lilja et al. 2011a).  
 
A Delphi study is an iterative process (see Figure 12) which endeavours to gather 
opinions from subject matter experts whilst attempting to discover new insight and 
gain consensus. As a research technique, the Delphi method has been employed in a 
significant number of published works and addresses numerous research topics in 
varied fields of interest.   
 
Figure 12: The Delphi Processes 
 
Source: Adapted from Landeta (1999). 
 
A modified Delphi method was chosen to complement the mixed methodology 
approach and pragmatic paradigm that underpins the current research. The modified 
Delphi method was deemed appropriate to address RQ2 (What are the main 
organisational influences on IIT based on expert opinion?) and was chosen as a 
suitable means of gathering expert opinion through a multi-stage email survey.  
 
Given insider threats are statistically rare (Shaw & Fischer 2005), or more likely 
seldom reported, then quantitative methods alone do not provide a full picture of 
this threat. As such this research utilises both quantitative and qualitative methods 
of enquiry during the modified Delphi process. The inclusion of qualitative methods, 
through information provided by subject matter experts, was considered an effective 
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way to gather relevant and purposeful information on insider threat (Catrantzos 
2012). Other qualitative means of inquiry, such as case study interviews, were not 
adopted as the research design was not a broader qualitative enquiry. The Delphi 
method was considered the most appropriate method of enquiry allowing for deep 
interrogation of emerging insights whilst addressing the limitations and difficulties of 
research on IIT. Further, as the Delphi method provides anonymity (panellist 
identities are unknown to other expert members) it allows experts to provide 
information and opinion without bias or attribution.  
 
The use of expert opinion in studying insider threat is well established (see Catrantzos 
2012; Greitzer et al. 2013; Greitzer et al. 2009; Kraemer et al. 2009). Consistent with 
the themes addressed by Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) it is considered a practical and 
applicable research method as it can investigate a complex issue, provide a group 
method where experts do not need to meet yet interact with emerging views, is a 
flexible design that allows for follow up (leading to richer data/deeper 
understanding), can allow for solicitation of information and, if required, ranking 
importance of organisational vulnerabilities. It also provides a group opinion which 
may be more valid than an individual opinion (Keeney et al. 2010). The overall aim of 
the Delphi study was to provide the most pertinent and important variables 
associated with insider threat to assist in the development of the OVIT and identify 
aspects of IIT not yet reported in the extant literature.  
 
3.4.2.1 Choosing Delphi participants/experts 
The choice of Delphi participants is perhaps the most critical component to a 
successful Delphi process including the quality of overall conclusions (Lang 2001). In 
order to generate reliable expert-based contribution the practice of randomly 
selecting participants is not acceptable (de Meyrick 2003). Therefore, the Delphi 
method requires the use of non-random, purposive samples (Shariff 2015).  
 
Choosing participants for a Delphi study has been the cause of contention in the 
literature. Even the use of the term ‘expert’ has created debate. According to 
Trevelyan and Robinson (2015) when designing a Delphi study consideration should 
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be given to how an ‘expert’ is defined as knowledge and experience cannot be easily 
assumed. Instead, these authors suggest that researchers should be explicit about 
participant’s expertise, and avoid labelling participants as ‘experts’ altogether. Whilst 
this is an interesting recommendation, the use of the term ‘expert’ is commonplace 
in much of the Delphi research. As such, this study will use the term ‘expert’ to define 
the participants of the panel but will make clear how expertise was determined a 
priori.  
 
Adler and Ziglio (1996) promote that Delphi participants should meet four 
requirements to ensure expertise: 1) knowledge and experience with issues under 
investigation; 2) capacity and willingness to participate; 3) sufficient time to 
participate; and, 4) effective communication skills. Further, Gutierrez (1989) refers to 
an expert as one who has an intimate knowledge of the subject under investigation, 
remains actively involved in the area, and is committed to the development of further 
insight and understanding. According to Campbell (2004) the definition of an expert 
will depend on the subject matter being explored, therefore clear representation of 
the way panel members are chosen is imperative. 
 
de Meyrick (2003) encourages researchers to make explicit the basis for selecting 
panel members, providing a means of verification and transparency. For the purpose 
of the current study, experts were selected based on demonstrated expertise in the 
field of insider threat and specifically targeted to ensure coverage of the private and 
public sectors. This was considered important given one criticism of research has 
been a narrow focus on organisational types (Hunker & Probst 2011).  
 
In addition to at least 10 years of involvement in Justice, National Security, Crisis 
Management, Counter Intelligence, Cyber Security, Risk Management, and/or Fraud 
Investigation, experts also had to meet one of the following recruitment criteria: (1) 
postgraduate qualifications in insider threat related research, (2) published articles 
on insider threat or related phenomena, (3) involvement in investigating insider 
threat cases, or (4) involvement in the assessment and mitigation of insider threat 
within organisations.  
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3.4.2.2 Anonymity 
Keeney et al. (2010) stated that complete anonymity in a Delphi process cannot be 
guaranteed, given at least the primary researcher is aware of who is participating as 
an expert. In the current project the identity of participating panel members was only 
known to the primary researcher. This was seen as a method to reduce any concerns 
regarding identity and allow for participants to be open and truthful in their 
responses. A strength of using the Delphi method is that experts do not interact 
directly with each other, providing their thoughts independently, thereby avoiding 
groupthink (Catrantzos 2012) and protecting individual identities (for example those 
working in policing or security related organisations). Anonymity also ensures 
objective responses and results (Lilja et al. 2011b).  
 
3.4.2.3 Participant details 
There is debate in the literature about the required size of an expert Delphi panel and 
no specific direction on the number of experts that ensure a representative sample 
(Keeney et al. 2010; Shariff 2015). Delphi panel sizes do vary considerably and are 
influenced by factors including the level of problem complexity, resourcing, and 
whether the sample is homogenous or heterogeneous (Trevelyan & Robinson 2015).  
Skulmoski et al. (2007) suggest that using a homogenous sample of between ten and 
fifteen experts can yield sufficient results. Given the small number of participants the 
importance of a high level of panel expertise assists individuals to fully contribute to 
the process (Ludwig 1997).  
 
Ensuring reliability in the Delphi method was an important consideration. As (Lilja et 
al. 2011b) noted, the size of the sample itself is not the most significant factor for 
reliability but the representativeness of the sample, with bias being minimised by the 
iterative Delphi process and anonymity of respondents. As the Delphi process did not 
use a random sample to represent the target population (Keeney et al. 2010), to 
minimise this concern experts were recruited from both public and private sectors 
and across a range of industry. It is acknowledged in the literature that random 
samples are not always viable or appropriate as long as experts represent a 
considerable diversity in viewpoints. The use of convenience sampling and snowball 
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techniques are commonplace in research employing the Delphi method (Keeney et 
al. 2010). The researcher aimed to recruit between 10 and 15 participants for this 
research in line with the recommendation of Skulmoski et al. (2007). Experts were 
initially contacts of the researcher and then a snowball technique was used to identify 
more members to achieve a higher participation rate (Lavrakas 2008).  
 
Email was chosen as the method for the distribution of questionnaires due to its 
convenience and potential to reduce the turnaround time between questionnaires 
(Okoli & Pawlowski 2004). Email invitations including consent forms and participant 
information sheets (see Appendix A, B, and C) were emailed to 28 experts. The 
invitation was designed to explain the aim of the study, describe and define the 
Delphi process, and present the requirements of participation (anonymity, 
commitment, expected risks and benefits, etc.). Participants were also informed of 
the process for selection of experts as this has been shown to improve participation 
rates (Wee Yong et al. 1989).   
 
Of the 28 experts who were invited to participate in the study, two (7%) declined 
participation, nine (32%) did not respond to the email, and 17 (61%) consented to 
participate in the research. To enhance participation, follow-up emails were sent to 
those who had not responded to the initial request for participation. After emailing 
the first round of the Delphi, two experts withdrew from the process. This left 15 
experts participating in Round 1 of the Delphi. Of the 15 experts, seven were male 
and eight were female. Seven were from private organisations and eight were 
Government employees. Three participants had completed PhDs related to insider 
threat and seven had conducted work based research on insider threat. Finally, all 
Delphi participants met the criteria of experience investigating insider threat cases 
and in the assessment and mitigation of insider threat within organisations. 
 
Attrition of participating experts did occur between round one and round two but 
was minimal (13%). Research suggests that attrition reduces as the Delphi process 
progresses (van Zolingen & Klaassen 2003) which is consistent with the drop out data 
in the current study. No further attrition occurred between round two and round 
                                                P a g e  | 102 
 
three of the Delphi resulting in 87% of panel experts remaining in the Delphi 
processes through all stages.  
 
3.4.3 Delphi analysis 
Hasson et al. (2000) reported that after an extensive review of Delphi literature there 
was no universal guideline available to assist researchers in how to perform data 
analysis. As expressed by Brady (2015) specific analytic techniques are not enforced 
by the Delphi method and the choice of data analysis is guided by the aim of the 
research, its design, and the type of data collected. Due to the iterative nature of a 
Delphi study, data analysis is continuous and conducted throughout the course of the 
research. As such, previous rounds of analysis help to inform the following rounds of 
the Delphi process (Brady 2015). Both qualitative and quantitative analysis 
techniques were utilised for the current study.  
 
3.4.3.1 Quantitative analysis 
The data was primarily quantitative in a question and answer format utilising Likert 
scales (see Appendix D, E, and F). As the Delphi survey was emailed to participants all 
of the responses required entry into SPSS; questions were represented by columns 
and each row represented one participant. Each question was given a code and 
values were attributed to ratings on the Likert scale. As participants had the choice 
to respond to questions, there were some questions with missing data. These values 
were not replaced.  
 
The group’s collective opinion was determined through descriptive statistics (Shariff 
2015). Frequencies and P-P plots were used to assess the responses from the 
Australian panel experts and determine the level of consensus reached and the 
identification of any emerging issues or major discrepancies.  
 
According to some authors optimising a Delphi study requires a priori definition of 
consensus (Diamond et al. 2014; Meijering et al. 2013). Consensus measurement in 
Delphi studies has been presented in both qualitative and descriptive statistics 
including; the stipulation of a number of rounds, level of panel members agreement, 
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mode, mean/median rankings, coefficient of variation, and post group consensus 
(Von der Gracht 2012). For the current study, consensus was defined a priori and 
primarily agreement driven. The use of expert agreement as an indicator of 
consensus is considered particularly meaningful when Likert scales are utilised as in 
the case of the current study (Trevelyan & Robinson 2015). Hence, consensus was 
deemed to be achieved if a) using the valid percentage at least 70 percent, typically 
acceptable in Delphi research (Brewer 2007), of panel members agreed on the 
direction of the response and b) using the P-P plot there was normal distribution with 
a low variability and minimal outliers. Where any item achieved at least 70% 
agreement and there were no ‘polar-opposite’ responses of concern it was 
considered to have reached consensus. Items that reached consensus were 
eliminated from further rounds of the Delphi study. These items were deemed 
‘pertinent’ and included in the development of the OVIT.  
 
It is important to note that the quantitative analysis process reduced the original 
number of items for Round 2 of the Delphi Study. This was considered important for 
the sustainability of the research including the consideration of participant fatigue 
and diminishing potential attrition (Keeney et al. 2010; Trevelyan & Robinson 2015). 
 
3.4.3.2 Qualitative analysis 
While thematic analysis is encouraged in the Delphi method, there is limited direction 
in the literature about how to undertake this task (Brady 2015). As such the literature 
has revealed various processes for qualitative data analysis and in some cases clear 
direction on the analysis is not available. For the purpose of the current study classical 
content analysis of qualitative data was used to determine emerging themes from 
responses to open ended questions in all three Delphi rounds. This process involved 
the identification of concepts and dimensions found in the text responses of 
participants.  
 
The Delphi method can utilise computer packages or be processed manually (Shariff 
2015). For the purpose of the current study, manual qualitative data analysis was 
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employed. Under the direction provided by Elo and Kyngäs (2008), the process of 
data analysis involved the preparation, organising, and reporting of data.  
 
To prepare the data for analysis, text responses received from the Delphi rounds 
were transcribed verbatim to excel database. Consistent with the Profile Matrix (also 
referred to as a thematic matrix) presented by Kuckartz (2014), the questions of the 
Delphi survey were the structuring elements in the columns, and each row 
represented by one expert participant. As such the profile matrix allowed for both 
person- and question-oriented analysis.  
 
The information contained within each text cell was then deductively analysed to 
identify patterns, new information, and further curiosities. Prior knowledge from the 
literature, along with expert consultation through supervision, also assisted in 
identifying pertinent details and avenues for follow up. The content analysis was 
targeted by ensuring the research question was the primary focus (Elo & Kyngäs 
2008). Setting this parameter allowed the researcher to concentrate on units of 
analysis that were relevant to the topic and contributing to understanding of 
organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat. 
 
Commonly the results of qualitative analysis are fed back to participants in 
quantitative form (Hasson et al. 2000). This method of feedback along with the use 
of further open-ended questions was utilised in the current study.  
 
3.4.4 Delphi Rounds 
3.4.4.1  Delphi Round 1 
In contrast to the Classical Delphi technique, round one of this modified Delphi study 
was developed based on the results of the phase one literature review. The use of 
systematic review of the literature to inform round one of the Delphi method is 
established in previous research (Shariff 2015; Slade et al. 2014). Through the phase 
one examination of the research, relevant items related to intentional insider threat 
were determined. These items were considered to be of high pertinence (Keeney et 
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al. 2010) and the expert panel was required to give feedback and make judgements 
on these pre-selected items.  
 
It has been cautioned that using pre-existing information in a Delphi study may lead 
to bias or limit expert contribution (Hasson et al. 2000). To avoid such bias and ensure 
broad coverage of the topic of intentional insider threat, the addition of qualitative 
questions and options to provide additional comment via text boxes was 
implemented.  
 
The items identified through phase one of the research were translated into survey 
format questions. A Likert scale was chosen as it is commonly used in the design of 
Delphi questionnaires and provides the key ability to interpret data through level of 
agreement and consensus (Keeney et al. 2010). Trevelyan and Robinson (2015) 
suggested that Delphi research is best with four to seven Likert scale categories. 
Consistent with this recommendation, a five point Likert scale was chosen. However, 
a neutral response was included in the current study, which was discouraged by the 
same authors. In addition to the Likert scale response to questions, experts were also 
offered the opportunity to raise issues and ideas not already identified in the 
questionnaire through free text responses. The first round of the Delphi was 
conducted between 24 November 2015 and 07 December 2015.  
 
In order to address RQ2 the questions of the first Delphi round aimed to gain insight 
into (1) the experts’ understanding and definition of insider threat, (2) what 
organisational vulnerabilities they believe contribute to insider threat behaviour, and 
(3) how organisations can better protect themselves from insider threat. See 
Appendix D for the specific questions of Delphi round one.  
 
Following the submission of the 15 expert responses the results were compiled and 
analysed. In line with the underlying pragmatic approach to the research, qualitative 
and quantitative methods were used to analyse results in round one. 
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3.4.4.2 Delphi Round 2 
The round 2 questionnaire was developed based on the results obtained using the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis described above. The Delphi continued with the 
three main areas of enquiry as detailed above including targeted questions 
developed from the opinions of the participants (Skulmoski et al. 2007).  
 
The second round of the Delphi process was conducted between 05 February 2016 
and 29 February 2016. The second round was the most demanding of the three 
Delphi questionnaires. Round 2 included feedback and results in the Annex (see 
Appendix E) from the initial Delphi questionnaire and presented more open-
ended/narrative questions based on the outcomes of the initial round to gain further 
insights. This iterative process allowed experts the opportunity to validate (or 
dismiss) the main themes captured by the initial Delphi questionnaire (Catrantzos 
2012). The Delphi Round 2 questionnaire can be found in Appendix E. 
 
3.4.4.3 Delphi Round 3 
The final round of the Delphi process was conducted between 31 March 2016 and 10 
April 2016. Round three of the Delphi allowed the researcher to provide participants 
with the overall findings of the previous two rounds. Expert panel members were 
then asked to provide their level of agreement on the outcomes of the three main 
areas of enquiry (definition, vulnerabilities, and strengths). As such, this round was 
far more quantitative in approach in that it asked for a level of agreement to the 
findings. However, free text responses were also included for experts to provide 
further explanation if they chose. Additional questions that emerged from the Delphi 
Round 2 were also presented with Likert scale and free text responses. Based on 
guidance by Skulmoski et al. (2007) only three rounds of the Delphi were conducted 
as the process sufficiently answered RQ2 through achievement of consensus, 
satisfactory information exchange, and direction on the variables suitable for 
inclusion in the inventory. Furthermore, the use of three rounds is considered optimal 
to ensure results are meaningful whilst also remaining mindful of potential 
participant fatigue and attrition potential (Trevelyan & Robinson 2015). The round 3 
questionnaire can be found at Appendix F. 
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3.4.5 Delphi Summary 
Following the completion of the Delphi process, Delphi experts were provided with 
an overview of the Delphi findings. This process was considered important to verify 
and validate the findings as well as provide the opportunity to thank participants for 
their participation. This summary report, emailed to participants on the 25 May 2016, 
can be found in Appendix G. 
 
3.4.6 Assessing the reliability and validity of the Delphi Method 
3.4.6.1 Validity, Reliability, and Rigour 
Face validity is defined as a judgment by experts that the items of the Delphi survey 
are addressing the construct of intentional insider threat (Neuman 2011). How well 
the survey addresses the appropriate concept in terms of relevance and presentation 
are components of face validity. Therefore, in the current research it was important 
to demonstrate and ensure that each round of the survey was clear and unambiguous 
(Shariff 2015). The expert panel raised no concern and expressed no confusion 
throughout the Delphi process contributing to face validity indicators. Further the 
high level of agreement across the items indicates that the questions presented as 
part of the Delphi were addressing the construct of intentional insider threat.  
 
Content validity is secured in a Delphi method through involvement of expert 
participants as well as the use of iterative rounds (Shariff 2015) . Content validity is 
the assessment of whether a measure is representative of all aspects of the 
conceptual definition of a construct (Neuman 2011). The comprehensiveness of the 
Delphi surveys which were informed by published literature, careful analysis of each 
Delphi round, and inclusion of dimensions contributed by the expert panel members 
helped to increase content validity. In addition, the confirmation of the content 
throughout all three rounds and provision of a final summary paper allowed panel 
experts the opportunity to review outcomes.  
 
Finally, concurrent validity is addressed through the iterative nature of the Delphi 
process. The use of successive rounds (Hasson et al. 2000) continuing to target 
concepts related to intentional insider threat, helped to increase concurrent validity.  
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As already presented above ensuring reliability in the Delphi method was an 
important consideration. Reliability is defined as the ability of a method to yield 
consistently similar results (Shariff 2015). One way to address reliability is through 
the choice of data collection. In the current Delphi study, the use of a 5-point Likert 
scale contributed to enhance reliability. As Trevelyan and Robinson (2015) discussed 
following their exploration of Likert scale reliability, the optimal number of Likert 
categories is between four and seven, as smaller scales have poor reliability and 
discriminating power and are less favoured by participants.  
 
Diamond et al. (2014) recommended quality indicators for a Delphi study which 
included reproducible participant criteria, stated number of rounds, and clear criteria 
for consensus. Further, Hasson et al. (2000) provided guidance on ensuring a 
successful and credible Delphi study. They suggested that credibility (truthfulness), 
fittingness (applicability), auditability (consistency) and confirmability all add to the 
rigour of the study. The advice from Hasson et al. (2000) and Diamond et al. (2014)  
was clearly addressed in the current study. 
 
The Delphi method reduces or eliminates influences that affect reliability such as 
group bias, group think, and influence of strong group influencers (Keeney, McKenna 
& Hasson 2010). The transparency of expert selection criteria, maintaining anonymity 
of respondents, and ensuring public and private sector representation in the Delphi 
study further contributed to reliability (Hasson, Keeney & McKenna 2000; Lilja, 
Laakso & Palomki 2011).   
 
The success of the Delphi method can be enhanced through the organisation and 
administrative skills of the researcher (Hasson, Keeney & McKenna 2000). With this 
in mind, the use of a database to track the Delphi process was deemed an important 
attribute to reliability of the study. The database was developed with the objectives 
of the study in mind. It included coded details of each expert panel member, the 
industry and expertise represented, as well as details of the three Delphi rounds; 
including when emails were sent, when questionnaires were received, and any email 
reminders required.   
                                                P a g e  | 109 
 
In order to further demonstrate the rigour of the entire study, especially the Delphi 
method, the researcher kept a supervision journal throughout the course of the study 
(Brady 2015). Among other things this journal documented supervision sessions, 
methodological considerations, and major research decisions and rules. The journal 
was able to contribute to the trustworthiness of the study as it detailed 
contemplations and decisions made over the research journey, including 
identification of challenges and justification of decisions.  
 
Given the high attention to validity, reliability and rigour indicators in the design and 
delivery of the Delphi study, these methodological considerations are considered well 
defensible. 
 
3.5 Phase Three - Organisational Vulnerability to Intentional Insider Threat 
Inventory (OVIT) 
3.5.1 Inventory Design 
Based on the findings of both phase one and phase two of the project, the OVIT was 
developed. The Delphi process was an important component of the research, 
providing a means to consolidate the literature review findings (RQ1) and gain 
greater understanding of the most pertinent variables relevant to the construction of 
an inventory on Organisational Vulnerability to Insider Threat (OVIT). The 
implementation and validation of the inventory is also an important contributor to 
the Delphi study providing a means of validation of the Delphi process (Skulmoski et 
al. 2007).  
 
Under the pragmatic paradigm research methods are chosen to best support the 
question being investigated. The current research intended to examine concepts in 
the form of distinct variables which contribute to an organisation’s vulnerability to 
intentional insider threat. As such this phase of the study employed a quantitative 
cross-sectional approach to the research and the use of a survey as a valid form of 
enquiry (Creswell 2009, 2014). The exploratory and descriptive nature of the study 
suits the use of a cross-sectional survey design (administered at a single point in time) 
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where concerns such as being unable to investigate change or social processes are 
not pertinent (Creswell 2014).  
 
There are many other advantages to employing a cross-sectional survey for the 
current research, especially in the online format. These include the ability to collect 
data in an unobtrusive manner, access to a hard to reach sample, participant 
anonymity, and reducing the time required to collect valuable information (Alessi & 
Martin 2010).  
 
3.5.2 Development of the OVIT 
The Organisational Vulnerability to Intentional Insider Threat Inventory (OVIT) was 
developed from the information obtained in phases one and two of the current 
research. The instrument was designed specifically for the current research. The 
inventory included both the conceptualisation and operationalisation of relevant 
dimensions related to intentional insider threat as distilled through consensus during 
the Delphi process. These dimensions were transformed into question format, and as 
per the quantitative component of the Delphi study, responses were on a 5-point 
Likert Scale with anchors of Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree or Never to Always 
based on question type (see Sections 3.4.4.1 and 3.4.6.1 for justification of the use of 
5-point Likert scales in survey research).  
 
Due to the nature of the construct of organisational vulnerability to intentional 
insider threat the inventory was constructed to examine the three concepts 
(individual, organisational, and technical) as elucidated in the literature and Delphi 
process and in line with the initial conceptualisation presented in the literature 
review (Chapter 2). As such, the final OVIT Inventory was designed as three 
embedded instruments; OVIT – Individual, OVIT – Organisational, and OVIT – 
Technical (see Section 4; see Tables 21, 28, and 35). The initial online survey consisted 
of 242 questions; eight demographic (optional) questions and 234 questions relating 
to the three dimension of intentional insider threat (see Appendix I).  
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The online survey comprised six sections: 
• Introductory cover page 
• Demographic information 
• Section for questions addressing individual factors (OVIT – Individual, 70 
items); these questions explored the extent to which organisations assess and 
monitor a variety of known individual risk factors. The questions covered a 
wide range of individual vulnerabilities from social connections, psychological 
predispositions, motivation, staff behaviour, and duty-of-care perspectives. 
• Section for questions addressing organisational factors (OVIT – 
Organisational, 119 items); questions specifically explored the organisational 
environment and how this can enable negative insider actions. Questions 
covered policies, practices, and strategies that may contribute to intentional 
insider threat. 
• Section for questions addressing technical factors (OVIT – Technical, 45 
items); these questions looked at how organisations may detect, analyse, and 
identify intentional insider threat potential through technical means. The 
questions covered areas such as access, monitoring, and technical control 
strategies. 
• A thank you page and contact details. 
 
Prior to conducting the pilot the draft survey in its entirety was distributed to the 
researcher’s primary supervisor and two of the Delphi panel members to test the 
survey, and for feedback on the process, presentation and content. The feedback 
received was incorporated into the final pilot survey. In addition, the feedback cycle 
contributed to the face and content validity of the survey. The survey was then 
distributed for pilot testing. 
 
3.5.3 Pilot of the OVIT 
Pilot testing survey instruments is considered best-practice (Neuman 2011). It 
provides the researcher with the opportunity to make amendments to the design and 
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content and identify any potential problems with the survey itself, implementation, 
or form.  
 
The pilot survey was available online through Questionpro™ 
(www.questionpro.com). As per the guidance of Johanson and Brooks (2010) samples 
representative of the population provide the most accuracy of parameter estimates 
and they suggest that 30 respondents is the reasonable minimum expectation for 
survey development. Working on this recommendation, the Delphi expert panel 
members, as detailed above, along with a convenience sample of senior public 
service risk managers and consultants from professional service companies in 
Australia were invited via email to complete the survey. The initial invitees were also 
encouraged to recruit participants (snowball technique). The pilot study was viewed 
by 79 people, many of whom did not begin the survey. Of the 30 participants that 
started the survey, 23 completed it. The response rate was 76.67%.  
 
The results from the pilot attempted to improve the OVIT instrument, including 
validity, reliability and utility. It is acknowledged that a strong survey is able to 
accurately and consistently measure the constructs under investigation (Neuman 
2011). As such, determining the statistical rigour of the survey was of paramount 
importance.  
 
Due to the lower response rate (23 respondents) to the pilot study the ability to 
measure the reliability and validity through statistical analysis was compromised. 
Despite a seemingly low response to the pilot, which did not meet the target of 
Johanson and Brooks (2010), the number of participants does fall within routine 
recommendations for pilot and exploratory studies which have recommended 
between 10 and 30 participants in survey research (Johanson & Brooks 2010). Whilst 
statistical techniques were not performed, participants extended guidance and 
feedback on the survey, providing valuable content and face validity, as well as minor 
corrections to content, clarity, and completeness. The most often cited feedback was 
that the survey was very long; this was not surprising given the item list was 
intentionally oversampled, however, it was seen as imperative to reduce the length 
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of the survey before progressing. Several participants also made comment on the 
insight they were able to draw from the entirety of the survey and from the specific 
questions; a valuable outcome of participation and validation of the pragmatic 
approach whereby application and practice are important value considerations.   
 
3.5.3.1 Improvement to the OVIT 
Given the feedback on the length of the inventory it was deemed important to reduce 
the length. Analysis of the factorability of the pilot sample data aided in survey 
reduction. However, given the small sample size and the high number of items on 
each inventory (Individual, Organisational, and Technical), a factor analysis on the 
entire inventory or its three sub-inventories was not possible and violated guidance 
on minimum suitability for factor analysis (Hair et al. 2010). Given that statistical 
analyses were unable to be completed on the pilot OVIT, the researcher returned to 
qualitative and manual form of survey improvement. 
 
A review of all of the items of the inventory was undertaken by the researcher in 
order to determine any duplicate or superfluous questions. Reducing the number of 
items was important from a practical perspective, but also for the future factor 
analytic process, where reduction of large numbers of variables is encouraged early 
to aid better factor solutions (MacCallum et al. 1999). To ensure this process was 
robust, the potential items for removal were confirmed with the researcher’s 
supervisor and one panel expert for consensus. Through this process the inventories 
were reduced to 56 individual items, 90 organisational items, and 27 technical items. 
 
3.5.4 Inventory administration 
Consistent with the administration of the pilot study, the final OVIT was administered 
in its entirety online using Questionpro™ (www.questionpro.com). Questionpro™ 
provided the researcher the ability to construct and host the online survey in one 
destination. Participants were directed to the survey link, initially through email and 
then through other advertising means, in order to complete the survey. Responses 
to the survey are automatically coded and the data is stored by Questionpro™. 
Automatic reporting by Questionpro™ allows for detailed understanding of 
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responses through indication of views, dropouts, and completed surveys which are 
easily exported to SPSS for further analysis. An entry level subscription was chosen 
for this research. This limited some of the services, available through upgrade, but 
was not considered to negatively affect the current study or its ability to address the 
relevant research questions. The entry level package provided the ability to collect, 
store, and export the data relevant to meet the needs of the doctoral project.  
 
There are many benefits to online surveys including the comparative low cost and 
ability to yield responses in real time and without the influence of researcher bias 
(Neuman 2011). For the current study the use of an online survey also provided 
opportunity for geographical distribution and a way to attempt to increase response 
rates.  
 
3.5.5  Sampling 
This study aimed to develop an organisational inventory to assess an organisations 
vulnerability to intentional insider threat. In its broadest sense all, and any, 
organisation may benefit from the implementation of the inventory. However, it is 
not possible to access the full population in the design, validation, or rollout of the 
survey. As such a sampling strategy is required. Sampling is the process of defining 
the population under investigation and in a mixed method approach can combine 
both random and purposeful samples (Creswell 2009).  
 
The sampling strategy for the Delphi process and the pilot study are detailed above. 
For the deployment of the full OVIT, probability sampling and representation of the 
full population was not feasible. Instead, non-probability sampling was employed as 
it is considered the most appropriate method when a sample frame is not available 
(Sheehan 2002) or when the population is very large (Etikan 2016).  
 
Convenience sampling utilises participants who are easily accessible whilst purposive 
sampling is the deliberate selection of participants due to their knowledge and 
experience (Etikan 2016). In the current research, the non-random selection of 
individuals available to the researcher, through convenience and purposive sampling, 
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included Delphi experts and other networks. In order to achieve the high number of 
responses required to undertake relevant statistical analyses, further outreach to a 
broader non-probability sample included a LinkedIn post requesting participation 
(https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/people-grudge-agenda-may-cause-crippling-
damage-justine-bedford/?trackingId=rM770ON3AeQ87sMwnVkIMA%3D%3D), 
snowball sampling, direct request to specific organisations and to other Doctoral 
students, and inclusion of the research opportunity on the Australian Psychological 
Society website (http://www.psychology.org.au/academic/research_opps/). While 
non-probability sampling is a valid approach to the quantitative study of difficult to 
reach populations (Neuman 2011) it is acknowledged to be a limitation of the current 
study. The sampling method does not determine the depth of knowledge or 
participants understanding of the survey questions, which may be influenced by 
factors such as role in the organisation, commitment, and interest in IIT and related 
work behaviours.   
 
3.5.5.1 Sample size 
In order to facilitate the statistical analysis required to demonstrate rigour and 
meaningfulness a large sample size is required in quantitative research helping to 
reduce sampling error and provide adequate statistical power (Creswell 2009). The 
sample size is further determined by the number of elements included in the study 
(Hair et al. 2010). The purpose of the current study is to develop a set of inventories 
which assess an organisation’s vulnerability to intentional insider threat. As 
previously stated, it is important that the entire inventory is reliable and valid but 
also, from a practical perspective, that it is not prohibitive in length. The use of factor 
analysis not only contributes to reliability and validity indicators but also contributes 
to data reduction through the identification of superfluous questions (Hair et al. 
2010).  
 
When it comes to determining the appropriate sample size to undertake a factor 
analysis there is considerable disagreement. This has led to confusion and overall has 
not served researchers well. Determination of an adequate sample size has included 
advice on absolute sample sizes, sample to variable ratios, and post-hoc 
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determinations discovered at the completion of data analysis. From an absolute 
sample size perspective, 100 cases is considered poor by some (Comrey & Lee 2013) 
but, under some conditions, adequate for others (Hair et al. 2010). According to 
several authors, a sample of 300 is considered a good size for any factor analysis 
(Comrey & Lee 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell 2013; Yong & Pearce 2013). Hair et al. (2010) 
state that in a factor analysis a sample of fewer than 50 is inadequate and that at 
least a sample size of 100 is preferred. Further, Kline (2005) recommends that as long 
as factor loadings are greater than 0.6, a sample size in excess of 200 is acceptable. 
Worthington and Whittaker (2006) demonstrated that absolute sample sizes 
endorsed in publications ranged between 84 and 411. 
 
There are complex dynamics to be considered when conducting factor analysis and 
some researchers have argued that a minimum threshold for sample size does not 
exist and invariant across studies (Costello & Osborne 2005; de Winter et al. 2009; 
MacCallum et al. 1999). Whilst others recommend that adequate sample size is best 
discovered at the completion of data analysis (Cabrera-Nguyen 2010). Those 
suggesting that minimal sample size is not absolute instead look to alternative 
determinations including sample to variable ratio (recommendations range from 3:1 
through to 20:1, although studies with as low as 2:1 have been reported; Costello & 
Osborne 2005), the factorability of the correlation matrix, measures of sampling 
adequacy, high communalities, high correlations and loadings, and items per factor 
(Cabrera-Nguyen 2010; de Winter et al. 2009; Guadagnoli & Velicer 1988; MacCallum 
et al. 1999; Williams et al. 2010).  
 
Given that the current research is part of a doctoral study, time to collect data is not 
unlimited and this restricted the researcher’s capacity to achieve a very large sample. 
In addition, it is well reported (and accepted) that low response rates are not 
uncommon when targeting mid-high level management participation or experts 
within a particular field (Cycyota & Harrison 2006) as is the case with the current 
study. Taking into consideration the above guidelines, noting caution in determining 
an absolute a priori threshold for factor analysis (MacCallum et al. 1999), the aim was 
to achieve 200 valid responses to all three inventories, satisfying various approaches 
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to determining minimum sample size, assuming that tests for sampling adequacy, 
communalities, and adequate factor loadings were also achieved.  
 
3.6 Data Analysis Strategy  
As already discussed, the primary purpose of the current research is to develop a 
diagnostic inventory assessing organisational vulnerability to intentional insider 
threat. In order to determine the best inventory questions and the validity and 
reliability of each of the inventories (Individual, Organisational, Technical), statistical 
analysis is required. The statistical analysis software, IBM SPSS version 25, was used 
to analyse the data of phase three of the current study. The following section 
describes the process of data extraction, preparation, and analysis. 
 
3.6.1 Extracting the data 
Responses to the final OVIT were collected online through Questionpro™. This online 
survey data management system was able to collect all data electronically which was 
then downloaded directly as an Excel file and exported to SPSS. Once available in SPSS 
the process of investigation followed the recommendations of Hair et al. (2010) and 
Creswell (2009), beginning with a check for inconsistencies in the data and 
examination for any missing data, followed by testing the assumptions of multivariate 
analysis (see Data analysis and interpretation Chapter 4). 
 
3.6.2 Summary statistics 
Descriptive statistics that summarise the demographic characteristics of the 
participants was extracted and collated. The purpose of this was two-fold. Firstly, it 
afforded an ability to identify suitability for further multivariate analysis (Hair et al. 
2010) and secondly, it provided the researcher with an overview of the data set. 
Serving as a precursor to the EFA, calculations of the correlations between variables 
were also performed. This helped determine the potential for the EFA and provided 
an initial view of the relationships between variables. Results can be found in Chapter 
4. 
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3.6.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical approach which can be used in the 
construction, refinement, and evaluation of surveys (Williams et al. 2010). Whilst 
factor analysis has many promising uses, in relation to the current study it aided the 
construction of three inventories to measure intentional insider threat, reduction of 
a large number of questions into a smaller set, and provided construct validity 
evidence (Field 2013; Hair et al. 2010; Williams et al. 2010).  
 
There are two types of factor analysis; confirmatory and exploratory. Due to the 
exploratory nature of the current study, including its progression into unchartered 
territory, the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was considered the most appropriate. 
This is in part due to the fact that the current research is not a test of theory and has 
no significant assumptions or expectations that are required of a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA; Williams et al. 2010).  
 
As already elucidated above, the aim of the current study is to develop a diagnostic 
inventory to assess organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat. Given 
the current state of research and practice in the area, this research is exploratory in 
nature. The research problem well suits the use of exploratory factor analysis, where 
the statistical technique can provide a way to summarise and condense a large 
number of inventory questions in to a smaller set and to best define constructs which 
underlie the original question sets (Hair et al. 2010; Hooper 2012; Williams et al. 
2010).  
 
From a data summary perspective, the EFA provides structure to the data. Through 
EFA individual variables are grouped together to represent a collective expression of 
a concept (Hair et al. 2010). In data reduction, the EFA helps to reduce the large 
number of inventory questions, in to a smaller and more manageable question set, 
whilst still retaining the nature and meaning of the original questions (Hair et al. 2010; 
Hooper 2012).    
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As factor analysis is an interdependence technique it is driven by both statistical 
assumptions and its underlying conceptual assumptions (Hair et al. 2010). As such, 
this multivariate technique is complementary to the pragmatic paradigm 
underpinning the current research. Consideration on the choice of variables is based 
on both statistical qualities and researcher judgement.  
 
To support the current research an EFA is determined as the most suitable statistical 
analysis. Whilst EFA has been described as “a complex procedure with few absolute 
guidelines and many options” (Costello & Osborne 2005, p. 1) decisions must be 
made in an attempt to yield the best outcomes. Following exploration of the various 
extraction methods available, the Maximum Likelihood (ML) has been recommended 
as yielding the best results when data are relatively normally distributed (Costello & 
Osborne 2005). Therefore the current study used the ML.  
 
“The goal of rotation is to simplify and clarify the data structure” (Costello & Osborne 
2005, p. 3). Some authors discuss that in the social sciences the use of orthogonal 
rotation may be flawed as it is highly probable that units of interest are correlated 
(Costello & Osborne 2005; Hooper 2012). They determine that orthogonal rotation 
will not effectively and accurately produce a solution. Instead, the same authors 
recommend oblique rotation to reduce the loss of valuable information especially 
where factors are correlated. Oblique rotation (Promax) is chosen for the current 
research due to the assumption that factors are allowed to correlate (Costello & 
Osborne 2005; Field 2013; Hooper 2012).  
 
As the OVIT consists of three embedded inventories, each was factor analysed 
separately. This is consistent with the advice of MacCallum et al. (1999) that it is 
“preferable” to analyse smaller inventories where variables adequately represent 
content of the domain.  
 
3.6.4 Assessing the reliability and validity of the OVIT 
When developing an empirically based survey instrument it is paramount that the 
inventory is valid and reliable and can therefore lead to meaningful results and 
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interpretation (Creswell 2009, 2014). Reliability is determined when an inventory is 
internally consistent, stable over time, and there is no change to administration and 
scoring (Creswell 2014). In contrast, validity is determined by the inventory’s ability 
to provide meaningful and useful inferences (Creswell 2014). Neuman (2011) 
discusses that achieving perfect reliability and validity is not possible but that 
measures should be taken to achieve the most statistically sound instrument. 
 
As the OVIT is a newly developed set of three inventories, specifically for this 
research, there is no previous assessment of validity or reliability. As such, this section 
will provide an overview of the design of the OVIT and its ability to connect 
measurement to constructs.  
 
As previously discussed, the pragmatic paradigm underpins the current study. As such 
discussion of validity and reliability of the survey will be presented from the 
pragmatic worldview and with relevance to the current research. It is acknowledged 
there are some forms of validity which are not able to be addressed due to the 
limitations of the current research. For example, criterion validity and its subtypes 
which aim to measure the validity of an instrument through comparison and external 
verification sources (Neuman 2011). Concurrent validity relies on the ability to 
measure validity against a pre-existing measure of the construct (Neuman 2011). As 
the OVIT is a unique contribution to the study of insider threat, concurrent validity is 
unable to be assessed due to a lack of pre-existing and accepted measure of insider 
threat. Further, predictive validity relies on a future event or behaviour to verify the 
construct (Neuman 2011). The cross-sectional nature of the study prohibits 
assessment of predictive validity, which is a limitation of the current research. 
However, future longitudinal research will enable a better overview of concurrent 
validity. Further, case studies and organisationally specific research can assist in the 
assessment of the validity of the OVIT. The discussion below captures the most 
relevant reliability and validity indicators for the current research.  
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3.6.4.1 Face and content validity 
Face validity is defined as a judgment by experts that the items of a survey are able 
to measure the construct (Neuman 2011). It has been argued that face validity is a 
weak form of validity due to its reliance on subjective criteria (Jones 1999). It has 
therefore been commented that face validity does not contribute significantly to the 
validity assessment and should be disregarded (Engel & Schutt 2009; Royal 2016). 
However, other authors consider that face validity has a role, especially in the 
development of new surveys, and provides a precursory assessment of validity prior 
to consideration of more effective and robust validity checks (Engel & Schutt 2009). 
Content validity is the assessment of whether a measure is representative of all 
aspects of the conceptual definition of a construct (Neuman 2011). As such, content 
validity is considered a valuable asset to survey design and is a highly recommended 
inclusion (Engel & Schutt 2009). 
 
Both face and content validity were assessed in parallel during the current research. 
Face and content validity was established through reference to peer-reviewed 
literature in establishing items for the survey. Further the Delphi method provided a 
means for subject matter experts to determine insider threat items of high 
pertinence. Establishing consensus of the most relevant items through the Delphi 
process contributed equally to face and content validity. The review of the draft 
survey, for content and form, by experienced researchers and experts in the field 
provided additional support for the validity of the content. Finally, the 
implementation of a pilot survey also contributed to the measurement validity of the 
study. Whilst factor analysis was conducted during the pilot phase, the three 
inventories of the OVIT were subjected to factor analysis providing further support 
for face validity (see Section 4.4.3). 
 
3.6.4.2 Convergent validity 
Convergent validity is established when multiple measures of the same construct are 
associated with one another (Neuman 2011). Convergent validity is achieved when a 
high statistical correlation is found to exist between the items measuring their 
intended concepts (Hair et al. 2010). Convergent validity is established through factor 
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analysis. Again, due to the low response rate in the pilot study factor analysis was not 
possible. However, factor analysis of the three inventories of the final OVIT was found 
to be at an adequate level (see Data analysis and interpretation for EFA results). As 
such, the variables under the three concepts (individual, organisational, and 
technical) helped to better understand the distinct differences and aided diagnosis of 
organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat.  
 
The use of triangulation is also a component of the current study. Triangulation 
“seeks convergence, corroboration, and correspondence of results from different 
methods” (Creswell 2011, p. 62). The three phases of the current study, especially 
the Delphi process, pilot study, and final inventory, provide a means to determine the 
representativeness of items across different methods. These different methods 
allowed for corroboration of findings as well as helping to validate each separate 
phase of the research process.   
 
3.6.4.3 Reliability 
As previously stated it is not possible to achieve perfect validity and reliability. 
However, it is important to ensure that both validity and reliability are ably 
demonstrated. Interestingly, a reliable research study can be achieved without 
achieving validity. However, the reverse is not true; in order for research to be valid 
it must also be reliable (Engel & Schutt 2009). Therefore, reliability must be indicated 
in order for validity to follow. Neuman (2011) discussed three types of reliability: 1) 
measurement reliability, the consistency or dependability of the measure of a 
variable; 2) stability reliability, a measure of reliability across time and demonstrating 
consistency; and 3) representative reliability, a measure that yields consistent results 
across different groups.  
 
Reliability of a measure can be enhanced through the clear conceptualisation of all 
constructs, increasing the level of measurement, using multiple indicators of a 
variable, and implementation of a pilot study. With respect to the current survey, all 
four of these potential improvements to reliability were considered (see Table 2). 
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Table 2: Reliability indicators of the study. 
Conceptualisation Review of current definitions, models and frameworks. 
Development of an intentional insider threat definition 
by Delphi experts. 
Increasing 
measurement 
The use of a 5-point Likert scale rather than a 
dichotomous response or 2-4 point Likert scale. 
Multiple indicators Several items in the OVIT addressing the one item of 
consensus by the Delphi panel 
Pilot study Implementation of peer, supervisor, and expert review 
of the draft survey as well as a pilot survey to Delphi 
experts (and beyond) 
Source: Developed for this study. 
 
Reliability of a survey may be determined by the internal consistency of a scale using 
the reliability coefficient (Hair et al. 2010). Hair et al. (2010) discusses the use of the 
Cronbach’s alpha to be the most widely used and accepted measure of reliability. The 
outcomes of the Cronbach’s alpha analyses indicated the entire OVIT (α = .98) and 
the three separate OVIT inventories (Individual α = .96; Organisational α = .96; 
Technical α = .95) to be reliable instruments as were the underlying Factors (see Data 
Analysis and Interpretation sections 4.4.3.4, 4.4.3.8, and 4.4.3.12, for further 
information).  
 
Two other common measures of reliability include inter-rater reliability and test-
retest reliability (Neuman 2011). Both of these types of reliability were not 
considered applicable to the current research due to the type of data collected and 
the use of a cross-sectional survey design. As with the predictive validity above, 
future use of the survey may provide opportunity to assess the instrument through a 
longitudinal design and achieve test-retest reliability; however, due to the 
parameters of the doctoral research, this was not achieved for the current study.  
 
3.7 Limitations 
Significant effort was made to ensure that the current study was able to balance 
statistical requirements and methodological rigour with practical utility. Under the 
pragmatic paradigm the research questions are considered central to the 
investigation and methods to extract valuable insight. All three phases of the current 
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research (literature review, Delphi method, and survey) were able to provide a 
positive contribution, academically and practically. Although the research was based 
on an exploratory and mixed method design, the main purpose was to develop a set 
of inventories to assess an organisation’s vulnerability to intentional insider threat, 
hence greater emphasis on quantitative research.  
 
Insider threat is a relatively new field of research. Certainly it has gained momentum, 
especially in the past decade and with the increasing focus on cyber security. 
However, the overall study of insider threat lacks theoretical underpinnings and 
direction. As such, the current research is not theoretically driven and without 
theoretical underpinning to inform interpretation of results, there is a level of 
subjectivity as determined by the researcher. However, this concern is partially 
mitigated by the chosen philosophical approach, the pragmatic worldview. The 
pragmatic paradigm does not require theory for application as it holds the research 
problem itself as the central consideration from which data collection and analysis is 
chosen (Mackenzie & Knipe 2006).  
 
The use of mixed methods in the research design contributes to the depth and 
breadth of research outcomes. However, the results are still limited by the 
exploratory and cross-sectional design. Applying the OVIT to real case studies and 
determining its utility in demonstrating vulnerabilities is an avenue for future 
research and can assist to build on reliability and validity indicators of the OVIT. The 
ability to generalise findings and assert causality is restricted and only overcome by 
capacity for future longitudinal research (Creswell 2014) which is beyond the scope 
of the current doctoral studies, however the strongest validation would be for the 
OVIT to predict actual insider exploits that can only be determined by a longitudinal 
study (Greitzer et al. 2013). The resultant EFA outcomes are exploratory and further 
future studies will help to sharpen the outcomes.  
 
As already discussed there are statistical limitations relevant to the methodology. Not 
all types of validity and reliability are able to be determined in the current research 
and will require further future exploration. The sample size in the pilot, whilst 
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meeting recommendations by several researchers (Johanson & Brooks 2010), 
allowed for pragmatic survey input including content, comprehension, and 
presentation. However, the pilot sample was not sufficient to satisfy minimum 
requirements for statistical analyses. Also, the capacity to achieve the desired 200 
participants for the final OVIT analyses is potentially contentious given the difficulty 
in recruiting management and time poor responders.  
 
Further, the EFA is largely criticised for its subjectivity, whereby results of the analysis 
are determined by the researcher (Williams et al. 2010). Further, Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007) noted that the process of the EFA, including the choice of rotation and 
factors to retain, are not theoretically underpinned, but rather pragmatic and 
therefore rely on the judgment of the researcher. In order to reduce such bias, review 
processes were used throughout the study to ensure ongoing expert, colleague, and 
supervisor input. Finally, a limitation for the EFA is that the use of oblique rotation 
methods can present risk of being sample specific and lacking generalisability, 
especially when there is small sample size and/or low cases-to-variable ratio (Hair et 
al. 2010).  
 
From a practical perspective the OVIT is able to provide organisations with education, 
understanding, and a baseline measure of overall vulnerability to intentional insider 
threat. It is hypothesised that the implementation of appropriate countermeasures 
to address areas of vulnerability should reduce an organisation’s overall level of 
vulnerability. Again this assumption is not able to be tested within the restraints of 
the current project. It is, however, recommended that organisations may track 
progress through re-administration of the OVIT and that over time, predictive utility 
of the survey as well as risk parameters (such as what constitutes a low, moderate, 
or high level of vulnerability) can be determined. 
 
A common concern of survey instruments is their reliance on self-report data. It is 
accepted that respondents to the OVIT may present bias including impression 
management and/or self-deception (Paulhus 1998). The OVIT was not designed to 
include measures of undesirable response styles. However, the survey result 
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outcomes were triangulated against the Delphi results and extant literature to 
establish a level of reliability. The absence of a measure of undesirable responding is 
a limitation that may be controlled by ensuring multiple members of an organisation, 
across various disciplines, participate in the completion of the OVIT. Having three 
separate inventories may be of significant benefit as staff can respond to the 
inventory specific to their role and/or level of organisational knowledge. Further, 
from a practical and academic perspective, additional qualitative measures and 360° 
feedback questionnaires may provide a way to further address this limitation.  
 
The current study was designed to address a considerable limitation in the extant 
literature on insider threat, namely the absence of significant Australian contribution. 
As such the Delphi method was aimed at gathering Australian expert opinion on 
insider threat. It is possible that Australian expert opinion and experience differs from 
that of experts in other countries. Given this, it would be unwise to suggest the 
findings could be generalised internationally.  
 
Finally, as discussed earlier, the study of insider threat is relatively new. A search of 
the available literature on insider threat especially that which relates to 
organisational vulnerability reveals it has received limited and narrow focus. 
However, this does not necessarily determine that research on the topic is not being 
conducted; only that it is not available through public means. There are several 
possible reasons for a lack of publication and presentation of research and 
experience; including potential damage to reputation (Sarkar 2010) or sensitive and 
classified material. Certainly the limited and redacted reporting on Project Slammer 
(Director of Central Intelligence 1990) suggests that further classified knowledge may 
be available but inaccessible. There was an attempt to overcome this problem 
through an extensive literature review, anonymous participation in the Delphi 
method and survey, and purposive sampling techniques. However it is possible that 
the items of the OVIT might have omitted or not factored in all dimensions of insider 
threat.  
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3.8 Ethical Considerations 
In conducting research it is asserted that researchers consider and anticipate ethical 
issues that may arise throughout the research journey (Creswell 2009, 2011, 2014). 
According to Neuman (2011) a commitment to ethical conduct in research helps to 
preserve the integrity of the research process as well as the researcher and 
participants. To retain ethical integrity, University of Southern Queensland (USQ) 
places a strong emphasis on the promotion of ethical conduct. The ethical guidelines 
of the USQ are monitored by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) and 
before the conduct of any research ethics approval must be granted. Human Ethics 
Research Approval was applied for and granted on 08 October 2015 and was valid 
until expiry on 08 October 2018 (see Appendix H). The HREC also requires the 
submission of Ethics Progress Reports at regular intervals.  
 
Daft (2007, p. 374) defined ethics as “the code of moral principles and values that 
governs the behaviours of a person or group with respect to what is right and wrong”. 
History, society and the environment has an effect on an individual’s ethical values, 
along with organisational influence and professional standards (Daft 2007). In the 
workplace managerial ethics is defined as “[s]tandards of conduct and moral 
judgment used by managers of organisations in carrying out their business” (Bartol 
et al. 2008, p. 112).  
 
As an Organisational Psychologist the researcher is expected to follow the Australian 
Psychological Society Code of Ethics (The Australian Psychological Society 2007, p. 6) 
which “articulates and promotes ethical principles, and sets specific standards to 
guide both psychologists and members of the public to a clear understanding and 
expectation of what is considered ethical professional conduct by psychologists”. The 
code itself is built around three general ethical principles: Respect for the rights and 
dignity, propriety, and integrity of people. The APS Code of Ethics requires that when 
psychologists undertake research they also observe specific principles. In support of 
the APS Code of Ethics there are also Ethical Guidelines which aid ethical decision 
making, along with an ethical decision-making model (see Appendix J) to assist with 
working through ethical dilemmas.  
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The current research project falls under the definition of human research by the 
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (The National Health and 
Medical Research Council 2007 (updated March 2014)) given that it involves 
participants taking part in surveys and the Delphi method. Taking into consideration 
the kind of harm, level of harm, and likelihood of harm to participants, the current 
research is considered to be low risk (The National Health and Medical Research 
Council 2007 (updated March 2014)). Still, the research requires anticipation of any 
relevant ethical dimensions (Creswell 2009). Possible ethical dilemmas, hurdles, and 
other considerations for the current research are addressed in Appendix K. 
 
3.9 Summary 
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the research design, paradigm, and strategy for 
the current study. Through detailing the research methodology, data collection, and 
methods of statistical analysis the rigour of the study was elucidated. Whilst the 
research is underpinned by a robust approach to investigation, it is not without 
limitations, which are acknowledged. Finally the ethical considerations of the study 
have been identified.   
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4 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the research design, strategy and methods 
adopted by the study to achieve the aims and objectives of the research as well as 
answering the research questions. It also described the strengths and limitations of 
the mixed method approach to the study and focused on a critical justification of the 
research analysis techniques. This chapter reports on the results of the three phases 
of the research project.   
 
4.2 Phase One: The Literature Review 
Phase one included a thematic analysis of the extant literature as a basis for 
determining the pertinent aspects of IIT as they relate to the aims of the study and 
the research questions. Based on the exhaustive review of literature available on IIT 
141 items were determined relevant for inclusion in the phase two of the study. 
These were themes in the literature, focal areas of discussion, and directions in past 
research regarding where future research could be of benefit. To address the 
research aims, objectives and questions, the review looked at words and themes 
that related to the definition of IIT, (see Table 3), factors/variables considered to 
increase or decrease IIT (see Table 4), as well as organisational conditions thought 
to mitigate and moderate IIT (see Table 5). Italicised items are those that reached 
consensus in the following Delphi study phase.  
 
4.2.1 The definition 
As previously discussed, there are several definitions of insider threat available in the 
literature. However, in the absence of a widely accepted definition a more precise 
description for Australia may provide assistance to alleviate the fragmented 
conceptions which exist. As such the current study looked at current definitions, and 
presented the  most used words to a panel of Australian experts for further consensus 
and clarification. The words from the literature are presented in  
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Table 3. An Australian definition of intentional insider threat is provided in Section 
4.3.1. 
 
Table 3: Definition of intentional insider threat: Words from the literature. 
 Action 
 Contractor/Consultant 
 Critical Information 
 Employee 
 Inaction 
 Intent 
 Knowledge 
 Legitimate Access 
 Loss 
 Person of Trust 
 Protected Information 
 Sensitive Information 
 Unauthorised 
 Values Assets 
 
4.2.2 Increasing and decreasing intentional insider threat 
The tables below outline key areas identified in the literature that have potential to 
affect organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat. Table 4 provides the 
variables that were derived from the content analysis that decrease and increase 
potential for IIT. As can be determined in the table below there are a vast number of 
factors which affect IIT. 
 
Table 4: Factors that increase or decrease IIT based on literature review. 
Factors considered to decrease IIT 
 Ability to accept and integrate feedback 
 Aligned values 
 Behavioural monitoring 
 Benchmarking 
 Computer monitoring 
 Conscientiousness 
 Control of physical security environment 
 Cultural understanding 
 Employee assistance programs 
 Extracurricular involvement 
 Help-seeking 
 Impeded access/access controls 
 Loyalty 
 Minimum privileges 
 Ongoing education 
 Positive economic position 
 Positive IT subculture 
 Positive organisational culture 
 Positive reputation 
 Positive support networks 
 Random auditing 
 Relevant IT policies and procedures 
 Relevant security policies and procedures 
 Resilience 
 Security awareness training 
 Self-awareness 
 Sharing knowledge of insider risks outside 
the organisation 
 Sophistication/knowledge of IT staff 
 Sound and reliable behaviour outside of 
work 
 Sound judgment 
 Sound work history 
 Strict exit controls on staff leaving the 
organisation 
 Strict use of probation 
 Strong leadership 
 Vetting and background checks 
Factors considered to increase IIT 
 Criminal associations 
 Disparate values 
 Disgruntlement 
 Ego/sense of entitlement 
                                                P a g e  | 131 
 
 Ethical flexibility 
 Foreign attachments 
 History of security violations 
 Increased market competition 
 IT job market/skills shortage 
 Lack of leadership 
 Limited authentication procedures 
 Mental health concerns 
 Moles 
 Negative/stressful life events 
 Old IT policies and procedures 
 Outsourcing work 
 Personal computer behaviour; addiction, 
delinquency, etc. 
 Planting: logic bombs, key logging 
 Poor reputation 
 Poor sophistication of IT systems 
 Social networking 
 Targeted by competitors/foreigners 
 Use of contractors/transient workforce 
 Use of personal technology devices 
 Financial pressures 
 High IT staff turnover 
 Increase in number of cyber adversaries 
 Ineffective/lack of collaboration with 
others 
 Lack of electronic access controls 
 Lack of social connectedness 
 Limited hardware controls 
 Mobile workforce 
 Motivation 
 No/limited auditing and monitoring 
 Organisational change 
 Overseas/remote/ 
satellite locations 
 Personality vulnerability/disorder 
 Poor organisational culture 
 Poor security culture 
 Reduced budget/economic position 
 Speed of developing technologies 
 Unsecured networks 
 
4.2.3 Organisational conditions related to intentional insider threat 
The research also presents variables extracted from content analysis regarding 
organisational conditions thought to moderate, and potentially mitigate IIT. These 
variables include organisational policies, processes, and other actions to reduce IIT. 
Table 5 provides the list of variables related to organisational conditions thought to 
moderate/mitigate organisational susceptibility to insider threat.  
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Table 5: Organisational variables that may mitigate or moderate IIT based on 
literature review. 
Variables thought to moderate or mitigate insider threat 
 Access 
 Background updates/re-evaluations 
 Bag checks 
 Collaboration with government or other 
businesses 
 Cyber vetting 
 Drug and alcohol testing 
 Electronic access controls 
 Employee assistance programs/ 
Staff counselling 
 Employee engagement 
 Employee monitoring 
 Employee screening and selection 
 Impeded access 
 Increase in staff counterproductive 
workplace behaviour 
 IT monitoring of employees 
 IT/Cyber security functions 
 Leadership 
 Management 
 Organisational behaviour monitoring 
 Organisational culture 
 Organisational economic pressures 
 Organisational values 
 Outsourcing 
 Overseas locations 
 Performance evaluations 
 Physical access controls 
 Policy and procedures 
 Polygraph 
 Psychological assessment 
 Random auditing 
 Recruitment 
 Psychological assessment 
 Random auditing 
 Recruitment 
 Referee checks 
 Regulatory oversight 
 Rotation of duties 
 Security awareness/education 
 Security culture 
 Security governance 
 Security reporting 
 Separation of duties 
 Size of the organisation 
 Social engineering 
 Specific insider threat training 
 Staff morale 
 Team members reporting 
 Trust 
 Undue secrecy 
 Use of probation 
 Vetting 
 Video/CCTV 
 
4.2.4 Working model of organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat 
based on literature. 
The conceptual model below (Figure 13) provides a synthesis of the literature review 
and content analysis in visual form. This model demonstrates the simple set 
relationship between the three concepts of organisational vulnerability to intentional 
insider threat. It is conceptually determined that organisational vulnerability to 
intentional insider threat is at greatest risk where the individual, organisational, and 
technical factors intersect. 
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Figure 13: A conceptual model of insider threat 
 
Source: Developed for this study. 
 
The current research proposes that increasing vulnerability is experienced when 
there are weaknesses across any or all of the three risk areas; organisational, 
individual, and technical. As such, the overlapping sections of any two factors 
represent an increasing organisational vulnerability to IIT and present opportunity for 
mitigation against IIT. However, it is only when all three are present that an actual IIT 
event is possible.   
 
4.3 Phase Two: The Delphi Method 
This section introduces the results of the Delphi study. The aim of the Delphi study 
was to generate, validate, and determine pertinent items of intentional insider threat 
to form a diagnostic inventory. The Delphi study was conducted over three 
consecutive rounds.  Whilst the overall aim of the Delphi process was to determine 
relevant variables for inclusion in a diagnostic inventory of intentional insider threat, 
each round of the Delphi had its own individual aim.  
 
The sections below provide a summary of the Delphi results as they relate to the 
research questions and support the development of a diagnostic inventory to assess 
organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat.  
Organisational Risk 
Factors
• Org culture, HR policies, 
security awareness training, 
etc
Technical Risk 
Factors
• Type of access, IT 
controls, auditing, etc
Individual Risk 
Factors
• Personality, stressors, 
MH issues
Greatest risk 
for insider 
threat  
Indicator of 
vulnerability to 
IIT  
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4.3.1 An Australian definition of intentional insider threat 
Generally there was a strong agreement on the key words associated with defining 
intentional insider threat. Results from Round 1 of the Delphi identified only three 
words from the literature in the definition not resonating well with the panel of 
experts and did not reach consensus. These terms included action, inaction, and 
contractor/consultant. The other 12 terms identified in the literature reached 
consensus (see Table 3).  
 
Textual analysis of the overall input from panel experts through open-ended 
questions during the Delphi process assisted to uncover common themes. The words 
in Figure 14 appear in alphabetical order, however, their size relates to the frequency 
of appearance in panel expert responses through the Delphi process.  Therefore, it is 
clear that the word organisation appears the most in the definition. The terms threat, 
employee, information, and intentional are also high ranking terms.  
 
Figure 14: Text cloud showing frequency of words in summary of definition. 
 
Based on the words achieving consensus and the strength of terms offered by the 
panel members, a definition of intentional insider threat was constructed and 
presented to the panel. 
Intentional insider threat is when a person of trust (employee, 
contractor, consultant, vendor) who has/had legitimate access to an 
organisation attempts to cause harm through counterproductive 
behaviour intended to result in the loss, disclosure, or damage to that 
organisation’s information, resources, or assets.   
 
                                                P a g e  | 135 
 
Panel feedback and refinement resulted in the addition of the word reputation. All 
panel members agreed on the final definition: 
Intentional insider threat is when a person of trust (employee, 
contractor, consultant, vendor) who has/had legitimate access to an 
organisation attempts to cause harm through counterproductive 
behaviour intended to result in the loss, disclosure, or damage to that 
organisation’s information, resources, assets, or reputation. 
 
4.3.2 Delphi outcomes 
4.3.2.1 Individual Influences  
Individual vulnerabilities from the content analysis of the literature were presented 
to the panel. The panel were asked to rate to what extent they agree or disagree that 
the presented vulnerabilities contribute to an increased risk of intentional insider 
threat. Consensus was achieved on ten of the items presented. The panel also 
achieved consensus on eight of the items suggested to decrease risk of intentional 
insider threat (see Table 6 for variables achieving consensus).  
 
Table 6: Individual variables that increase or decrease risk of intentional insider 
threat. 
Individual variables from the literature which gained consensus 
Increase IIT Decrease IIT 
 Criminal associations 
 Disgruntlement 
 Ego/sense of entitlement 
 Ethical flexibility 
 Financial pressures 
 History of security violations 
 Motivation 
 Negative/stressful life events 
 Personality vulnerability/disorder 
 Targeted by competitors/foreigners 
 Aligned values 
 Conscientiousness 
 Loyalty 
 Positive support networks 
 Resilience 
 Self-awareness 
 Sound and reliable behaviour outside of 
work 
 Sound judgment 
 
Through open ended questions the panel was able to provide additional items, 
related to the individual that may be critical to increasing or decreasing intentional 
insider threat. These were collated and presented to the panel experts in subsequent 
rounds. The individual vulnerabilities identified by the panel and gaining overall 
consensus are presented in Table 7. As can be seen by the table, only variables 
thought to increase IIT was offered, or gained consensus, by the panel. There were 
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no individual variables offered or which gained consensus to assist in the reduction 
of IIT.  
 
Table 7: Individual variables that increase individual vulnerabilities to intentional 
insider threat. 
Individual variables thought to increase IIT offered by the panel 
 Addictions (particularly gambling) 
 Affiliations (religious, criminal) 
 Concerns with moral development 
 Financial concerns that could lead to embarrassment (i.e. gambling, poor investments) 
 Lack of individual coping mechanisms/resources 
 Workplace deviance 
 
4.3.2.2 Organisational Influences 
As per the individual analysis above, organisational variables from the content 
analysis of the literature were presented to the panel. The panel was asked to rate to 
what extent they agreed or disagreed that the presented items had an effect on 
intentional insider threat. As can be seen in Table 8 consensus was achieved on a 
large number of the organisational variables. The panel arrived at consensus on 18 
items thought to increase IIT and 17 were considered to decrease risk of IIT. 
 
Table 8: Organisational variables that increase and decrease insider threat. 
Organisational variables from the literature which gained consensus 
Increase IIT Decrease IIT 
 Access 
 Employee engagement 
 Employee monitoring 
 Employee screening and selection 
 Increase in staff counterproductive 
workplace behaviour 
 IT monitoring of employees 
 Lack of leadership 
 Leadership 
 Management 
 Moles 
 Old IT policies and procedures 
 Organisational behaviour monitoring 
 Organisational change 
 Organisational culture 
 Poor organisational culture 
 Poor security culture 
 Poor sophistication of IT systems 
 Undue secrecy 
 Behavioural monitoring 
 Control of physical security environment 
 Physical access controls 
 Policy and procedures 
 Polygraph 
 Positive organisational culture 
 Relevant IT policies and procedures 
 Relevant security policies and procedures 
 Security awareness training 
 Security awareness/education 
 Security culture 
 Security governance 
 Security reporting 
 Size of the organisation 
 Strict exit controls on staff leaving the 
organisation 
 Strong leadership 
 Vetting and background checks 
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The panel was provided the opportunity to contribute further to organisational 
conditions that are critical in increasing or decreasing risk of IIT. Unlike the individual 
variables above, the panel offered a number of organisational items (21) that 
achieved consensus on increasing (11) and decreasing (10) IIT (see Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Organisational variables that increase and decrease IIT. 
Organisational variables from the panel 
Increase IIT Decrease IIT 
 Lack of consistency of policies and 
expectations across all levels of the 
organisation 
 Lack of monitoring and enforcing policies 
 Lack of oversight of senior managers 
 Perception that managers do not value 
staff 
 Complacency 
 Lack of connection to employee issues 
 Lack of management of issues at the 
emerging stages 
 Poor application of security 
 Poor organisational communication 
 Poor security practices of leadership 
 Witnessing other staff get away with poor 
security behaviour with no consequence 
 Compliance and risk management 
education 
 Improving research on how offenders 
“evaluate an opportunity” 
 Leadership that is connected and 
supportive of staff 
 Organisational resilience 
 Positive leadership and change 
management 
 Staff consultation 
 Whistleblower protection policies 
 Better communication across organisations 
 Clear organisational goals and objectives 
 Identifying red flags 
 
4.3.2.3 Technical Influences 
The same process was followed for the technical variables. The outcomes of the 
content analysis were presented to the Delphi experts. Items were rated on an 
agreement based Likert scale. As can be seen in Table 10 consensus was achieved 
across a number of technical items. The panel determined that nine of the items 
exposed from the content analysis were of significance to the study of IIT. The panel 
members further agreed on six items which may decrease risk of IIT. 
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Table 10: Technical variables that increase and decrease IIT. 
Technical variables from the literature which gained consensus 
Increase IIT Decrease IIT 
 Electronic access controls 
 Impeded access 
 IT monitoring of employees 
 IT/Cyber security functions 
 Lack of electronic access controls 
 Limited authentication procedures 
 Limited hardware controls 
 No/limited auditing and monitoring 
 Poor sophistication of IT systems 
 
 Computer monitoring 
 Impeded access/access controls 
 Minimum privileges 
 Random auditing 
 Separation of duties 
 
 
The panel was offered the opportunity to provide further technical variables which 
they thought critical to increase, decrease, moderate, or mitigate IIT. The only 
additional technical variable that was offered by the Delphi panel experts and gained 
consensus was the inclusion of obvious and declared security controls. 
 
4.3.3 Summary 
The findings from the Delphi study were foundational for the development of a 
diagnostic inventory designed to determine an organisation’s vulnerability to 
intentional insider threat. The individual, organisational, and technical items 
identified by the Delphi panel experts to be of pertinence in the study of IIT underpin 
the development of the inventory. Items of significance were determined based on 
consensus. That is, a) at least 70% of panel members agreed on its importance, and 
b) there was no abnormal distribution of responses for that item. Inventory questions 
were developed to represent each of the items which gained consensus through the 
Delphi process. The design of the OVIT is presented in Section 3.5. The results of 
phase three of the study are presented below.  
 
4.4 Phase Three. The Organisational Vulnerability to Intentional Insider 
Threat Inventory (OVIT) 
Data analysis is the process of “examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise 
recombining the evidence, to address the initial propositions of a study” (Yin 1984). 
In order to achieve the aim of developing a diagnostic inventory to assess 
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organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat an Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) was undertaken.  
 
4.4.1 Data Preparation: Cleaning and Screening 
Hair et al. (2010) discussed that it is important for researchers to assess and 
overcome potential pitfalls resulting from the design of the research and/or the 
data collection practices. In order to achieve this, cleaning and screening of the data 
is required. The process of investigation followed the recommendations of Hair et 
al. (2010) and Creswell (2009), beginning with a check for inconsistencies in the data 
and examination for any missing data. 
 
4.4.1.1 Response rates 
For the purpose of the current research the survey was administered according to 
the method outlined in Chapter 3. The sampling strategy also described in the 
previous chapter included convenience, purposive and nonprobability techniques. 
This effort of sampling resulted in 602 views of the online survey. Of the 602 views, 
only 161 (26.74%) commenced the survey. Following data preparation a total of 141 
cases were retained for further analysis. Twenty cases were removed as they did not 
meet predetermined criteria for missing data (see 4.4.1.2). The sample size of 141 did 
not reach the a priori threshold of 200 valid cases. However, as demonstrated below 
the sample size presented no concerns for sampling adequacy, resulted in high 
communalities, provided a degree of over determination (where each factor is 
represented by a sufficient number of variables), and/or converged to a proper 
solution, all of which have been shown to provide quality factor solutions with 
relatively smaller sample sizes (MacCallum et al. 1999). Therefore the post-hoc 
judgment is that the sample size is adequate and sufficient to achieve the exploratory 
objectives of the study. 
 
4.4.1.2 Missing data  
As Hair et al. (2010) discussed there are both practical and substantive impacts of 
missing data, including reduction of sample size and possible bias in results. They 
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suggested a four-step process for identifying and remedying missing data before 
undertaking further statistical analysis. The steps include (1) identifying the type of 
missing data, (2) determining the extent of missing data, (3) diagnosing the 
randomness of missing data, and (4) choosing the imputation method. 
 
Missing data can result from errors in data collection, data entry, or from the 
omission of answers on the part of respondents (Hair et al. 2010). To reduce the 
potential for missing data the survey was administered online with a setting loaded 
to ensure that participants completed all questions (not including demographic 
questions) before progressing to subsequent pages of the survey. As such there was 
no missing or inconsistent data for participants who completed the entire survey 
(n=141).   
 
Following the process expressed by Hair et al. (2010) the survey set included missing 
data which could not be ignored. These missing data were easily identifiable to the 
researcher and were not random, mainly a result of failing to complete the survey 
(step one). Due to attrition, the extent of the missing data was extensive and not 
considered low enough to not affect the results (step two). Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2013) argued that appropriate treatment depends on the pattern of missing values. 
The most efficient method of remedy was to delete these non-random individual 
cases (Hair et al. 2010). This was considered appropriate especially as the design of 
the survey presented concepts of intentional insider threat in a specified order and 
grouping of questions (i.e., individual, organisational, and then technical). As such, 
failure to complete the entire survey often meant failure to address all three concepts 
of insider threat. Following this decision, it was not necessary to continue to steps 
three and four; applying empirical examination of the missing data and imputation.  
 
Following this process the remaining number of cases with no missing data was 141 
and sufficient to complete the selected analysis technique as described below. To 
ensure no data transfer concerns between the online survey tool and SPSS, a missing 
value analysis was conducted which determined no missing values in the data for the 
141 respondents.  
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4.4.1.3 Outliers 
Outliers can be defined as extreme responses which can unduly influence the 
outcome of EFA (Hair et al. 2010). Not all outliers are necessarily negative and instead 
should be reviewed within the context of the study and the statistical analysis of 
choice. Hair et al. (2010) recommend that where outliers have the potential to distort 
the multivariate analysis outcomes they should be handled appropriately. Based on 
methods for detecting outliers, no outliers were identified in the current data set for 
deletion. 
 
The process for assessing potential outliers was undertaken using univariate analysis. 
The univariate analysis is used to identify any observations that are unique or 
extreme. According to Hair et al. (2010) cases falling outside the range of 2.5 to four 
standard deviations from the mean indicates the detection of an outlier. A review of 
the standard deviations suggested no univariate outliers (STD between 0.88 and 
1.99).  
 
4.4.1.4 Normality  
Normality is the most fundamental assumption in multivariate analysis (Hair et al. 
2010). Normality is defined as the “degree to which the distribution of the sample 
data corresponds to a normal distribution” (Hair et al. 2010, p. 36). Normality can be 
assessed in a number of ways and for the current study included both graphical and 
statistical assessment. Non-normality in data distribution can have random effects on 
analysis (Hall & Wang 2005). As such, normality was assessed using measures of 
kurtosis and skewness to determine any possible impacts due to the shape of the 
distribution.  
 
Graphical analysis of normality was assessed through use of a normal probability plot. 
Normal P-P Plot, using Blom’s proportion estimation formula, identified no significant 
concerns regarding the distribution of the data. Statistical analysis of normality can 
also be assessed using the skewness and kurtosis results of the descriptive statistics. 
West et al. (1995) proposed a reference of substantial departure from normality as 
an absolute skew value > 2.1. In addition, the same authors proposed a reference of 
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substantial departure from normality as an absolute kurtosis (proper) value > 7.1. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) further suggested that an absolute z-score above 3.29 
for either skewness or kurtosis raised concern of non-normal distribution. Based on 
these criteria the skewness and kurtosis results do not represent a departure from 
normality that would require a remedy for non-normality (see Appendix L for results). 
 
4.4.1.5 Summary 
The data preparation, cleaning, and screening provided critical insights into the 
characteristics of the data. Importantly, undertaking these steps ensured that the 
data analysis met the demands, assumptions, and requirements of multivariate 
techniques. Due to the survey strategy missing data was easily managed. Further 
graphical and statistical measures of outliers and non-normality suggested no 
significant violations to require remedy. As a result, 141 qualifying responses were 
included in the exploratory multivariate analysis.  
 
4.4.2 Data Summary 
4.4.2.1 Respondent profiles summary 
Descriptive statistics that summarised the demographic characteristics of the 
participants were extracted and collated. The purpose of this was two-fold. Firstly, it 
provided an ability to identify suitability for further multivariate analysis (Hair et al. 
2010) and secondly, allowed the researcher to understand the sample in greater 
depth.  
 
In total, 141 qualifying respondents were included in the analyses. The demographic 
information in the online survey covered gender, age, level of education, job level, 
industry, size of organisation, and level of expertise on insider threat issues. Whilst 
missing values were not accepted for the questions related to the content of the 
inventory, missing data for the descriptive questions was accepted. Missing values 
ranged between 0.7% and 4.3% for the demographic questions.  Tables 11, 12, 13, 
and 14 provide an overview of respondent characteristics. 
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Table 11: Frequencies of respondent profiles: Location. 
  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Location Australia 138 97.87 97.87 
Other 3 2.13 2.13 
Total 141 100 100.0 
 
Location: The OVIT survey was open to anyone with access to the Internet. However, 
sampling technique including non-random selection of individuals available to the 
researcher, through convenience and purposive sampling as well as broader non-
probability techniques, resulted in a highly homogenous sample. As a result the 
majority of participants were located in Australia (97.87%). 
 
Table 12: Frequencies of respondent profiles: Gender and age. 
  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Gender Female 75 53.2 53.6 
Male 65 46.1 46.4 
Total 140 99.3 100.0 
  Missing 1 0.7   
Age 18-24yrs 4 2.8 2.9 
25-34yrs 11 7.8 7.9 
35-44yrs 68 48.2 48.9 
45-54yrs 34 24.1 24.5 
55-64yrs 16 11.3 11.5 
65-74yrs 6 4.3 4.3 
Total 139 98.6 100.0 
  Missing 2 1.4   
 
Age and Gender: The study did not purposefully target for age or gender. In summary 
the sample consisted of and almost equal balance 53.6% females and 46.4% males. 
With respect to age, the majority of respondents (48.9%) were between 35-44 years 
old with those aged between 45-54 years old accounting for a further 24.5%. As such 
the majority of participants were over 35 years of age and in the middle to advanced 
stages of their careers.  
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Education, Job Level, and Industry: As can been seen in Table 14, 64.8% of 
respondents were middle management and above. Specialist staff (11.5%) and 
Contractors/Consultants (13.7%) were also strongly represented in the sample.  
Respondents with a tertiary education were strongly represented in this sample 
(77.1%). Of the 141 participants, 42.1% had a postgraduate qualification at or above 
the Master level. Overall, the sample can be regarded as predominantly having a 
tertiary level education with a minimal representation of those that have not pursued 
further vocational or tertiary qualifications (12.9%).  
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Table 13: Frequencies of respondent profiles: Education, Job level, Industry. 
  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Education Less than Year 12 5 3.5 3.6 
Year 12 or equivalent 13 9.2 9.3 
Vocational/Trade Qualification 11 7.8 7.9 
Bachelor Degree 49 34.8 35.0 
Master Degree 50 35.5 35.7 
Doctoral Degree/PhD 9 6.4 6.4 
Other 3 2.1 2.1 
Total 140 99.3 100.0 
  Missing 1 0.7   
Job level CEO 15 10.6 10.8 
Senior Manager 29 20.6 20.9 
Middle manager 46 32.6 33.1 
General Staff 14 9.9 10.1 
Specialist Staff 16 11.3 11.5 
Contractor/Consultant 19 13.5 13.7 
Total 139 98.6 100.0 
  Missing 2 1.4   
Industry Government 74 52.5 53.2 
Private 50 35.5 36.0 
Not for Profit 10 7.1 7.2 
Other 5 3.5 3.6 
Total 139 98.6 100.0 
  Missing 2 1.4   
APS Industry Communication, Arts, Recreation 3 2.1 2.2 
Defence, Security, Intelligence, Law Enforcement 52 36.9 38.5 
Education, Employment 12 8.5 8.9 
Environment, Energy 4 2.8 3.0 
Health, Human, Social Services 16 11.3 11.9 
Industry, Science 9 6.4 6.7 
Not Applicable 19 13.5 14.1 
Other 19 13.5 14.1 
Fire and Emergency 1 0.7 0.7 
Total 135 95.7 100.0 
  Missing 6 4.3   
 
With respect to Industry, there was a strong representation from Government 
(53.2%) and many respondents working in Defence, Security, Intelligence or Law 
Enforcement (38.5%). This is not an unexpected result given that the researcher 
primarily targeted participants from this population through purposeful and 
convenience sampling.   
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Table 14: Frequencies of respondent profiles: Insider threat expertise. 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Level of expertise on insider 
threat issues 
Not advanced 28 19.9 20.4 
Somewhat advanced 24 17.0 17.5 
Moderately advanced 22 15.6 16.1 
Advanced 55 39.0 40.1 
Very advanced 8 5.7 5.8 
Total 137 97.2 100.0 
  Missing 4 2.8   
 
Expertise: The level of insider threat expertise of the sample was considered an 
important demographic characteristic to capture. It was postulated that participants 
experience and exposure to insider threat issues would make completion of the 
inventory more straightforward. The inventory covered a depth and breadth of 
questions that were considered more accessible to respondents with insider threat 
experience as well as those in positions of management (with an overview of 
organisational functions). The fact that 79.6% of respondents had some level of 
experience with insider threat issues is a positive indication of ability to respond to 
the content of the inventories. Further, 62% of the sample was moderately to very 
advanced, suggesting that majority of the sample understood the context and 
nuances of IIT. Whilst 20.4% of participants did not have an advanced level of insider 
threat expertise they were able to complete the inventory. 
 
Based on the frequency information available on the participants a high level of 
homogeneity in the sample was achieved. Respondent profiles demonstrate just 
close to parity outcomes on gender (53.6% female and 46.4% male), job level 
(approximately 30% for Senior Management, Middle Management, and 
general/specialist staff), industry sector (53.2% public versus 46.8% other) and a 
predominantly Australian sample (over 97%). The generally even distributions across 
a number of descriptive questions assisted in improving the internal validity of the 
results. 
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4.4.2.2 OVIT profiles summary 
Appendix M is a representation of the distributed inventory questions in a descriptive 
format. The tables include the questions of the inventory, the valid percentage of 
responses, as well as the median response. As per the data preparation process 
described above, all 173 questions of the inventory are completed by the sample. For 
ease, the summaries below are separated to address each of the three dimensions 
considered to influence Organisational Vulnerability to Intentional Insider Threat, in 
line with the three separate OVIT inventories. 
 
Individual: 
Descriptive statistics from the individual inventory questions revealed that the 
organisations represented by the respondents could certainly do more to assess for 
individual vulnerabilities which have been associated with intentional insider threat. 
Over 40% of respondents indicated that their organisations never test for illegal drug 
use, past substance use/abuse, problematic gambling behaviour, or financial, credit, 
and bankruptcy history. Organisations also seem reluctant to identify increasing 
financial pressures on their employees. There seems to be some level of reliance on 
criminal record checks with 66.7% of organisations often or always checking the 
criminal history of potential staff with many of these (29.8%) also evaluating risk-
related criminal associations. Despite this, a similar percentage (31.2%) does not 
review criminal associations. It seems surprising that 13.5% of organisations never 
checked criminal records as part of their organisational processes.  
 
Positive conduct of employees appears to be valued with a very high representation 
of good conduct policy uptake (74.1%). Performance reviews remain a strongly 
endorsed employee management intervention. Perhaps an organisations ability to 
identify and manage potential for disgruntlement assists in very high commitment 
(58.9%), high ethical standards (68%), and integrity and honesty (66%) of staff. 
However, it is acknowledged that better management of workplace deviance may be 
warranted. 
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When it comes to psychological characteristics there is great variability of 
endorsement across the Likert scales. Questions associated with assessment of 
individuals, especially conscientiousness, sound judgment, self-awareness, 
resilience, and ego/sense of entitlement are not consistently applied. The variability 
in responses across the scale of these questions is a concern given the link between 
personality and character and potential to act as a malicious insider. There is possibly 
a link between the lack of strength in positive endorsement of these assessment 
methods and the perceived complacency of organisations when it comes to insider 
threat. More than half of the respondents indicated their organisations do not 
employ trained professionals to identify and manage employees vulnerable to 
become an insider threat. Therefore, it is not unsurprising that almost 55% of 
organisations do not regularly undertake personality testing to identify individuals 
with the potential to become an insider threat. Consistent with this, many 
organisations also do not identify employees susceptible to manipulation and 
coercion which may increase risk of insider threat action.  
 
Organisational: 
At an organisational level it appears there is a level of complacency when it comes to 
insider threat. Based on the results of the inventory there is a large variability in the 
utilisation of insider threat initiatives. Many respondents (41.8%) suggested that their 
organisations were not fostering an environment conducive to the success of insider 
threat initiatives. Almost 35% of the respondents indicated that their organisations 
do not have specialised or multidisciplinary teams for the evaluation of insider threat 
risk. As well, 34% of respondents indicated their organisations do not have a senior 
management position dedicated to security. Further, a high percentage (73%) is less 
than occasionally making efforts to integrate insider threat mitigation as part of their 
broader enterprise risk management strategy. Despite this there was a surprising 
level of positive response to organisations conducting research on insider threat 
(63.2% indicating at least occasional engagement). 
 
While many organisations do not appear to be focusing specifically on insider threat 
intervention, respondents indicated a commitment to improving security (70.2%), 
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especially through exit strategies, including the disabling of access privileges and 
signing of non-disclosure statements. However, further protection through random 
reviews of exiting staff computer activities is warranted. A high percentage of 
respondents indicated their organisations never (22%), rarely (22%), or occasionally 
(28.4%) reviewed staff computer activities leading up to their final date. On-boarding 
processes suggested that there is a high level utilisation of evidence-based 
recruitment methods as well as subjecting staff to relevant vetting processes for their 
roles (58.2% often or always). 
 
Physical security controls were common place through review of access anomalies 
and relevant policies of protection. Respondents also indicated a high uptake of 
policies and practices to protect organisational assets and prevent unauthorised 
disclosure of sensitive information. Certainly a high percentage (67.3%) of 
participants agreed that staff in their organisations were aware of critical assets 
worth protecting. There were quite a number of respondents indicating that their 
organisations did not have a whistle-blower policy (20.6%). Respondents also 
indicated a high level of variability across the Likert scale when it came to 
organisational policy, practice, principles, and measurement of counterproductive 
behaviour in the workplace.  
 
With regard to organisational culture, climate, and staff engagement, respondents 
indicated a high level of adoption of annual and/or pulse surveys, assessment of 
organisational and job fit, and a strong level of collegiality. Further, respondents 
described their organisations as resilient and able to learn from failures and mistakes. 
Questions on security culture showed over 30% of organisations are rarely or never 
assessing security culture. This may be due to positive experiences of security culture 
within organisations. From this survey a significant portion of respondents disagreed 
that their organisation had a poor security culture (60.3%). Over half of the 
respondents agreed that security reporting is encouraged.  
 
When it comes to management, respondents to this inventory indicated there may 
be room for improvement. There was strong capacity for management to 
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communicate plans and objectives, be accountable and responsible to others, and 
occasional utilisation of a variety of staff consultation methods to understand 
viewpoints. Further there was general support that management treated staff fairly 
(59.6%). However, 30% of respondents indicated that there was a perception that 
management did not value staff.  
 
Technical: 
A review of the 27 technical questions in the inventory revealed a substantial amount 
of variability in respondent answers resulting in a median of 3 (occasionally) for two-
thirds (66.67%) of the questions. It is not clear whether participants were unable to 
respond to questions with conviction or whether the median response is indicative 
of an opportunity for greater response to technical vulnerabilities. Certainly, high 
numbers of managerial respondents indicated they should have some oversight of 
the technical capabilities of their organisations.  
 
The two strongest positive actions of organisations, represented by the respondents  
include the existence of guidelines to ensure that staff only have access to data, 
systems, and information required to perform their duties (70.9%) and having back-
up and recovery processes in place to avoid disruption (73%). The median results 
suggest that respondents felt their organisations were at least occasionally and often 
more regularly attending to potential technical vulnerabilities and implementing 
technical safeguards. Authentication processes in the respondent organisations were 
occasionally multi-factorial (79.4%) and increasingly advanced with greater access to 
critical data (79.4%). Further, monitoring for access anomalies of sensitive systems 
(80.8%) and collecting and monitoring network traffic and security log anomalies 
(75.9%) suggested a high level of attention of the organisations represented by this 
sample.  
 
Whilst there were no questions with a median below 3 there were several questions 
in never and rarely categories such as: Organisations could make more use of 
advanced analytic tools to analyse and report on insider threat (38.3%), 
implementing auditing as part of performance reviews (46.8%), and using modern 
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technologies to assist insider threat detection, deterrence, prevention and reporting 
(31.2%). It is acknowledged that the uptake of these technical mitigations is 
influenced by the organisations complacency when it comes to insider threat focus 
and the value of insider threat specific intervention. 
 
4.4.2.3 Summary: Descriptive Statistics 
In summary, the current sample was represented by close to equal numbers of male 
and female respondents. The majority of the sample was highly educated, in the 
middle to advanced stage of career, and in positions of middle management or 
above. There was nearly equal representation of Government and Non-Government 
organisations and a high proportion of the sample expressed some level of insider 
threat expertise. 
 
When considering the three dimensions of IIT the descriptive statistics demonstrated 
potential organisational vulnerabilities as well as strengths.  
 
For the individual dimension, organisations could benefit more from checking for 
potential problematic behaviour, abuses, and personality characteristics associated 
with insider threat including workplace deviance. However, there is a strong sense of 
organisations attempting to manage staff behaviour through positive performance 
and conduct policy and strategies. 
 
From an organisational perspective, complacency was a striking outcome. 
Organisations can clearly benefit from greater focus on intentional insider threat. A 
specialised/multidisciplinary team and dedication to security risk management can 
assist in improvements and uptake of IIT initiatives. Improvement in assessment of 
security culture and leadership and management, as well as relevant policy, process, 
and practice could prove beneficial. Based on this sample, organisations appear more 
focused on physical and technical security matters.  
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Technical safeguarding is well represented in this sample but could be further 
enhanced through use of modern technologies and advanced analytic tools designed 
to detect, deter, prevent, and report on IIT.  
 
4.4.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
As presented earlier, an EFA was the chosen multivariate statistical approach to aid 
the development of the OVIT. An EFA is appropriate in exploratory studies and allows 
for the construction, refinement, and evaluation of statistical validity of surveys. The 
EFA is a statistical technique which is able to summarise and condense the large OVIT 
question set into a smaller question set and also define the underlying factor 
structure which may exist. 
 
An EFA was conducted on each of the dimensions of IIT as represented by the sub-
inventories of the OVIT, beginning with the OVIT-Individual and followed by the OVIT-
Organisational and OVIT-Technical. The following section more explicitly discusses 
the process of obtaining results for the OVIT-Individual, the OVIT-Organisational and 
OVIT-Technical.  
 
4.4.3.1 OVIT – Individual: Testing the assumptions 
Hooper (2012) recommended that prior to interpreting an EFA output the first step 
is to explore the Correlation Matrix. The Pearson Bivariate Correlation was chosen to 
ensure there were correlation coefficients that exceeded 0.30 among the variables 
of the three inventories. Examination of the correlation matrix determined there 
were many coefficients greater than 0.30. 
 
A highlighting condition was set in SPSS to easily determine correlations above 0.9, 
noting that correlations above 0.9 may indicate multi-collinearity (Hair et al. 2010; 
Yong & Pearce 2013). There was evidence of multi-collinearity with two items 
correlating above 0.9 (I5 – does the organisation assess past substance use and I6 – 
does the organisation assess for problematic gambling behaviour) in the OVIT – 
Individual. It was decided, based on researcher judgment, to maintain both of these 
questions in this exploratory stage of the research noting that each question is 
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conceptually different. Due to the size of the correlation matrices, the nature of the 
exploratory study, and in line with recommendations of Jackson et al. (2009), they 
have not been included in this thesis. The correlation matrices are available from the 
author on request.  
 
In order to assess the overall significance of the correlation matrix, the Bartlett test 
of sphericity was performed (Field 2013). This a statistical test to determine suitability 
for EFA and is an indication that there exits correlations among variables (Hair et al. 
2010). The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant for the OVIT-Individual (see 
Table 15) at 0.94 sampling adequacy. 
 
The measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) measures the degree of inter-correlations 
among variables and should be greater than 0.5 to proceed with an EFA (Hair et al. 
2010). According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin’s 
(KMO) test of sampling adequacy a value greater than 0.60 provides evidence for 
factorability. Further Williams et al. (2010) noted the importance of  this index, 
especially where case to variable ratios are low (as is the case in this research). The 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy for the OVIT-Individual is well above the 
recommended 0.60 (see Table 15). 
 
Table 15: OVIT-Individual KMO and Bartlett’s Test. 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
0.941 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-
Square 
3347.240 
df 300 
Sig. 0.000 
 
4.4.3.2 OVIT – Individual: Extraction of factors 
Costello and Osborne (2005) warned there is danger in over-and under-extraction of 
factors and careful consideration of factor retention should be applied. Hair et al. 
(2010) encourage researchers to combine a conceptual and evidence based approach 
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to factor reduction and suggest that researchers consider how many factors should 
be in the structure and how many factors can be reasonably supported.  
 
A number of selection criteria were utilised to determine factor extraction. First, a 
scree test was viewed to determine the optimum number of factors to be extracted. 
The point at which the scree curve begins to straighten out determines the maximum 
number of factors to extract. Given that the initial scree test results showed clustering 
of data points near the bend, multiple factor analyses were performed to improve 
factor extraction (Costello & Osborne 2005). The final scree test for the EFA are 
presented in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: The Final OVIT-Individual Scree Plot. 
 
 
The combination of the scree test and eigenvalues is recommended to determine the 
number of factors to retain (Yong & Pearce 2013). It is recommended that 
Eigenvalues should be greater than one when applied as a factor extraction method 
(Field 2013; Hair et al. 2010; Hooper 2012; Yong & Pearce 2013). As such, the 
Eigenvalues were utilised to assist factor extraction (using both the scree test and 
variance explained). The final Eigenvalue outcome is presented below in Table 16. 
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Table 16: The Final OVIT–Individual Eigenvalues. 
Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 13.470 53.881 53.881 12.918 51.673 51.673 11.812 
2 2.532 10.128 64.009 2.269 9.078 60.751 10.398 
3 1.665 6.661 70.670 1.445 5.781 66.532 9.215 
4 1.021 4.083 74.753 0.957 3.827 70.360 2.126 
5 0.776 3.105 77.858         
6 0.677 2.709 80.567         
7 0.547 2.189 82.756         
8 0.470 1.882 84.638         
9 0.453 1.811 86.450         
10 0.390 1.559 88.009         
11 0.349 1.394 89.403         
12 0.337 1.349 90.752         
13 0.317 1.270 92.022         
14 0.285 1.139 93.160         
15 0.264 1.054 94.215         
16 0.235 0.942 95.157         
17 0.192 0.768 95.925         
18 0.183 0.732 96.657         
19 0.177 0.707 97.364         
20 0.149 0.596 97.959         
21 0.128 0.513 98.473         
22 0.121 0.485 98.958         
23 0.108 0.434 99.392         
24 0.095 0.379 99.771         
25 0.057 0.229 100.000         
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total 
variance. 
 
Additionally, the percentage of variance also aided factor extraction. Hair et al. (2010) 
discussed that, in the social sciences, solutions are satisfactory if they account for 
more than 60% of the total variance. As can be seen in Table 16 the percentage of 
variance explained in the final EFA for the OVIT-Individual is well above this 
recommendation (70.36%). 
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Utilising these three approaches to factor extraction, along with researcher judgment 
consistent with the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the research, the 
final OVIT – Individual factor solution included four individual factors. 
 
4.4.3.3 OVIT – Individual: Factor rotation and interpretation 
The Maximum Likelihood procedure was used to extract factors from the variables of 
the OVIT-Individual. Hair et al. (2010) underlined the importance of factor rotation in 
interpreting factors. For the current research the Promax oblique rotation was 
chosen in the quest to achieve a simple and meaningful factor structure outcome 
(Pett et al. 2003). Costello and Osborne (2005) suggest that the use of the default 
kappa (4) is appropriate when using the Promax oblique rotation and this was 
maintained for the current study. 
 
Following the guidance of Field (2013) the factor loadings and communalities were 
explored first. In search for the best factor solution, item loadings above 0.30, with 
the least crossloadings, and factors with at least three items are considered “best-fit” 
(Costello & Osborne 2005). However, according to Hair et al. (2010) factor loadings 
above ±0.3 meet minimal level, with loadings ±0.5 considered practically significant 
and loadings exceeding ±0.7 indicating a well-defined structure (Hair et al. 2010). 
Further, Hooper (2012) suggest that loadings less than .40 may indicate that it is 
unreliable and a candidate for deletion.  
 
Following these guidelines, low-loading items (less than 0.40) were dismissed unless 
there was a determination, based on theoretical or conceptual reasoning and in line 
with the underpinning pragmatic paradigm that the item should remain in this 
exploratory phase. According to Costello and Osborne (2005) researcher judgment is 
important as the removal of some items can compromise the integrity of the data. 
Further, any items below 0.40 that were retained did not breach the minimum 
loading of an item of at least 0.32 (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007).  Next, Communalities 
were explored to determine factor items that may be candidates for deletion. It is 
commonly accepted that communalities above 0.3 are stable (Hooper 2012). 
However, Costello and Osborne (2005) argued that in the social sciences 
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communalities between 0.40 and 0.70 are appropriate and that anything below 0.40 
should be considered for removal. Consideration of the communalities along with the 
item loadings was undertaken in conjunction. Communalities for the OVIT –Individual 
can be found in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: The Final OVIT–Individual Communalities. 
Communalitiesa 
  Initial Extraction 
I5. does the organisation assess past substance use/abuse 0.910 0.908 
I6. does the organisation assess for problematic gambling behaviour 0.901 0.920 
I17. does the organisation monitor foreign contacts of staff 0.779 0.764 
I9. does the organisation have methods to identify financial pressures of 
employees 
0.826 0.760 
I8. does the organisation assess financial, credit, and bankruptcy history 0.808 0.735 
I14. does the organisation evaluate risk-related criminal associations 0.736 0.684 
I16. does the organisation identify employees susceptible to social engineering 
(manipulation of people to get them to perform actions that do harm) 
0.747 0.699 
I38. does the organisation employ trained professionals to identify and manage 
employees vulnerable to becoming an insider threat 
0.720 0.671 
I44. the organisation has methods to assess for addictions 0.704 0.658 
I4. does the organisation test for illegal drug use 0.692 0.624 
I32. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee resilience 0.729 0.720 
I36. does the organisation conduct mental health testing/assessment 0.820 0.800 
I37. does the organisation conduct personality testing to determine an 
employee's vulnerability to become an insider threat 
0.820 0.802 
I34. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee sound judgment 0.735 0.631 
I35. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee 
conscientiousness 
0.730 0.631 
I39. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee self-awareness 0.721 0.675 
I31. does the organisation utilise methods during recruitment processes to assess 
for ego/sense of entitlement 
0.646 0.588 
I3. does the organisation have policy and processes to manage staff with a history 
of security violations 
0.732 0.806 
I10. does the organisation undertake a formal risk assessment of high risk 
employees/positions 
0.734 0.712 
I11. does the organisation have a means by which employees can report 
suspicious contacts from other employees or outsiders 
0.588 0.590 
I1. does the organisation check civil records 0.599 0.527 
I2. does the organisation have methods to assess sound and reliable behaviour of 
staff 
0.654 0.576 
I15. does the organisation check criminal records 0.533 0.354 
I55. people in the organisation maintain high ethical standards 0.796 0.972 
I56. people in the organisation demonstrate high integrity & honesty 0.785 0.783 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
a. One or more communality estimates greater than 1 were encountered during iterations. The resulting 
solution should be interpreted with caution. 
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The communality table presents a caution of a Heywood case. An Heywood case is 
represented by a communality equal to or greater than 1 (Harris 2001). With the 
respecifying of the factor model the extracted communality of question I55 
continued to rise. According to the current table, the communality estimate has 
become greater than 1. It is explained that the Maximum Likelihood method is 
susceptible to Heywood cases and there is debate about whether a Heywood case 
alone invalidates the solution. At this stage the variable has been maintained as it did 
not produce problematic communality estimates in earlier EFA solutions and the final 
solution has a maximum communality (0.972) below one (Harris 2001). de Winter et 
al. (2009) reported that Heywood cases reduce as p increases, and therefore, it is 
considered possible that the Heywood case may be improved in future analyses once 
greater sample size is achieved. Further, there is evidence of other published 
exploratory studies with similar communality estimates (e.g. Turner 2015). 
 
The tables below show the factor loadings after rotation using a significant factor 
criterion of 0.40. One item (I15. does the organisation check criminal records) fell 
below 0.4, represented in italics in Table 18 below, was maintained based on 
theoretical, conceptual, or researcher judgement. As described by Pett et al. (2003) 
some weak-loading items can be significant contributors to the content of a scale and 
therefore should not be eliminated. Further, this item remained within the minimum 
guidelines of 0.3 presented by other authors (Hair et al. 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell 
2007). 
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Table 18: The Final OVIT – Individual Pattern Matrix. 
Pattern Matrixa 
 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 
I6. does the organisation assess for problematic gambling behaviour 1.046       
I5. does the organisation assess past substance use/abuse 0.959       
I8. does the organisation assess financial, credit, and bankruptcy 
history 
0.958       
I9. does the organisation have methods to identify financial pressures 
of employees 
0.823       
I17. does the organisation monitor foreign contacts of staff 0.794       
I4. does the organisation test for illegal drug use 0.570       
I16. does the organisation identify employees susceptible to social 
engineering (manipulation of people to get them to perform actions 
that do harm) 
0.501       
I14. does the organisation evaluate risk-related criminal associations 0.478       
I44. the organisation has methods to assess for addictions 0.473       
I38. does the organisation employ trained professionals to identify 
and manage employees vulnerable to becoming an insider threat 
0.449       
I15. does the organisation check criminal records  0.359       
I34. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee 
sound judgment 
  0.854     
I39. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee self-
awareness 
  0.829     
I35. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee 
conscientiousness 
  0.812     
I31. does the organisation utilise methods during recruitment 
processes to assess for ego/sense of entitlement 
  0.780     
I32. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee 
resilience 
  0.775     
I37. does the organisation conduct personality testing to determine 
an employee's vulnerability to become an insider threat 
0.482 0.659     
I36. does the organisation conduct mental health testing/assessment 0.431 0.619     
I3. does the organisation have policy and processes to manage staff 
with a history of security violations 
    0.920   
I11. does the organisation have a means by which employees can 
report suspicious contacts from other employees or outsiders 
    0.690   
I1. does the organisation check civil records     0.653   
I10. does the organisation undertake a formal risk assessment of high 
risk employees/positions 
    0.642   
I2. does the organisation have methods to assess sound and reliable 
behaviour of staff 
    0.498   
I55. people in the organisation maintain high ethical standards       1.007 
I56. people in the organisation demonstrate high integrity & honesty       0.859 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
Note: Factor loadings < 0.4 are suppressed to assist in determining cross-loading and high loading items 
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Hooper (2012) recommended that before interpreting factor analysis a check for 
cross-loadings on the pattern matrix is required. Cross-loading items may require 
further consideration as these too raise questions regarding the reliability of the item 
(Hooper 2012). According to Costello and Osborne (2005, p. 4) “[a] “crossloading” 
item is an item that loads at 0.32 or higher on two or more factors”. However, Hooper 
(2012) was more strict with a criteria of 0.4. 
 
As can be seen from the pattern matrices, there are two cross-loading items evident 
(I36 and I37). Despite the suggestion of Hooper (2012) to remove cross-loading items, 
other authors have argued that correlating factors are not a high level concern in 
exploratory stages of research (Brown 2009; Pett et al. 2003). Based on the 
exploratory nature of the study, these cross-loading items were retained based on 
the researcher’s judgment and underlying theory (Costello & Osborne 2005; Field 
2013; Pett et al. 2003) and in line with the underlying pragmatic paradigm which 
balances practical utility with scientific outcomes. Yong and Pearce (2013) articulate 
that items that are crossloading may be retained if theoretical interpretation fits. 
Whilst the pattern of loadings demonstrated in this study is clear there is complexity 
in the factor structures as demonstrated by the cross-loadings (Brown 2009). 
 
There appears to be debate in the literature about whether the pattern or structure 
matrix, or both, should be the basis for interpretation in an EFA. According to Hair et 
al. (2010) many interpret the pattern matrix as it usually presents a more simple 
demonstration of the relationships between factors. Many researchers recommend 
the pattern matrix for interpretation (Costello & Osborne 2005; Field 2013; Hooper 
2012), especially where factors are highly correlated (Field 2013).  It is acknowledged 
that with an oblique rotation a difference in the pattern and structure matrix exists. 
It has been argued that the structure matrix best accounts for the bi-directional 
quality of the relationships between variables and factors and therefore the structure 
matrix should be the basis for interpretation (Comrey & Lee 2013; Graham et al. 
2003). Following the guidance of several researchers, the pattern and structure 
matrices were both examined (Gorusch 1983; Graham et al. 2003; Hair et al. 2010).  
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Table 19: The Final OVIT – Individual Structure Matrix. 
Structure Matrix 
 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 
I5. does the organisation assess past substance use/abuse 0.951 0.642 0.678   
I6. does the organisation assess for problematic gambling 
behaviour 
0.951 0.587 0.663   
I17. does the organisation monitor foreign contacts of staff 0.870 0.629 0.662   
I9. does the organisation have methods to identify financial 
pressures of employees 
0.868 0.637 0.640   
I8. does the organisation assess financial, credit, and bankruptcy 
history 
0.854 0.570 0.556   
I14. does the organisation evaluate risk-related criminal 
associations 
0.783 0.648 0.724   
I16. does the organisation identify employees susceptible to social 
engineering (manipulation of people to get them to perform 
actions that do harm) 
0.782 0.707 0.699   
I38. does the organisation employ trained professionals to 
identify and manage employees vulnerable to becoming an 
insider threat 
0.773 0.725 0.584   
I44. the organisation has methods to assess for addictions 0.765 0.728 0.600   
I4. does the organisation test for illegal drug use 0.761 0.540 0.572   
I32. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee 
resilience 
0.613 0.845 0.551   
I37. does the organisation conduct personality testing to 
determine an employee's vulnerability to become an insider 
threat 
0.771 0.834 0.465   
I36. does the organisation conduct mental health 
testing/assessment 
0.793 0.827 0.527   
I39. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee 
self-awareness 
0.577 0.820 0.516   
I35. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee 
conscientiousness 
0.506 0.786 0.454   
I34. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee 
sound judgment 
0.454 0.777 0.491   
I31. does the organisation utilise methods during recruitment 
processes to assess for ego/sense of entitlement 
0.524 0.766 0.482   
I3. does the organisation have policy and processes to manage 
staff with a history of security violations 
0.630 0.529 0.891   
I10. does the organisation undertake a formal risk assessment of 
high risk employees/positions 
0.704 0.561 0.822   
I11. does the organisation have a means by which employees can 
report suspicious contacts from other employees or outsiders 
0.549 0.560 0.756   
I1. does the organisation check civil records 0.564 0.402 0.712   
I2. does the organisation have methods to assess sound and 
reliable behaviour of staff 
0.547 0.617 0.705   
I15. does the organisation check criminal records 0.527 0.426 0.542   
I55. people in the organisation maintain high ethical standards       0.984 
I56. people in the organisation demonstrate high integrity 
& honesty 
      0.883 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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As Hair et al. (2010) expressed the structure matrix output is more complicated and 
it is not uncommon that variables will load highly on more than one factor. Hence, 
they argue a preference for interpreting the pattern matrix, which presents the 
unique, rather than shared, contribution of a variable to a factor. Based on review of 
the pattern (see Table 18) and structure matrices (see Table 19) there were limited 
differences for the OVIT-Individual factors as a whole. Certainly the order of the 
dimensions, and therefore strength of the loading on each factor, changed but 
generally resulted in the same outcomes. One of the variables (I15 - does the 
organisation check criminal records) moved from Factor 1 (in the pattern matrix) to 
Factor 3 in the structure matrix. From initial impressions it appears to fit more closely 
with the variables of Factor 1. Pett et al. (2003) recommend placing cross-loading 
items with the factor that is most closely related conceptually. However, for 
consistency and in this initial exploratory phase, results of the factors are taken from 
the structure matrix, which on the whole shares the same simple structure as the 
pattern matrix (Pett et al. 2003). Finally, a closer examination of both the pattern and 
structure matrices appears to reveal no evidence of variables acting as suppressors 
(Graham et al. 2003). 
 
It is noted that in the OVIT-Individual, Factor 4 has only two items (I55 – people in the 
organisation maintain high ethical standards and I56 – people in the organisation 
demonstrate high integrity and honesty). Costello and Osborne (2005) recommended 
that a factor may be weak and unstable with less than three items. However, Yong 
and Pearce (2013) suggested two variables could be valid if the variables were highly 
correlated (r > 0.7) to each other but uncorrelated with other variables as is the case 
with these two variables. Based on this recommendation the factor is maintained for 
this exploratory stage. 
 
Finally, the Factor Correlation Matrix (Table 20) was examined which presents the 
correlation coefficients between factors (Hair et al. 2010). The output suggests that 
for the OVIT-Individual there are relationships between factors and therefore 
independence cannot be assumed. This outcome also supports the use of the oblique 
(Promax) rather than orthogonal rotation (Hair et al. 2010). Clearly the correlations 
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between factors 1, 2, and 3, are strong. Factor 4 has a weak relationship with all the 
other factors. It is not clear, from this exploratory phase, why Factor 4’s correlation 
with the other factors is low and negative in regards to Factor 1.  
 
Table 20: The Final OVIT-Individual Factor Correlation Matrix. 
Factor Correlation Matrix 
Factor 1 2 3 4 
1 1.000 .702 .690 -.133 
2 .702 1.000 .606 .132 
3 .690 .606 1.000 .129 
4 -.133 .132 .129 1.000 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.   
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
4.4.3.4 Summary of EFA outcomes for the OVIT – Individual 
Fifty-six OVIT-Individual items were subjected to the Maximum Likelihood extraction 
method with Oblique (Promax) rotation. The final EFA solution was achieved in 12 
iterations of the full EFA process (i.e. checking KMO, Bartlett’s test of sphericity, 
goodness of fit, communalities, variance explained, factor loadings, removal of items 
etc.) in order to determine the EFA of ‘best-fit’. Four factors were extracted 
explaining 70.36% of the variance and 25 questions were retained. Reliability 
analyses of the full OVIT was sound (α = 0.98). Based on the recommendation of Hair 
et al. (2010) reliability analysis on the OVIT-Individual and its four factors was also 
completed.  Using the Cronbach’s alpha the OVIT-Individual was determined to be 
internally consistent and reliable (α = 0.96; see Table 21 and Figure 16). 
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Table 21: The OVIT-Individual Inventory. 
The OVIT (α = 0.98) 
OVIT – INDIVIDUAL (α = 0.96) 
Factor 1 – Staff vetting (α = 0.96) 
1. does the organisation assess past substance use/abuse 
2. does the organisation assess for problematic gambling behaviour 
3. does the organisation monitor foreign contacts of staff 
4. does the organisation have methods to identify financial pressures of employees 
5. does the organisation assess financial, credit, and bankruptcy history 
6. does the organisation evaluate risk-related criminal associations 
7. does the organisation identify employees susceptible to social engineering (manipulation of 
people to get them to perform actions that do harm) 
8. does the organisation employ trained professionals to identify and manage employees 
vulnerable to becoming an insider threat 
9. the organisation has methods to assess for addictions 
10. does the organisation test for illegal drug use 
 
Factor 2 – Staff psychological assessment (α = 0.93) 
11. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee resilience 
12. does the organisation conduct personality testing to determine an employee's vulnerability to 
become an insider threat 
13. does the organisation conduct mental health testing/assessment 
14. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee self-awareness  
15. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee conscientiousness 
16. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee sound judgment 
17. does the organisation utilise methods during recruitment processes to assess for ego/sense of 
entitlement 
 
Factor 3 – Staff security and risk management (α = 0.88) 
18. does the organisation have policy and processes to manage staff with a history of security 
violations 
19. does the organisation undertake a formal risk assessment of high risk employees/positions 
20. does the organisation have a means by which employees can report suspicious contacts from 
other employees or outsiders 
21. does the organisation check civil records 
22. does the organisation have methods to assess sound and reliable behaviour of staff 
23. does the organisation check criminal records (on structure but factor 1 on pattern matrix) 
 
Factor 4 – Staff ethics (α = 0.93) 
24. people in the organisation maintain high ethical standards 
25. people in the organisation demonstrate high integrity & honesty 
 
 
Labelling of factors is subjective but should reflect the conceptual intent (Hooper 
2012; Williams et al. 2010; Yong & Pearce 2013). Pett et al. (2003) recommended that 
the structure matrix is useful for naming factors. According to Field (2013) more 
important variables have greater loadings, and should be given more importance in 
the naming of factors. Given the subjective nature of labelling factors the final 
descriptors were discussed with one Delphi panel expert and the principal research 
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supervisor. This ensured conceptual, academic, and practical application of the 
factors in each of the OVIT sub-inventories. The four factors are named:  
1. Staff vetting 
2. Staff psychological assessment 
3. Staff security and risk management 
4. Staff ethics.  
 
Figure 16: OVIT - Individual Dimension Factor Structure 
 
Source: Developed for this study 
 
4.4.3.5 OVIT – Organisational: Testing the assumptions 
As per the OVIT-Individual, the OVIT-Organisational was subjected to the same 
testing of assumptions, beginning with a review of the Pearson Bivariate Correlation 
matrix. Again the correlation matrix determined coefficients above 0.30. A check for 
multi-collinearity indicated there were no correlations above 0.90 (as recommended 
by Yong & Pearce 2013). 
 
The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (300) = 3347.24, p<0.000). The KMO 
test for sampling adequacy was 0.918 which is greater than the recommended 0.60 
indicating the strength of the relationships as high (see Table 22). 
OVIT - Individual 
Dimension
α = 0.96
Staff vetting
α = 0.96
Staff psychological 
assessment
α = 0.93
Staff security and 
risk management
α = 0.88
Staff ethics
α = 0.93
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Table 22: OVIT-Organisational KMO and Bartlett’s Test. 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
0.918 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-
Square 
7344.441 
df 1275 
Sig. 0.000 
 
4.4.3.6 OVIT – Organisational: Extraction of factors 
As previously explained this study combined a conceptual and evidence based 
approach to factor reduction based on review of the scree test, eigenvalues, and total 
variance explained. As can be seen by the final factor analysis results, the eigenvalues 
of the factors are above one (See Figure 17 and Table 23).  
 
Figure 17: The Final OVIT-Organisational Scree Plot 
 
 
Table 23 shows that the total variance explained is 70.25% much greater than the 
recommended 60% (Hair et al. 2010). 
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Table 23: The Final OVIT–Organisational Eigenvalues. 
Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 21.204 41.576 41.576 20.860 40.902 40.902 16.137 
2 8.306 16.286 57.862 8.066 15.815 56.717 14.311 
3 2.955 5.793 63.655 2.672 5.240 61.957 10.129 
4 2.333 4.574 68.229 2.040 4.000 65.957 4.679 
5 1.570 3.078 71.307 1.264 2.479 68.437 14.968 
6 1.221 2.393 73.701 0.926 1.815 70.251 9.029 
7 0.960 1.883 75.584         
8 0.785 1.538 77.122         
9 0.686 1.345 78.467         
10 0.651 1.276 79.743         
11 0.620 1.216 80.958         
12 0.574 1.125 82.084         
13 0.557 1.092 83.176         
14 0.537 1.053 84.229         
15 0.511 1.001 85.230         
16 0.488 0.957 86.187         
17 0.461 0.903 87.091         
18 0.433 0.850 87.940         
19 0.395 0.774 88.714         
20 0.382 0.749 89.463         
21 0.375 0.736 90.199         
22 0.350 0.686 90.885         
23 0.319 0.625 91.510         
24 0.298 0.584 92.095         
25 0.296 0.581 92.676         
26 0.276 0.541 93.217         
27 0.267 0.523 93.740         
28 0.238 0.467 94.207         
29 0.230 0.451 94.658         
30 0.226 0.443 95.101         
31 0.215 0.421 95.522         
32 0.206 0.404 95.925         
33 0.198 0.388 96.313         
34 0.183 0.359 96.673         
35 0.166 0.325 96.997         
36 0.152 0.299 97.296         
37 0.142 0.279 97.575         
38 0.137 0.269 97.844         
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39 0.135 0.265 98.110         
40 0.122 0.240 98.350         
41 0.120 0.236 98.585         
42 0.108 0.211 98.797         
43 0.097 0.191 98.988         
44 0.096 0.188 99.175         
45 0.079 0.156 99.331         
46 0.075 0.146 99.477         
47 0.070 0.137 99.614         
48 0.060 0.118 99.732         
49 0.049 0.097 99.828         
50 0.044 0.087 99.915         
51 0.043 0.085 100.000         
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total 
variance. 
 
Utilising three approaches to factor extraction (review of scree test, eigenvalues, and 
total variance explained) along with researcher judgment consistent with the 
conceptual underpinnings of the research, the final OVIT – Organisational factor 
solution resulted in six individual factors. 
 
4.4.3.7 OVIT – Organisational: Factor rotation and interpretation 
The Maximum Likelihood estimation procedure with oblique rotation (Promax) was 
utilised and the factor loadings, commonalties, and a check for cross-loading items in 
the pattern matrix was undertaken. Communalities below 0.40 were removed for the 
OVIT-Organisational. Item loadings below the recommended 0.40 were also 
removed.  
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Table 24: The Final OVIT–Organisational Communalities. 
Communalities 
  Initial Extraction 
O76. the organisation is open and honest with its employees 0.914 0.852 
O52. management in the organisation do not hesitate to provide the 
leadership that is needed 
0.877 0.798 
O57. management in the organisation take care to be informed about how 
others think and feel about things 
0.885 0.791 
O56. management in the organisation provide the support and resources 
needed to help staff meet their goals 
0.854 0.767 
O58. management in the organisation encourage staff to speak up about 
employee issues 
0.865 0.738 
O62. the organisation has a positive organisational culture 0.843 0.765 
O60. staff in the organisation are treated fairly by management in the 
organisation 
0.841 0.734 
O30. does the organisation structure allow for open and efficient 
communication across all levels 
0.841 0.723 
O17. does the organisation have strong and positive leadership 0.844 0.700 
O63. both overt and covert messages are corrected to create a positive 
organisational culture 
0.843 0.711 
O77. management in the organisation encourage staff to participate in 
important decisions 
0.796 0.750 
O50. management in the organisation are accountable and responsible to 
others 
0.805 0.665 
O18. does management in the organisation communicate clear plans & 
objectives for the organisation 
0.845 0.680 
O48. the organisation is able to learn from failures and mistakes 0.816 0.721 
O51. management in the organisation lead by example when it comes to 
security practice 
0.827 0.712 
O55. the values of the organisation are made explicit and help to build a 
strong security culture 
0.756 0.641 
O78. policies and expectations are consistent across all levels of the 
organisation 
0.736 0.630 
O74. the organisation balances trust with the application of consistent 
employee monitoring 
0.807 0.676 
O26. does the organisation commit to the prevention, detection, deterrence, 
and response to insider threats 
0.884 0.809 
O45. the organisation keeps abreast of best practice when it comes to insider 
threat 
0.879 0.770 
O25. does the organisation management integrate insider threat mitigation 
as part of the broader enterprise risk mitigation strategy 
0.831 0.760 
O14. does the organisation have an established insider threat contingency 
management plan 
0.820 0.760 
O12. does the organisation promote integrated approaches to insider threat 
management 
0.842 0.745 
O4. does the organisation have a specialised and multidisciplinary team to 
evaluate the risk of insider threat 
0.832 0.761 
O11. does the organisation have policies and processes to attempt to 
identify moles 
0.835 0.725 
O38. does the organisation regularly review and update insider threat and 
security policy and procedures 
0.844 0.716 
O1. does the organisation offer specific training and education programs 
addressing policy and practice areas relevant to insider threat 
0.780 0.715 
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O2. does the organisation structure security awareness training and 
education efforts appropriately to the needs of different employees groups 
0.751 0.634 
O46. the organisation is good at addressing underlying systemic issues that 
may be linked to increased risk of insider threat 
0.814 0.661 
O39. does the organisation have policy to conduct random reviews of exiting 
staff computer activities leading up the final date 
0.734 0.473 
O13. does the organisation have a senior management position dedicated to 
security who answers to a Board member 
0.749 0.564 
O36. does the organisation have policies that protect the security of 
organisational information and IT resources 
0.833 0.750 
O42. does the organisation have policies protecting the physical security of 
facilities 
0.791 0.663 
O40. are policies and processes in place to ensure that the privileges and 
accesses of staff leaving the organisation are disabled 
0.825 0.637 
O37. does the organisation implement security practices to prevent 
unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information 
0.811 0.669 
O43. does the organisation review physical access anomalies and denials 0.783 0.672 
O54. the organisation has a poor security culture 0.723 0.738 
O66. when it comes to insider threat the organisation is complacent 0.805 0.760 
O59. that, overall, staff of the organisation engage in poor security behaviour 0.653 0.646 
O69. there is a lack of management of insider threat issues at the emerging 
stages 
0.777 0.735 
O80. staff are aware of the security controls utilised by the organisation 0.799 0.697 
O79. security reporting is encouraged in the organisation 0.831 0.663 
O84. security controls of the organisation are adequate and applied 
whenever necessary 
0.787 0.658 
O86. the organisation has a proactive and risk-based approach to mitigating 
emerging insider threats 
0.833 0.730 
O87. security awareness is high among staff 0.835 0.734 
O85. staff in the organisation can identify and report on red flags 0.764 0.637 
O83. the organisation is committed to improving security in order to protect 
its information and resources 
0.816 0.663 
O67. the organisation is aware of its risk tolerance level/risk appetite 0.691 0.561 
O35. does the organisation have a whistle-blower protection policy 0.832 0.768 
O34. does the organisation have confidential reporting so that employees 
can report suspicious events without fear of repercussion 
0.795 0.690 
O81. the organisation has a whistle-blower policy that has the confidence of 
all staff 
0.756 0.612 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
 
A review of the communalities table reveals high communality results for the 
organisational variables. There is also no evidence of any Heywood cases. 
The pattern matrix in Table 25 demonstrates a clean Pattern Matrix with six distinct 
factors and no suggestion of complex variables (items that crossload on to two or 
more factors). 
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Table 25: The Final OVIT – Organisational Pattern Matrix. 
Pattern Matrixa 
 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
O76. the organisation is open and honest with its 
employees 
1.018           
O57. management in the organisation take care 
to be informed about how others think and feel 
about things 
0.987           
O60. staff in the organisation are treated fairly 
by management in the organisation 
0.927           
O52. management in the organisation do not 
hesitate to provide the leadership that is needed 
0.908           
O30. does the organisation structure allow for 
open and efficient communication across all 
levels 
0.886           
O58. management in the organisation 
encourage staff to speak up about employee 
issues 
0.884           
O62. the organisation has a positive 
organisational culture 
0.874           
O56. management in the organisation provide 
the support and resources needed to help staff 
meet their goals 
0.864           
O50. management in the organisation are 
accountable and responsible to others 
0.847           
O17. does the organisation have strong and 
positive leadership 
0.812           
O63. both overt and covert messages are 
corrected to create a positive organisational 
culture 
0.801           
O77. management in the organisation 
encourage staff to participate in important 
decisions 
0.762           
O18. does management in the organisation 
communicate clear plans & objectives for the 
organisation 
0.743           
O48. the organisation is able to learn from 
failures and mistakes 
0.694           
O78. policies and expectations are consistent 
across all levels of the organisation 
0.675           
O51. management in the organisation lead by 
example when it comes to security practice 
0.631           
O74. the organisation balances trust with the 
application of consistent employee monitoring 
0.625           
O55. the values of the organisation are made 
explicit and help to build a strong security culture 
0.501           
O11. does the organisation have policies and 
processes to attempt to identify moles 
  0.996         
O4. does the organisation have a specialised and 
multidisciplinary team to evaluate the risk of 
insider threat 
  0.936         
O12. does the organisation promote integrated 
approaches to insider threat management 
  0.895         
                                                P a g e  | 172 
 
O14. does the organisation have an established 
insider threat contingency management plan 
  0.850         
O1. does the organisation offer specific training 
and education programs addressing policy and 
practice areas relevant to insider threat 
  0.840         
O45. the organisation keeps abreast of best 
practice when it comes to insider threat 
  0.824         
O25. does the organisation management 
integrate insider threat mitigation as part of the 
broader enterprise risk mitigation strategy 
  0.814         
O26. does the organisation commit to the 
prevention, detection, deterrence, and response 
to insider threats 
  0.795         
O2. does the organisation structure security 
awareness training and education efforts 
appropriately to the needs of different 
employees groups 
  0.661         
O13. does the organisation have a senior 
management position dedicated to security who 
answers to a Board member 
  0.655         
O38. does the organisation regularly review and 
update insider threat and security policy and 
procedures 
  0.609         
O46. the organisation is good at addressing 
underlying systemic issues that may be linked to 
increased risk of insider threat 
  0.591         
O39. does the organisation have policy to 
conduct random reviews of exiting staff 
computer activities leading up the final date 
  0.499         
O36. does the organisation have policies that 
protect the security of organisational 
information and IT resources 
    0.749       
O42. does the organisation have policies 
protecting the physical security of facilities 
    0.729       
O40. are policies and processes in place to 
ensure that the privileges and accesses of staff 
leaving the organisation are disabled 
    0.687       
O37. does the organisation implement security 
practices to prevent unauthorised disclosure of 
sensitive information 
    0.666       
O43. does the organisation review physical 
access anomalies and denials 
    0.580       
O54. the organisation has a poor security culture       0.835     
O59. that, overall, staff of the organisation 
engage in poor security behaviour 
      0.782     
O69. there is a lack of management of insider 
threat issues at the emerging stages 
      0.752     
O66. when it comes to insider threat the 
organisation is complacent 
      0.728     
O80. staff are aware of the security controls 
utilised by the organisation 
        0.775   
O84. security controls of the organisation are 
adequate and applied whenever necessary 
        0.675   
O87. security awareness is high among staff         0.624   
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O85. staff in the organisation can identify and 
report on red flags 
        0.620   
O83. the organisation is committed to improving 
security in order to protect its information and 
resources 
        0.605   
O86. the organisation has a proactive and risk-
based approach to mitigating emerging insider 
threats 
        0.593   
O79. security reporting is encouraged in the 
organisation 
        0.554   
O67. the organisation is aware of its risk 
tolerance level/risk appetite 
        0.434   
O35. does the organisation have a whistle-
blower protection policy 
          0.834 
O81. the organisation has a whistle-blower 
policy that has the confidence of all staff 
          0.626 
O34. does the organisation have confidential 
reporting so that employees can report 
suspicious events without fear of repercussion 
          0.571 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
Note: Factor loadings < 0.4 are suppressed to assist in determining crossloading and high loading 
items 
 
The structure matrix (Table 26) was contrasted and compared with the pattern matrix 
(Table 25). Limited differences were observed in these matrices. There was some 
change in the hierarchy of the items of each factor, but all of the items remained the 
same between both matrices. There was also no evidence of suppressor variables.  
 
Table 26: The Final OVIT – Organisational Structure Matrix. 
Structure Matrix 
 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
O76. the organisation is open and honest 
with its employees 
0.900 0.070 0.218 -0.192 0.379 0.296 
O52. management in the organisation do not 
hesitate to provide the leadership that is 
needed 
0.886 0.233 0.411 -0.211 0.492 0.304 
O57. management in the organisation take 
care to be informed about how others think 
and feel about things 
0.879 0.162 0.285 -0.118 0.407 0.303 
O56. management in the organisation 
provide the support and resources needed 
to help staff meet their goals 
0.863 0.163 0.436 -0.158 0.468 0.283 
O58. management in the organisation 
encourage staff to speak up about employee 
issues 
0.849 0.140 0.296 -0.238 0.456 0.261 
                                                P a g e  | 174 
 
O62. the organisation has a positive 
organisational culture 
0.847 0.087 0.162 -0.134 0.460 0.343 
O60. staff in the organisation are treated 
fairly by management in the organisation 
0.845 0.152 0.232 -0.110 0.407 0.342 
O30. does the organisation structure allow 
for open and efficient communication across 
all levels 
0.833 0.184 0.414 -0.123 0.428 0.240 
O17. does the organisation have strong and 
positive leadership 
0.830 0.174 0.396 -0.178 0.453 0.343 
O63. both overt and covert messages are 
corrected to create a positive organisational 
culture 
0.830 0.312 0.312 -0.199 0.517 0.453 
O77. management in the organisation 
encourage staff to participate in important 
decisions 
0.825 0.132 0.194 -0.091 0.550 0.383 
O18. does management in the organisation 
communicate clear plans & objectives for 
the organisation 
0.812 0.223 0.441 -0.150 0.500 0.372 
O50. management in the organisation are 
accountable and responsible to others 
0.805 0.193 0.364 -0.208 0.399 0.305 
O48. the organisation is able to learn from 
failures and mistakes 
0.796 0.294 0.580 -0.159 0.543 0.306 
O51. management in the organisation lead 
by example when it comes to security 
practice 
0.789 0.351 0.545 -0.251 0.623 0.334 
O78. policies and expectations are 
consistent across all levels of the 
organisation 
0.761 0.265 0.220 -0.181 0.567 0.398 
O74. the organisation balances trust with 
the application of consistent employee 
monitoring 
0.753 0.385 0.226 -0.228 0.605 0.528 
O55. the values of the organisation are made 
explicit and help to build a strong security 
culture 
0.714 0.378 0.565 -0.256 0.629 0.344 
O26. does the organisation commit to the 
prevention, detection, deterrence, and 
response to insider threats 
0.272 0.888 0.472 -0.319 0.576 0.497 
O45. the organisation keeps abreast of best 
practice when it comes to insider threat 
0.303 0.871 0.399 -0.276 0.573 0.487 
O25. does the organisation management 
integrate insider threat mitigation as part of 
the broader enterprise risk mitigation 
strategy 
0.217 0.867 0.379 -0.246 0.512 0.525 
O14. does the organisation have an 
established insider threat contingency 
management plan 
0.200 0.866 0.402 -0.307 0.478 0.462 
O12. does the organisation promote 
integrated approaches to insider threat 
management 
0.113 0.854 0.348 -0.199 0.468 0.382 
O4. does the organisation have a specialised 
and multidisciplinary team to evaluate the 
risk of insider threat 
0.080 0.851 0.384 -0.204 0.401 0.350 
O11. does the organisation have policies and 
processes to attempt to identify moles 
0.166 0.833 0.300 -0.195 0.375 0.345 
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O38. does the organisation regularly review 
and update insider threat and security policy 
and procedures 
0.306 0.808 0.418 -0.321 0.551 0.624 
O1. does the organisation offer specific 
training and education programs addressing 
policy and practice areas relevant to insider 
threat 
0.151 0.803 0.161 -0.091 0.500 0.442 
O46. the organisation is good at addressing 
underlying systemic issues that may be 
linked to increased risk of insider threat 
0.478 0.739 0.338 -0.296 0.585 0.584 
O2. does the organisation structure security 
awareness training and education efforts 
appropriately to the needs of different 
employees groups 
0.248 0.739 0.206 -0.105 0.581 0.466 
O13. does the organisation have a senior 
management position dedicated to security 
who answers to a Board member 
0.150 0.719 0.445 -0.246 0.465 0.311 
O39. does the organisation have policy to 
conduct random reviews of exiting staff 
computer activities leading up the final date 
0.295 0.639 0.455 -0.137 0.489 0.421 
O36. does the organisation have policies that 
protect the security of organisational 
information and IT resources 
0.429 0.386 0.824 -0.068 0.546 0.423 
O42. does the organisation have policies 
protecting the physical security of facilities 
0.298 0.448 0.787 -0.047 0.474 0.330 
O40. are policies and processes in place to 
ensure that the privileges and accesses of 
staff leaving the organisation are disabled 
0.445 0.388 0.780 -0.127 0.486 0.295 
O37. does the organisation implement 
security practices to prevent unauthorised 
disclosure of sensitive information 
0.365 0.499 0.773 -0.223 0.539 0.413 
O43. does the organisation review physical 
access anomalies and denials 
0.326 0.603 0.737 -0.216 0.565 0.423 
O54. the organisation has a poor security 
culture 
-0.238 -0.180 -0.175 0.833 -0.340 -0.192 
O66. when it comes to insider threat the 
organisation is complacent 
-0.071 -0.469 0.039 0.788 -0.193 -0.312 
O69. there is a lack of management of insider 
threat issues at the emerging stages 
-0.120 -0.315 0.136 0.783 -0.142 -0.334 
O59. that, overall, staff of the organisation 
engage in poor security behaviour 
-0.254 -0.030 -0.214 0.742 -0.241 -0.102 
O80. staff are aware of the security controls 
utilised by the organisation 
0.413 0.543 0.493 -0.258 0.822 0.428 
O79. security reporting is encouraged in the 
organisation 
0.557 0.560 0.472 -0.227 0.788 0.497 
O86. the organisation has a proactive and 
risk-based approach to mitigating emerging 
insider threats 
0.405 0.710 0.333 -0.316 0.783 0.532 
O84. security controls of the organisation 
are adequate and applied whenever 
necessary 
0.473 0.460 0.577 -0.243 0.779 0.359 
O85. staff in the organisation can identify 
and report on red flags 
0.444 0.574 0.494 -0.255 0.775 0.410 
O87. security awareness is high among staff 0.361 0.658 0.505 -0.376 0.769 0.299 
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O83. the organisation is committed to 
improving security in order to protect its 
information and resources 
0.492 0.476 0.615 -0.198 0.760 0.304 
O67. the organisation is aware of its risk 
tolerance level/risk appetite 
0.524 0.525 0.497 -0.199 0.705 0.400 
O35. does the organisation have a whistle-
blower protection policy 
0.289 0.513 0.431 -0.255 0.382 0.820 
O81. the organisation has a whistle-blower 
policy that has the confidence of all staff 
0.439 0.478 0.390 -0.277 0.515 0.742 
O34. does the organisation have confidential 
reporting so that employees can report 
suspicious events without fear of 
repercussion 
0.497 0.505 0.556 -0.168 0.571 0.722 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
The results of the Factor Correlation Matrix (Table 27) suggest that there are 
moderate relationships between factors and therefore independence cannot be 
assumed. This outcome again supports the use of the oblique (Promax) rather than 
orthogonal rotation (Hair et al. 2010). 
 
Table 27: The Final OVIT-Organisational Factor Correlation Matrix. 
Factor Correlation Matrix 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.000 .240 .395 -.206 .574 .406 
2 .240 1.000 .399 -.295 .579 .537 
3 .395 .399 1.000 -.134 .498 .243 
4 -.206 -.295 -.134 1.000 -.266 -.238 
5 .574 .579 .498 -.266 1.000 .502 
6 .406 .537 .243 -.238 .502 1.000 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.   
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
4.4.3.8 Summary of EFA outcomes for the OVIT – Organisational 
Ninety OVIT-Organisational items were subjected to the Maximum Likelihood 
extraction method with Oblique (Promax) rotation in order to determine the EFA of 
‘best-fit’. The final EFA solution was achieved in nine iterations of the full EFA process 
(i.e. checking KMO, Bartlett’s test of sphericity, goodness of fit, communalities, 
variance explained, factor loadings, removal of items etc.). The best result for this 
preliminary stage was achieved when the factor analysis was forced to six factors. 
These six factors explained 70.25% of the variance and a total of 51 questions were 
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retained. Before completing reliability analysis on the OVIT-Organisational, four 
questions required reverse scoring in SPSS (whereby a response on the Likert scale of 
1 became a 5, 2 became a 4, 3 remained the same, 4 became a 2, and 5 became a 1). 
The following questions were reverse scored: 
• O54. the organisation has a poor security culture 
• O59. that, overall, staff of the organisation engage in poor security behaviour 
• O66. when it comes to insider threat the organisation is complacent 
• O69. there is a lack of management of insider threat issues at the emerging 
stages 
 
Reliability analyses on the full OVIT-Organisational and its six factors were then 
completed. Using the Cronbach’s alpha the OVIT-Organisational inventory was 
determined to be internally consistent and reliable with an alpha of 0.98 which is well 
above the recommended 0.60 benchmark (see Table 28 and Figure 18).  
 
Table 28: The OVIT-Organisational Inventory. 
The OVIT (α = 0.98) 
OVIT – ORGANISATIONAL (α = 0.98) 
Factor 1 – Organisational culture and leadership (α = 0.97) 
1. the organisation is open and honest with its employees 
2. management in the organisation do not hesitate to provide the leadership that is needed 
3. management in the organisation take care to be informed about how others think and feel about 
things 
4. management in the organisation provide the support and resources needed to help staff meet 
their goals 
5. management in the organisation encourage staff to speak up about employee issues 
6. the organisation has a positive organisational culture 
7. staff in the organisation are treated fairly by management in the organisation 
8. does the organisation structure allow for open and efficient communication across all levels 
9. does the organisation have strong and positive leadership 
10. both overt and covert messages are corrected to create a positive organisational culture 
11. management in the organisation encourage staff to participate in important decisions 
12. does management in the organisation communicate clear plans & objectives for the organisation 
13. management in the organisation are accountable and responsible to others 
14. the organisation is able to learn from failures and mistakes 
15. management in the organisation lead by example when it comes to security practice 
16. policies and expectations are consistent across all levels of the organisation 
17. the organisation balances trust with the application of consistent employee monitoring  
18. the values of the organisation are made explicit and help to build a strong security culture 
 
Factor 2 – Insider threat initiatives (α = 0.96) 
19. does the organisation commit to the prevention, detection, deterrence, and response to insider 
threats 
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20. the organisation keeps abreast of best practice when it comes to insider threat 
21. does the organisation management integrate insider threat mitigation as part of the broader 
enterprise risk mitigation strategy 
22. does the organisation have an established insider threat contingency management plan 
23. does the organisation promote integrated approaches to insider threat management 
24. does the organisation have a specialised and multidisciplinary team to evaluate the risk of insider 
threat 
25. does the organisation have policies and processes to attempt to identify moles 
26. does the organisation regularly review and update insider threat and security policy and 
procedures 
27. does the organisation offer specific training and education programs addressing policy and 
practice areas relevant to insider threat 
28. the organisation is good at addressing underlying systemic issues that may be linked to increased 
risk of insider threat 
29. does the organisation structure security awareness training and education efforts appropriately 
to the needs of different employees groups 
30. does the organisation have policy to conduct random reviews of exiting staff computer activities 
leading up the final date (check loading as not showing on pattern matrix) 
31. does the organisation have a senior management position dedicated to security who answers to 
a Board member 
 
Factor 3 – Organisational protection (α = 0.91) 
32. does the organisation have policies that protect the security of organisational information and IT 
resources 
33. does the organisation have policies protecting the physical security of facilities 
34. are policies and processes in place to ensure that the privileges and accesses of staff leaving the 
organisation are disabled 
35. does the organisation implement security practices to prevent unauthorised disclosure of 
sensitive information 
36. does the organisation review physical access anomalies and denials 
 
Factor 4 – Organisational complacency (α = 0.85) 
37. the organisation has a poor security culture 
38. when it comes to insider threat the organisation is complacent 
39. there is a lack of management of insider threat issues at the emerging stages 
40. that, overall, staff of the organisation engage in poor security behaviour 
 
Factor 5 – Organisational security awareness (α = 0.93) 
41. staff are aware of the security controls utilised by the organisation 
42. security reporting is encouraged in the organisation 
43. the organisation has a proactive and risk-based approach to mitigating emerging insider threats 
44. security controls of the organisation are adequate and applied whenever necessary 
45. staff in the organisation can identify and report on red flags 
46. security awareness is high among staff 
47. the organisation is committed to improving security in order to protect its information and 
resources 
48. the organisation is aware of its risk tolerance level/risk appetite (check value as dropped off 
pattern matrix but is showing) 
 
Factor 6 – Organisational reporting (α = 0.96) 
49. does the organisation have a whistle-blower protection policy 
50. the organisation has a whistle-blower policy that has the confidence of all staff 
51. does the organisation have confidential reporting exist so that employees can report suspicious 
events without fear of repercussion 
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The factors were labelled and the final descriptors were discussed with the research 
supervisor to reduce subjectivity. The factors were named as:  
1. Organisational culture and leadership 
2. Insider threat initiatives 
3. Organisational protection 
4. Organisational complacency 
5. Organisational security awareness 
6. Organisational reporting.  
 
Figure 18: OVIT – Organisational Dimension Factor Structure 
 
Source: Developed for this study 
 
4.4.3.9 OVIT – Technical: Testing the assumptions 
The OVIT-Technical was subjected to the same test of assumptions as the OVIT-
Individual and the OVIT-Organisational. The Pearson Bivariate Correlation matrix was 
above 0.30 and below 0.90. 
 
The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (190) = 2617.91, p<0.000). The KMO 
test for sampling adequacy was 0.908 which is greater than the recommended 0.60 
(see Table 29).  
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Table 29: The OVIT-Technical KMO and Bartlett’s Test. 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
0.908 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-
Square 
2617.911 
df 190 
Sig. 0.000 
 
4.4.3.10 OVIT – Technical: Extraction of factors 
As previously explained this study combined a conceptual and evidence based 
approach to factor reduction based on review of the scree test (see Figure 19), 
eigenvalues, and total variance explained (see Table 30). The eigenvalues of the 
factors were above 1 and the total variance explained was 68.22%, much greater than 
the recommended 60% (Hair et al. 2010). 
 
Figure 19: The Final OVIT-Technical Scree Plot 
 
 
Utilising these three approaches to factor extraction, along with researcher judgment 
consistent with the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the research, the 
final OVIT – Technical factor solution resulted in three individual factors. 
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Table 30: The Final OVIT–Technical Eigenvalues. 
Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 11.093 55.465 55.465 10.725 53.623 53.623 9.666 
2 2.150 10.751 66.215 1.854 9.272 62.895 9.079 
3 1.350 6.752 72.967 1.065 5.326 68.221 5.389 
4 0.780 3.898 76.865         
5 0.660 3.301 80.166         
6 0.548 2.742 82.908         
7 0.535 2.673 85.581         
8 0.427 2.134 87.715         
9 0.413 2.064 89.779         
10 0.353 1.765 91.544         
11 0.280 1.402 92.946         
12 0.264 1.322 94.268         
13 0.200 1.001 95.269         
14 0.190 0.949 96.218         
15 0.177 0.885 97.102         
16 0.158 0.789 97.892         
17 0.146 0.731 98.623         
18 0.107 0.533 99.155         
19 0.091 0.455 99.610         
20 0.078 0.390 100.000         
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total 
variance. 
 
4.4.3.11 OVIT – Technical: Factor rotation and interpretation 
The Maximum Likelihood estimation procedure with oblique rotation (Promax) was 
applied to OVIT-Technical. Communalities below 0.40 were removed. Item loadings 
below the recommended 0.40 were also removed.  
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Table 31: The Final OVIT–Technical Communalities. 
Communalities 
  Initial Extraction 
T12. does the organisation monitor common data exfiltration methods (e-
mail, removable media) to identify anomalous behaviour 
0.836 0.826 
T13. does the organisation collect and monitor network traffic and security 
logs for anomalies 
0.837 0.833 
T14. does the organisation monitor key databases, data access and 
movement 
0.821 0.819 
T16. does the organisation have means to monitor trends in IT policy 
breaches to inform corrective action 
0.833 0.785 
T10. does the organisation implement random auditing of IT use 
implemented 
0.783 0.711 
T15. does the organisation use modern technologies to assist insider threat 
detection, deterrence, prevention and reporting 
0.779 0.690 
T9. does the organisation use advanced analytics tools to analyse and report 
on insider threat 
0.779 0.683 
T21. does the organisation use regular penetration testing to strengthen 
defences 
0.732 0.595 
T7. does the organisation restrict administrators from controlling auditing 
functions 
0.768 0.752 
T8. does the organisation conduct routine auditing of privileged functions 0.833 0.761 
T6. does the organisation require multiple users to action all modifications 
to critical systems, network, applications, and data 
0.709 0.709 
T5. does the organisation ensure access to sensitive systems and areas 
enforced by authentication procedures are monitored for anomalies 
0.792 0.692 
T4. does the organisation ensure authentication procedures become more 
advanced with increasing access to critical information/data 
0.709 0.627 
T2. does the organisation have guidelines to ensure that staff only have 
access to data, systems, and information required to perform their duties 
0.633 0.543 
T3. does the organisation implement multi-factor authentication 0.603 0.489 
T22. does the organisation hire technically sophisticated system 
administrators or programmers 
0.657 0.471 
T27. does the organisation employ special authentication procedures 
employed for database administrators 
0.742 0.739 
T25. does the organisation review access request denials 0.712 0.699 
T24. does the organisation have a clear list of access privileges for all roles 0.694 0.655 
T26. does the organisation ensure computing equipment connected to the 
corporate network of the organisation reside in an area that has electronic 
access controls in place (i.e.- requires a swipe card to access) 
0.675 0.566 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
 
A review of the communalities in Table 31 reveals high communality results for the 
technical variables. There is also no evidence of any Heywood cases. 
 
A check for cross-loading items in the pattern matrix was then undertaken. The 
pattern matrix in Table 32 demonstrates a clean Pattern Matrix with three distinct 
factors and no suggestion of complex variables. One item fell just below 0.4 at 0.395 
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(T22 - does the organisation hire technically sophisticated system administrators or 
programmers), but was retained based on theoretical considerations at this 
exploratory stage. This item was also within the minimum guidelines of 0.3 (Hair et 
al. 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). 
 
Table 32: The Final OVIT – Technical Pattern Matrix. 
Pattern Matrixa  
 
Factor 
1 2 3 
T13. does the organisation collect and monitor network traffic and security logs 
for anomalies 
1.016     
T12. does the organisation monitor common data exfiltration methods (e-mail, 
removable media) to identify anomalous behaviour 
1.000     
T14. does the organisation monitor key databases, data access and movement 0.952     
T10. does the organisation implement random auditing of IT use implemented 0.774     
T16. does the organisation have means to monitor trends in IT policy breaches 
to inform corrective action 
0.722     
T15. does the organisation use modern technologies to assist insider threat 
detection, deterrence, prevention and reporting 
0.690     
T9. does the organisation use advanced analytics tools to analyse and report on 
insider threat 
0.677     
T21. does the organisation use regular penetration testing to strengthen 
defences 
0.529     
T7. does the organisation restrict administrators from controlling auditing 
functions 
  0.884   
T6. does the organisation require multiple users to action all modifications to 
critical systems, network, applications, and data 
  0.883   
T2. does the organisation have guidelines to ensure that staff only have access 
to data, systems, and information required to perform their duties 
  0.828   
T4. does the organisation ensure authentication procedures become more 
advanced with increasing access to critical information/data 
  0.707   
8. does the organisation conduct routine auditing of privileged functions   0.613   
T3. does the organisation implement multi-factor authentication   0.524   
T5. does the organisation ensure access to sensitive systems and areas enforced 
by authentication procedures are monitored for anomalies 
  0.523   
T22. does the organisation hire technically sophisticated system administrators 
or programmers 
 0.395     
T27. does the organisation employ special authentication procedures employed 
for database administrators 
    0.881 
T25. does the organisation review access request denials     0.856 
T24. does the organisation have a clear list of access privileges for all roles     0.821 
T26. does the organisation ensure computing equipment connected to the 
corporate network of the organisation reside in an area that has electronic 
access controls in place (i.e.- requires a swipe card to access) 
    0.617 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
Note: Factor loadings < 0.4 are suppressed to assist in determining crossloading and high loading items 
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The structure matrix (Table 33) of the OVIT-Technical was contrasted and compared 
with the pattern matrix (Table 32). Based on review of these matrices there were 
limited differences observed. There was some change in the hierarchy of the items 
of each factor, but all the same items remained the same between both matrices. 
There was also no evidence of suppressor variables.  
 
Table 33: The Final OVIT – Technical Structure Matrix. 
Structure Matrix 
 
Factor 
1 2 3 
T12. does the organisation monitor common data exfiltration methods (e-
mail, removable media) to identify anomalous behaviour 
0.905 0.623 0.381 
T13. does the organisation collect and monitor network traffic and security 
logs for anomalies 
0.904 0.598 0.449 
T14. does the organisation monitor key databases, data access and 
movement 
0.901 0.635 0.453 
T16. does the organisation have means to monitor trends in IT policy 
breaches to inform corrective action 
0.874 0.748 0.409 
T10. does the organisation implement random auditing of IT use 
implemented 
0.839 0.671 0.373 
T15. does the organisation use modern technologies to assist insider 
threat detection, deterrence, prevention and reporting 
0.819 0.696 0.367 
T9. does the organisation use advanced analytics tools to analyse and 
report on insider threat 
0.813 0.697 0.359 
T21. does the organisation use regular penetration testing to strengthen 
defences 
0.748 0.680 0.433 
T7. does the organisation restrict administrators from controlling auditing 
functions 
0.647 0.865 0.377 
T8. does the organisation conduct routine auditing of privileged functions 0.777 0.842 0.401 
T6. does the organisation require multiple users to action all modifications 
to critical systems, network, applications, and data 
0.601 0.841 0.415 
T5. does the organisation ensure access to sensitive systems and areas 
enforced by authentication procedures are monitored for anomalies 
0.745 0.799 0.480 
T4. does the organisation ensure authentication procedures become more 
advanced with increasing access to critical information/data 
0.633 0.789 0.413 
T2. does the organisation have guidelines to ensure that staff only have 
access to data, systems, and information required to perform their duties 
0.485 0.731 0.359 
T3. does the organisation implement multi-factor authentication 0.597 0.686 0.397 
T22. does the organisation hire technically sophisticated system 
administrators or programmers 
0.531 0.618 0.559 
T27. does the organisation employ special authentication procedures 
employed for database administrators 
0.370 0.394 0.859 
T25. does the organisation review access request denials 0.376 0.373 0.835 
T24. does the organisation have a clear list of access privileges for all roles 0.314 0.398 0.804 
T26. does the organisation ensure computing equipment connected to the 
corporate network of the organisation reside in an area that has electronic 
access controls in place (i.e.- requires a swipe card to access) 
0.519 0.474 0.724 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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The Factor Correlation Matrix was examined (Table 34). The results indicated 
moderate to high relationships between factors and therefore independence cannot 
be assumed. This outcome supports the use of the oblique (Promax) rather than 
orthogonal rotation (Hair et al. 2010). 
 
Table 34: The Final OVIT-Technical Factor Correlation Matrix. 
Factor Correlation Matrix 
Factor 1 2 3 
1 1.000 .746 .467 
2 .746 1.000 .493 
3 .467 .493 1.000 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.   
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
 
4.4.3.12 Summary of EFA outcomes for the OVIT - Technical 
Twenty-seven OVIT-Technical items were subjected to the Maximum Likelihood 
extraction method with Oblique (Promax) rotation. In order to determine the EFA of 
‘best-fit, ’final EFA solution was achieved in seven iterations of the full EFA process 
(i.e. checking KMO, Bartlett’s test of sphericity, goodness of fit, communalities, 
variance explained, factor loadings, removal of items etc.).  Three factors were 
extracted explaining 68.22% of the variance and 20 questions were retained in the 
OVIT - Technical. Reliability analyses on the full OVIT-Technical and its three factors 
were completed. Using the Cronbach’s alpha the OVIT-Technical was determined to 
be internally consistent and reliable (α = 0.95, see Table 35 and Figure 20).  
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Table 35: The OVIT-Technical Inventory. 
The OVIT (α = 0.98) 
OVIT – TECHNICAL (α = 0.95) 
Factor 1 – Technical monitoring and detection (α = 0.96) 
1. does the organisation monitor common data exfiltration methods (e-mail, removable media) 
to identify anomalous behaviour 
2. does the organisation collect and monitor network traffic and security logs for anomalies 
3. does the organisation monitor key databases, data access and movement 
4. does the organisation have means to monitor trends in IT policy breaches to inform corrective 
action 
5. does the organisation implement random auditing of IT use implemented 
6. does the organisation use modern technologies to assist insider threat detection, deterrence, 
prevention and reporting 
7. does the organisation use advanced analytics tools to analyse and report on insider threat 
8. does the organisation use regular penetration testing to strengthen defences 
 
Factor 2 – Technical restrictions (α = 0.92) 
9. does the organisation restrict administrators from controlling auditing functions 
10. does the organisation conduct routine auditing of privileged functions 
11. does the organisation require multiple users to action all modifications to critical systems, 
network, applications, and data 
12. does the organisation ensure access to sensitive systems and areas enforced by authentication 
procedures are monitored for anomalies 
13. does the organisation ensure authentication procedures become more advanced with 
increasing access to critical information/data 
14. does the organisation have guidelines to ensure that staff only have access to data, systems, 
and information required to perform their duties 
15. does the organisation implement multi-factor authentication 
16. does the organisation hire technically sophisticated system administrators or programmers 
 
Factor 3 – Technical access (α = 0.88) 
17. does the organisation employ special authentication procedures employed for database 
administrators 
18. does the organisation review access request denials 
19. does the organisation have a clear list of access privileges for all roles 
20. does the organisation ensure computing equipment connected to the corporate network of 
the organisation reside in an area that has electronic access controls in place (i.e.- requires a 
swipe card to access) 
 
 
The technical factors were labelled and the final descriptors were discussed with the 
research supervisor to reduce subjectivity. The factors were names as:  
1. Technical monitoring and detection 
2. Technical restrictions 
3. Technical access.  
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Figure 20: OVIT – Technical Dimension Factor Structure 
 
Source: Developed for this study 
 
4.5 Operationalising Organisational Vulnerability to Intentional Insider Threat 
The EFA process determined that the OVIT and its sub-inventories are statistically 
robust. From the outcomes of the EFA a framework for understanding organisational 
vulnerability to IIT has been determined. The construct of IIT is represented by the 
three dimensions; individual, organisational, and technical. These dimensions 
breakdown further in to 13 factors (see Figure 21).  
 
The development of the OVIT framework is significant especially in terms of the gaps 
identified in the literature review surrounding insider threat (see Chapter 1). Band et 
al. (2006) encouraged a more rigorous focus on organisational predispositions and 
vulnerabilities. The OVIT framework addresses the importance of individual and 
technical factors, but also the organisational factors of influence which have been 
largely ignored or undervalued. The OVIT framework reflects where organisations 
may improve the organisational environment, thereby reducing inappropriate insider 
action and exploitation.  
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Figure 21: The OVIT Framework and factor structure of individual, organisational, 
and technical dimensions 
 
 
 
Source: Developed for this research. 
 
The OVIT framework compliments the existing models and frameworks on insider 
threat. However, it also presents a completely original model to the theory. Unlike 
previous models the OVIT challenges the ‘attack-focus’, prominence of insider 
attributes and actions, and prediction and detection. Instead, the OVIT framework 
identifies multi-dimensional areas where organisations can reduce vulnerability to IIT 
in a way that is not cumbersome or challenging for practitioners to use. From an 
applied perspective the potential for the OVIT framework to provide predictive or 
protective outcomes also addresses the limitation in current practice towards 
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reactive and detection focused solutions (Greitzer & Hohimer 2011; Greitzer et al. 
2009).     
 
4.6 Summary 
The focus of the current thesis is to operationalise the key constructs of 
organisational vulnerability to IIT. This was achieved through three research phases 
ultimately attempting to define, describe, and validate the construct of 
organisational vulnerability to IIT.  
 
Part One – Defining IIT 
The definition of organisational vulnerability to IIT was built around a thematic 
analysis of the extant literature which aided the determination of pertinent aspects 
of IIT. The literature review provided an understanding of the many factors 
associated with the construct of IIT vulnerability. A significant number of items were 
identified to increase, decrease, and mitigate or moderate IIT based on the extant 
literature. A synthesis of the literature review and content analysis revealed a simple 
set relationship between three dimensions of IIT being individual, organisational, and 
technical dimensions.  
 
Through a Delphi study expert panel members were presented with factors and 
variables of intentional insider threat from the literature. The Delphi panel also 
provided additional critical items relevant to IIT. As such the Delphi process was able 
to build upon the literature review and determine an Australian definition of IIT (see 
below) as well as demonstrate the most pertinent measures of IIT; those critical to 
increasing, decreasing, and moderating IIT (see Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 above). 
Intentional insider threat is when a person of trust (employee, 
contractor, consultant, vendor) who has/had legitimate access to an 
organisation attempts to cause harm through counterproductive 
behaviour intended to result in the loss, disclosure, or damage to that 
organisation’s information, resources, assets, or reputation. 
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Part Two – Describing IIT 
Following the literature review and Delphi process, pertinent items of IIT were 
transformed into questions for the development of a diagnostic inventory of 
organisational vulnerability to IIT (the OVIT). The valid completion of the online 
inventory by 141 respondents provided a means for describing IIT. The high level of 
homogeneity of the sample providing a basis for robust outcomes. Analysis of the 
descriptive statistics highlighted: (1) that organisations could benefit more from 
checking for potential problematic behaviour, abuses, and personality characteristics 
associated with insider threat; (2) organisational complacency, when it comes to IIT 
focus and implementation of initiatives, was a salient outcome; and (3) technical 
safeguarding is a positive organisational practice although could be enhanced though 
use of modern technologies and advanced analytic tools designed to detect, deter, 
prevent, and report on IIT. 
 
Through exploratory factor analysis (EFA) a further understanding of the construct 
was achieved. The EFA was able to reduce the number of items designed to measure 
the individual, organisational, and technical dimensions of organisational 
vulnerability to IIT.  
 
Phase Three – Validating IIT 
The validation of the construct was achieved through an EFA of the OVIT. Following 
assumption testing, the conduct of EFA on the inventories designed to measure the 
three dimensions of IIT (individual, organisational, technical) was performed. 
Assumption testing revealed no significant concerns for exploratory research. 
Maximum Likelihood procedure was used to extract factors from the variables of the 
OVIT sub-inventories and the Promax oblique rotation was chosen to provide simple 
and meaningful factor structures. The overall outcomes demonstrated that the full 
OVIT (96 questions) and its three sub-inventories - OVIT-Individual (25 questions), 
OVIT-Organisational (51 questions), and OVIT-Technical (20 questions) - are valid and 
reliable measures of the dimensions and construct.  
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This chapter described the data analysis undertaken in this exploratory research 
study. The chapter highlighted the three main phases of data collection and analysis 
highlighting the results of the literature review, the Delphi process, and the 
Exploratory Factor Analyses. The multivariate analysis process included data 
preparation, cleaning and screening, generating descriptive statistics, and conducting 
three EFA. Whilst an EFA of the entire inventory was not possible, the EFA of the three 
separate inventories produced preliminary factor solutions which operationalised 
the construct of organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat.  
 
The results of this study has contributed new insights to IIT such as the development 
of an IIT definition. It has extended conceptual and theoretical understanding 
through demonstrated exploratory evidence of the validity and reliability of the 
construct of IIT, including the relevance of its three dimensions; individual, 
organisational, and technical. A working framework on organisational vulnerability to 
intentional insider threat is presented. The underlying factors associated with the 
dimensions of IIT is an original contribution which extends current understanding of 
IIT. The elucidation of underlying IIT factors provides a means for organisations to 
understand vulnerability to intentional insider threat and target specific areas to 
mitigate IIT. 
 
The interpretation, implications, and limitations of these results are discussed in the 
following chapter.            
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5 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The current thesis began in Chapter 1 by introducing the researcher and providing an 
introduction and overview to the research. The influence of the scientist-practitioner 
model along with policies of the Australian Government was introduced. A 
background to the motivation for completing the research, the scope of the project, 
an outline of the anticipated contributions, as well as the aims of the research and 
thesis structure was presented.  
 
In order to achieve the aims of the research, Chapter 2 presented an extensive 
literature review that explored insider threat and risk management. Various 
approaches to the study of insider threat were introduced. Further, prominent 
models and frameworks of insider threat were examined. Positioning the study in a 
risk management framework was also undertaken. The limitations of the available 
research were expressed to justify the importance of further exploration of 
organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat and benefit of developing the 
OVIT.  
 
Chapter 3 outlined the research design adopted in the study and detailed major 
methodologies used. The current research was underpinned by the Pragmatist 
worldview and a sequential mixed method typology chosen for the design. This 
research aimed to develop a greater understanding of IIT through three distinct 
research phases: review of current literature, a Delphi study, and the 
operationalisation of organisational vulnerability to IIT through multivariate analysis. 
Finally, ethical considerations for the research was examined.  
 
Chapter 4 provided the data analysis and interpretation. Results of the three phases 
of the research design were presented in detail. The outcomes of the exploratory 
factor analyses were presented culminating in the presentation of the OVIT 
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Framework and factor structures for the individual, organisational, and technical 
dimensions.  
 
Chapter 5 now reports on the findings that have emerged throughout the research 
process. This chapter first explores the conclusions reached with regard to the three 
research questions. Additional contributions to the field from a theoretical, practical, 
and personal perspective are also discussed. Finally, limitations of the study and 
recommendations for future research are explored.  
 
5.2 Research Outcomes 
Intentional insider threat is one of the many risks that organisations are confronted 
with. The ability to reduce vulnerability to IIT is critical to organisations achieving 
strategic and competitive advantage (Vashisth & Kumar 2013). It also provides 
organisational protection reducing potential financial loss, damage to reputation, and 
loss of valuable intellectual property. This thesis focused on organisational 
vulnerability to IIT, addressed some of the inadequacies in existing research, 
especially related to organisational influence, risk management, and the 
multidimensional aspects of the problem. It also provided a brief futures perspective 
in order to suggest how IIT may evolve looking ahead. 
 
The study developed a diagnostic inventory (OVIT) to assess organisational 
vulnerability to IIT and, based on these findings presented a preliminary model of 
organisational vulnerability to IIT with both practical and academic utility. The 
research adopted a multipronged approach proposing a comprehensive way to 
mitigate vulnerability to IIT. The thematic analysis determined pertinent dimensions 
of IIT and provided a greater understanding of the multidimensional (individual, 
organisational, and technical) considerations of IIT.  
 
A modified Delphi study and expert opinion and consensus provided relevant and 
purposeful information on insider threat (Catrantzos 2012) and the most relevant 
factors and variables were incorporated in the final operationalisation of IIT and 
development and validation of the OVIT. The outcome of this exploratory research is 
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a comprehensive, expertly informed, valid, and reliable tool for the assessment of 
organisational vulnerability to IIT as well as a working framework which clearly 
demonstrates the relationship between the construct and its dimensions and factors.  
 
5.3 Research Findings 
5.3.1 Phase One – Research Question 1 
Research Question 1: What are the main organisational influences on intentional 
insider threat (IIT) based on available literature? 
Research question one proposed that the literature content has explored the 
foundational concepts and variables related to IIT. It was deemed critical to the study 
to comprehensively identify the relevant influences of IIT expressed in the available 
literature. Through phase one, 141 item variables (see Section 3.4.1) were extracted 
from extant literature addressing pertinent aspects of IIT. These included coverage 
of the individual, organisational, and technical aspects of the problem. There were 
35 variables of influence considered to potentially decrease IIT, 42 thought to 
increase IIT, and 51 generalised potential methods and conditions to mitigate insider 
threat.  
 
The distillation of themes from the literature review not only contributed to potential 
variables of interest that were included in phase two of the study, but also culminated 
in a simple conceptual model of organisational vulnerability to IIT (see Figures 9 and 
13). This is a unique contribution of the study and provides a simple diagrammatic 
overview of the concepts of IIT, how they are related, and how they affect 
organisations.  
 
An evaluation of the available research and extant literature demonstrated that 
whilst researchers and organisations did recognise IIT as a potential organisational 
risk, there was a greater emphasis on addressing external and technological risk 
(Cyber Security Division 2009). Further, consistent with the findings of Festa (2012b) 
and Catrantzos (2012) there was a clear and prominent focus on individual, societal, 
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and technological influence, with less focus on organisational factors and 
determinants.  
 
Prior to the current study, there was a persistent concern identified in the literature 
regarding the narrow and predetermined focus given to insider threat. This thesis 
contributes to, and enhances, the importance and application of organisational 
factors in the management of IIT. Based on this exploratory study it was determined 
that the construct of organisational vulnerability to IIT can be represented by three 
dimensions (individual, technical, organisational) and 13 factors (see 20 and phase 3, 
RQ2). The more specific OVIT-Organisational Inventory resulted in 90 items 
representing the organisational dimension within the construct of broader 
organisational vulnerability.  
 
Seeking a level of robustness in the OVIT-Individual, demographical, motivational, 
and psychological components were incorporated. Addressing specific individual 
concerns was not within the aims of the current study. However, ensuring that 
organisations considered a layer of protection in determining individual vulnerability 
was important. The OVIT and related working model identifies four specific factors 
under the individual dimension supporting a focus on understanding people working 
for and within any organisation.  
 
Likewise, technical factors have been incorporated in to the OVIT. It is clear from the 
literature that IT and cyber influence is important. Therefore a comprehensive 
approach to determining organisational vulnerability requires consideration of some 
of the technical factors within an organisation’s control. The span of influence of the 
technical factors is narrower than the organisational component, with 20 questions 
retained for the OVIT-Technical Inventory.  
 
5.3.2 Phase One – Other Outcomes 
Whilst RQ1 was very specific, the undertaking of phase one presented additional 
findings which are considered important for presentation. The current thesis was 
able to extend the literature and understanding of IIT in various ways, advancing the 
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study of IIT. Specifically this study was able to address the clear lack of representation 
of Australian contribution to IIT literature as well as couch its findings in a manner 
relevant to the Australian context while also contributing original insights to IIT 
literature of global relevance. 
 
Risk Management and IIT 
The Australian Government mandates a risk management approach to addressing 
insider threat, however, a review of the literature exposed limited research which 
specifically utilises risk management methodology to underpin investigations. In fact, 
there was also an underwhelming representation from Australia on the topic.  
 
Even so, the extensive and exhaustive review of the extant literature determined that 
organisational vulnerabilities and strengths could be distilled and identified for 
greater investigation. The coverage of demographical, psychological, motivational, 
organisational, and technological research, as it relates it IIT, demonstrates the 
multifactorial influence as well as the need for multidimensional response.  
 
The addition of reflecting on IIT through a risk management perspective also exposed 
new insights determining organisational influence on IIT. As such, this thesis presents  
a unique contribution to the study of IIT which integrates the research on insider 
threat with the AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009 risk management standards (see Sections 
2.2.8, 2.2.9, and 2.2.10).  
 
Given the above exercise, the current thesis has also made a contribution to the risk 
management field. Until now, there has been limited expression of insider threat 
through use of a risk management methodology as defined the Australian Standards 
(AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009). This is a unique contribution of the current thesis. In 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5 integrates risk management standards, including security risk 
management, with research/publications on insider threat, under rigorous research 
conditions. Further, ensuring an alignment between risk management methodology, 
assessment, and practice has provided a diagnostic tool with potential for a 
standardised approach to the identification, assessment, and evaluation of IIT. 
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Implementation of the OVIT allows for comparisons within and across organisations, 
enhancing shared understanding and facilitating decision making and judgment 
(Homeland Security 2011).  
 
The OVIT Framework 
When it comes to current and prominent models of insider threat, individual and 
technical dimensions are well covered. However, to varying extent, the current 
models undermine or underrepresent the importance of organisational influence in 
both positive and negative representations. Even though the current research aimed 
to strengthen the importance of organisational representation in the literature, the 
resultant OVIT appears capable of aligning with the most commonly cited models of 
insider threat (see Table 36). Further the assimilation of all three dimensions into a 
diagnostic instrument is original and makes a significant contribution to IIT practice. 
 
From the current thesis a working model of organisational vulnerability to IIT has 
been presented along with three inventories designed as a diagnostic tool to aid 
organisations in appropriate risk management. The model presented is an academic 
contribution, but it does not stand alone. In fact, the presenting model works with 
the existing frameworks and models in insider threat study. Many of the existing 
models already acknowledge insider attributes and actions as well as the complex 
interaction between individuals and their environments (Legg et al. 2013). The set of 
inventories produced from this research are able to support the various models of 
insider threat that exist in the literature (see Table 36) and advances the contribution 
to knowledge of IIT and practice by proposing a diagnostic tool aimed at identifying 
and mitigating vulnerability in a holistic approach. 
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Table 36: OVIT Support for Existing Insider Threat Models. 
Model OVIT support 
Critical pathway model  Personal predispositions 
Personal stressors 
Concerning individual behaviours 
Organisational responses 
Management and Education of the Risk of 
Insider Threat (MERIT) models (Cappelli et al. 
2012) 
Personal predispositions 
Disgruntlement 
Behaviour 
Behavioural monitoring 
Technical monitoring 
Positive organisational intervention 
Legg et al. (2013) Enterprise – elements that constitute the 
enterprise on an operational level 
People – elements describing an insider, his 
motivations and his behaviour within the 
enterprise 
Technology and Information – elements 
relating to hardware and software in the 
enterprise and the digital activities that can be 
recorded 
Physical – elements that capture physical 
components (e.g. locations) that exist within 
the enterprise 
‘A Grounded Framework’ by Nurse et al. 
(2014a) 
Technical and behavioural indicators 
Human factors and motivations 
 
The Blick Review 
In Australia, a review by Blick (Williams 2000) recommended Australian Government 
reduce potential for insider threat through various means of protection. These 
covered psychological assessment, staff checking, physical and personnel security 
practices, and security programs. These broad areas of countermeasure were 
consistently identified in the literature review process. In addition, the outcomes of 
this thesis resulted in a working model of organisational vulnerability to IIT, along 
with specific items in the OVIT, which captures the factors of staff vetting, staff 
psychological assessment, and staff security and risk management, under the 
individual dimension. As well there are factors of the organisational dimension - 
organisational initiatives and organisational protections – which fit well with the 
means of protection offered by Blick. This provides support for the recommendations 
Blick provided to Government. However, the recommendations (as exposed through 
open source publication) do not appear to address the full gamut of protection 
available to organisations, critically avoiding broader organisational influence and 
control.    
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Contrasting Outcomes 
The research review process identified a number of potential insider threat concerns 
which were not identified as pertinent in this study. For example, Shaw et al. (1998) 
indicated that high demand for IT services and high rates of turnover in IT roles should 
be explored as having potential to reduce loyalty to organisations and result in 
increased insider threat risk. Further, globalisation and foreign allegiance, as 
discussed by Cappelli et al. (2012) and Herbig (2008), were concepts considered to 
affect loyalty and therefore insider threat potential. However, throughout this 
research, questions addressing the risk related to high turnover and allegiance did 
not survive beyond the Delphi study (that is, did not reach consensus).  
 
In addition, Colwill (2010) argued that outsourcing could result in the dilution of 
protection controls and increase risk of insider threat. However, Munshi et al. (2012) 
determined that empirical evidence at the current time does not appear to suggest 
that outsourcing and use of contractors are significant factors in insider threat. 
Outsourcing as an IIT diagnostic concern did not reach consensus through the Delphi 
panel phase and appears to support the current position of Munshi et al. (2012).     
While there were some factors which did not survive from the literature review 
through to the final OVIT, there were many areas which were clear strengths 
consistently addressing the construct under investigation. Personality vulnerabilities 
and predispositions affecting judgment are clear examples. So too, organisationally 
specific considerations such as the way in which organisations recruit, train, and 
manage staff. Positive organisational leadership, culture, and conditions are 
consistently expressed as having the potential to strengthen defence (CPNI & PA 
Consulting Group 2012; Shaw & Fischer 2005; Shaw et al. 2009; Shaw & Stock 2011; 
Tang et al. 2016). Based on the outcomes of this current research there is a clear 
representation by several questions addressing the organisational dimension, 
especially the factor of organisational culture and leadership.  
 
From an IT perspective detection, analysis, and misuse are clear priorities in the 
research effort (Neumann 2010). This, overall, is consistent with the findings of the 
current thesis, where the technical dimension has resulted in three factors of 
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technical monitoring and detection, technical access, and technical restrictions. When 
it comes to cyber-security and insider threat, the research literature suggests that IT 
sabotage often occurs following termination or during suspension from duties 
(Cappelli et al. 2012; Catrantzos 2012). It is therefore positive to note the survival of 
variables of the OVIT addressing termination and exit processes from the individual, 
organisational, and technical perspectives (e.g. does the organisation have policy to 
conduct random reviews of exiting staff computer activities leading up the final date 
and are policies and processes in place to ensure that the privileges and accesses of 
staff leaving the organisation are disabled). 
 
Foresight and Futures Studies 
The current status of IIT research and the way in which this thesis contributes and 
extends the current position has been clearly presented in this thesis. However, it is 
worthy to note that IIT study and practice cannot be static. To this end, attention to 
foresight and futures studies was introduced as a complimentary perspective in 
Phase One of the study. The current research has successfully contributed to this 
narrative throughout the entire research project and the foresight and futures 
studies perspective is presented here even though it transcends all three research 
phases.  
 
Clearly this thesis has contributed to foresight and futures studies through addressing 
the initial phase of the foresight process and makes initial insights into Phase 2 of the 
foresight process. Horton (1999) acknowledges that third parties are useful 
contributors to phase one, helping organisations unfamiliar with the subject matter 
and/or preventing narrow sightedness. The future availability of the thesis presents 
a gathering of relevant source material on the current status of insider threat, 
providing a sound basis for greater understanding of the future of insider threat. 
Whilst the foresight process is most commonly applied to organisations specifically, 
it can be argued that the process of engagement in foresight methodology may still 
be relevant in broader applications such as in the conduct of research (van der Laan 
2010). For example, consider the application of the foresight process to insider threat 
through conduct of the current research. Certainly the means of undertaking the 
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current thesis has achieved against the first two phases of the foresight process and 
provides some wisdom required for appropriate action.  
 
The collection of information and review of literature, discussion with colleagues and 
business networks, appraisal of government reports, and supervision with university 
staff, satisfies the collection component of phase one of the foresight process. Not to 
mention the Delphi study (RQ2) which was conducted as part of the methodology. 
Delphi studies are a common research method adopted in futures studies  (van der 
Laan 2010) and assist with Phase 2 interpretation of the foresight process. The 
collation component of phase two requires that collected information is given greater 
structure and form through reduction in volume and deciphering what is most 
relevant (Horton 1999). The result is a summarisation of all information in a relevant 
form, perhaps akin to the current research literature review. In phase two, translation 
has been achieved through the plain language writing of the research thesis as well 
as the three inventories. Finally, interpretation is achieved via the results and 
discussion of the current research thesis. As Horton (1999) described the application 
of meaning to the data and the ability to use it to product actionable outcomes to 
prepare for possible future scenarios is what is most important. It is therefore 
recommended that future research adopt the findings of this thesis for the Phase 3 
completion of the foresight process. 
 
Assimilation and commitment are the pillars of phase three of the foresight process. 
The current research has achieved this through presentation of new insights, actions, 
and tangible outcomes. Not only the production of three inventories to assist 
organisations to better understand their vulnerability to insider threat, but also the 
discussion of new insights and presentation of new foresights following the data 
collection through both the Delphi method and survey outcomes.  
 
Here, the OVIT demonstrates its utility in providing a means of evaluating 
organisational vulnerability to IIT regardless of the organisation’s (or staff) expertise 
in the area or any bias in assumptions (such as the insider threat only being of 
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technical concern). Further the implementation of the OVIT can provide an 
organisation’s real-time understanding of vulnerability to IIT. 
 
5.3.3 Phase One – Contributions 
Theory 
 Enhanced understanding and knowledge of organisational vulnerability to intentional insider 
threat 
 Comprehensively identified the relevant influences of IIT expressed in the available literature 
 Conceptualisation of a simple model of organisational vulnerability to IIT based on the 
consolidation of extant literature 
 Integrating the research on insider threat with the AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009 risk management 
standards  
 Contributing foresight and building on futures studies research as it relates to insider threat 
Practice 
 Enhancing the narrative and emphasising the importance of organisational factors in the study 
(and application) of IIT 
 Demonstrating the multifactorial influence as well as the need for multidimensional response 
 Informing future practice through distilling emerging trends related to insider threat 
Self 
 Enhanced theoretical knowledge by developing greater understanding of risk management and 
insider threat 
 Enhanced professional knowledge, tolerance for ambiguity and critical judgement by 
increasing understanding of insider threat through use of high level research skills 
 
5.3.4 Phase Two – Research Question 2 
Research Question 2: What are the main organisational influences on IIT based on 
expert opinion? 
The Delphi study was a vital contributor to the overall research. Whilst the literature 
review provided the current positioning of IIT, the Delphi process sought to gain 
insight and feedback from experts to identify key gaps and critical additions to 
variables of influence. Through utilisation of the Delphi method, deep insights from 
Australian experts provided a greater understanding of the construct of IIT. Having 
extracted the pertinent variables in the literature review, the Delphi study 
contributed to, and informed, this real world study by determining which items were 
of greatest relevance and priority. The Delphi process also exposed a number of 
variables, considered critical to the diagnostic potential of IIT, and either missing (or 
missed) from the literature review process or where panel experts considered their 
relevance as underrepresented or underemphasised. 
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Given the Delphi study was part-based on the literature it is not surprising that there 
is a strong level of consistency between the Delphi outcomes and the extant research. 
The Delphi results are presented in Section 4.3 as variables which underpin the initial 
OVIT. These variables have been summarised as broad organisational considerations 
and themes for the detection and prevention of IIT. Table 37 demonstrates that these 
broad Delphi outcomes are consistent with the literature and, in the majority, also 
support the operationalisation of organisational vulnerability to IIT as proposed by 
the OVIT Framework and working model presented as part of this thesis.  
 
Table 37: Mapping of outcomes from the research with existing literature. 
Summarised Delphi 
Outcomes 
Operationalised Thesis 
Factors 
Examples of Supporting 
Literature 
Regular staff education and 
training; including security 
awareness, compliance, and 
risk management 
Staff Security and Risk 
Management 
Insider Threat Initiatives 
Sarkar (2010) 
Williams (2008) 
Kraemer et al. (2009) 
Hunker and Probst (2011) 
Leadership training, 
education, and management 
aimed at producing strong 
and supportive leaders and 
managers 
Organisational Culture and 
Leadership 
Staff Ethics 
Organisational Complacency 
Greitzer and Hohimer (2011) 
Kraemer et al. (2009) 
Hunker and Probst (2011) 
Gelles (2016) 
Appropriate employee 
monitoring and assessment 
through all stages of the 
employee cycle – especially as 
it relates to disgruntlement 
and ego/sense of entitlement. 
Staff Vetting 
Staff Psychological 
Assessment 
Organisational Complacency 
Probst et al. (2010b) 
Greitzer et al. (2013) 
(Festa 2012a) 
Shaw and Stock (2011) 
Huth (2013) 
Providing avenues for staff 
engagement and input, 
including performance 
reviews, staff surveys, etc. 
Staff Security and Risk 
Management 
Organisational Reporting 
Probst et al. (2010b) 
Huth (2013) 
Provision of an EAP/Staff 
counselling service 
Not applicable – did not 
survive the EFA 
Greitzer and Hohimer (2011) 
Probst et al. (2010b) 
Relevant, endorsed, and 
monitored security policies 
and procedures; including 
whistle-blower protection 
policies, how to identify, 
report and manage 
concerning behaviour/security 
issues 
Staff Security and Risk 
Management 
Insider Threat Initiatives 
Organisational Protection 
Organisational Security 
Awareness 
Organisational Reporting 
Greitzer and Hohimer (2011) 
Williams (2008) 
Kraemer et al. (2009) 
Hunker and Probst (2011) 
Probst et al. (2010b) 
Huth (2013) 
 
Relevant, endorsed, and 
monitored IT policies and 
procedures 
Organisational Protection 
Organisational Security 
Awareness 
Sarkar (2010) 
Huth (2013) 
Aiming for consistency across 
all organisational policies and 
processes 
Organisational Protection 
Organisational Security 
Awareness 
Pfleeger et al. (2010) 
Hunker and Probst (2011) 
Shaw and Stock (2011) 
Huth (2013) 
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Obvious and declared security 
controls 
Organisational Protection 
Organisational Security 
Awareness 
Probst et al. (2010b) 
Huth (2013) 
Random auditing and 
computer monitoring 
Technical Monitoring and 
Detection 
Insider Threat Initiatives 
Sarkar (2010) 
Kraemer et al. (2009) 
Impeded access controls, 
including minimum privilege 
access, physical access 
controls, etc. 
Technical Restrictions 
Technical Monitoring and 
Detection 
Technical Access 
Sarkar (2010) 
Kraemer et al. (2009) 
Open source monitoring Organisational Protection 
Technical Monitoring and 
Detection 
 
Sarkar (2010) 
(Festa 2012a) 
Ongoing and evolving focus on 
risk assessment and 
management, including 
development of an Insider 
Threat response plan 
Staff Security and Risk 
Management 
Insider Threat Initiatives 
Organisational Complacency 
Hunker and Probst (2011) 
Huth (2013) 
Gelles (2016) 
Developing a resilient 
organisation with a strong 
organisational and security 
culture 
Organisational Culture and 
Leadership 
 
Pfleeger et al. (2010) 
Williams (2008) 
Hunker and Probst (2011) 
Probst et al. (2010b) 
Gelles (2016) 
Catrantzos (2012) 
Focus on research including 
how offenders evaluate 
opportunity, how to develop a 
security culture, etc. 
Not applicable to the 
diagnostic requirements of 
the OVIT. But does support: 
Insider threat initiatives 
Organisational reporting 
Most research and publication 
recommends future research 
and opportunity.  
  
5.3.5 Phase Two – Other Outcomes 
Aside from the consistencies, as they relate to operationalisation of IIT, determined 
through the Delphi study and literature review, there are several additional 
contributions borne out of the Delphi process. These are not directly related to RQ2 
or the determination of the OVIT and operationalisation of organisational 
vulnerability to IIT. Still they are important contributions ascertained from the three 
rounds of the Delphi study (phase two). 
 
An Australian Definition 
As Hunker and Probst (2011) expressed there is no uniform or widely accepted 
definition of insider threat and certainly a review of the literature also revealed a 
similar fate for the definition of IIT. The absence of an Australian definition of IIT has 
been addressed in the current research. Whilst a specific definition for the Australian 
context may not be a necessity, a more precise definition for Australia may provide 
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assistance to alleviate the fragmented conceptions which exist. In the current study 
the development of an Australian definition on IIT assisted understanding in the 
scope of exploration as well as the parameters of the development of the OVIT. 
Further, the development of an Australian definition enhanced the conceptualisation 
of the construct under investigation and therefore worked to enhance the reliability 
of the study (see Table 2, page 124).  
 
Gelles (2016) discussed the critical importance of defining insider threat within an 
organisation as it can help inform an insider threat strategy, including its structure, 
size, and scope. Whilst the definition produced from this thesis is not organisationally 
specific it may provide a sound broad basis to begin. The Australian based definition 
of IIT formed through this research is: 
Intentional insider threat is when a person of trust (employee, 
contractor, consultant, vendor) who has/had legitimate access to an 
organisation attempts to cause harm through counterproductive 
behaviour intended to result in the loss, disclosure, or damage to that 
organisation’s information, resources, assets, or reputation. 
 
According to the majority of panel experts an employee was ranked as the greatest 
risk when it comes to IIT (out of employee, contractor, and consultant). However, 
follow up in qualitative form demonstrated that this was not upheld from a consensus 
perspective (less than 70% agreement). As such, it appears from this research that all 
individuals engaged with an organisation present as a potential insider threat. This is 
consistent with the definitions presented by Catrantzos (2012) and Cappelli et al. 
(2012) which articulate the insider threat to be from anyone with legitimate access 
regardless on the type of engagement. It is also consistent with the final definition 
advanced from the current thesis.   
 
Barriers to Insider Threat Initiatives 
The cost of implementing insider threat initiatives was raised by the panel as a barrier 
to implementation. This was evident around psychological assessment, where panel 
experts noted that the cost (in both time and funds) could be a deterrent. Securing 
resource requires the engagement of senior managers (Clarke & Varma 1999; Dionne 
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2013; Standards Australia 2006), and the OVIT is able to provide a means for 
organisations to understand where they are at greatest risk. From a risk management 
perspective efficiency and value can be achieved and the selection of IIT initiatives 
tailored to ensure cost effectiveness and organisational compatibility (Fenz et al. 
2011; Fenz et al. 2014; Khan & Khan 2014). 
 
Interestingly there appeared to be two (overlapping) positions when it came to where 
insider threat initiatives were most effective with regards to the individual. Keeping 
potential threats out of the organisation (through pre-employment initiatives) versus 
monitoring employees once they were inside (as well as the combination of both). 
This is a topic covered briefly in the literature. Catrantzos (2012) appears the 
strongest proponent of employee engagement and monitoring over more 
“traditional” strategies such as background checks and updates, and invasive 
monitoring. He argues that initial screening is “a low hurdle” to overcome and greater 
value can be achieved with close probation, transparency, and a self-monitoring 
team. Regardless, the OVIT presents an opportunity to explore organisational 
effectiveness from both sides.  
 
A Multi-disciplinary Approach 
The Delphi study upheld the position that IIT can only be satisfactorily addressed 
through a multi-disciplinary approach. There was consensus that organisations 
should have cybersecurity skills available, whether internally or externally sourced. 
The Delphi study also proposed the importance of senior management dedication to 
security. Not only through the way management lead by example and build a positive 
security culture, but ultimately through a dedicated senior management position 
responsible for security. As such the fields of organisational psychology, risk 
management, management and leadership, information management, 
organisational behaviour, and futures studies were integrated as a holistic practice 
orientated approach to IIT. 
  
                                                P a g e  | 207 
 
5.3.6 Phase Two – Contributions 
Theory 
 Execution of an Australian based study that expands the current knowledge base on IIT 
 Built on existing definition and formulated an Australian based definition 
 Application of the Delphi method to the study of IIT 
 The identification of further variables related to IIT not available in the extant literature 
 Conference presentation. Providing information that condensed Delphi research outcomes 
Practice 
 The importance of a senior management position dedicated to security who answers to a Board 
member 
 The need for a multidisciplinary approach to insider threat 
 Contribution to the growing knowledge base on IIT through conference poster presentation 
Self 
 Enhanced collaboration and professional knowledge by developing greater networks in risk 
management and with experts in CWB/Insider threat 
 Understanding of the Delphi Method and capacity to employ this research technique in future 
work-based projects 
 
5.3.7 Phase Three – Research Question 3 
Research Question 3: How is organisational vulnerability to IIT operationalised by the 
study? 
The results of the pilot process and full study Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
revealed that organisational vulnerability can be assessed through inventory format. 
Whilst only a preliminary and working model of the construct under investigation, 
the OVIT framework proposes three dimensions of organisational vulnerability to IIT 
with 13 representing factors.  Theoretical support, with a lead from Sarkar (2010), 
justified the alignment of the factors with the three dimensions. The literature 
available provided a sufficient basis to assess the three dimensions of IIT (individual, 
organisational, and technical) and link these dimensions to the overall construct of 
organisational vulnerability to IIT. Further the triangulation of the data throughout all 
three phases supported the resulting item content of the diagnostic inventories.  
 
This study investigated the three dimensions of IIT with a specific focus on elements 
of threat that are within organisational control. That is, what can organisations do 
that can increase, decrease, or mitigate against IIT. The diagnostic inventories were 
developed to provide organisations a greater understanding of their own 
vulnerability to IIT. The results of the EFA demonstrated statistically significant factor 
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structures and determined the three inventories as valid and reliable measures of 
each dimension (OVIT-Individual, α = 0.96; OVIT-Organisational, α = 0.98; OVIT-
Technical, α = 0.95) and ultimately of the overall construct under investigation (The 
OVIT α = 0.98; see Figure 22).  
 
Figure 22: Statistical representation of the OVIT. 
 
Source: Developed for this study. 
 
Sarkar (2010) advocated for a three-pronged approach to the assessment of insider 
threat to information security. He believes the use of “technical, behavioural, and 
organisational assessment is essential in facilitating the prediction of insider threats” 
(Sarkar 2010, p. 112). As presented in the literature review, historically insider threat 
assessment and mitigation has focused on technical evaluation and solutions. 
However, the importance of including individual and organisational factors in 
identifying and controlling threat is gaining attention.  
 
The OVIT responds to the challenge presented by Sarkar (2010) by providing a means 
to assess the risk of organisational vulnerability to IIT using a three-pronged approach 
CONSTRUCT
The OVIT (α = 0.98)
DIMENSIONS FACTORS
•Staff vetting (α = 0.96)
•Staff psychological assessment (α = 0.93)
•Staff security and risk management (α = 0.88)
•Staff ethics (α = 0.93)
OVIT – INDIVIDUAL             
(α = 0.96)
•Organisational culture and leadership (α = 0.97)
•Insider threat initiatives (α = 0.96)
•Organisational protection (α = 0.91)
•Organisational complacency (α = 0.85)
•Organisational security awareness (α = 0.93)
•Organisational reporting (α = 0.96)
OVIT – ORGANISATIONAL 
(α = 0.98)
•Technical monitoring and detection (α = 0.96)
•Technical restrictions (α = 0.92)
•Technical access (α = 0.88)
OVIT – TECHNICAL (α = 
0.95)
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(individual, organisational and technical). The evaluation of the responses to the OVIT 
also allows organisations to correct, detect, and prevent potential insider threat 
actions and assist organisations to prioritise and allocate resources to address 
potential IIT risk.  
 
This research has identified 13 factors essential to the assessment of organisational 
vulnerability to IIT. The factors and their underlying questions oblige the best practice 
and “basic baseline” measures determined by Sarkar (2010) which include: strict HR 
policies; mandatory awareness training; technical controls; hardware controls; 
network controls; and auditing and monitoring as detecting controls. However, the 
OVIT extends beyond these baseline recommendations and demonstrates the 
importance of other factors to the assessment and mitigation of IIT. Moreover, the 
OVIT clearly demonstrates essential individual and organisational factors that 
organisations should be considering when determining a risk strategy.  
 
5.3.8 Phase Three - Other Outcomes 
Whilst the aim of the study was to develop a valid and reliable diagnostic tool for IIT, 
the study did reveal a valid and valuable insight into the practice of IIT approaches in 
Australia. As such, descriptive statistics yielded a description of the sample’s 
characteristics and practice (e.g. lack of foresight, lack of inter-organisational 
collaboration, talent turnover, and lack of expertise, etc.). 
 
Having established a preliminary construct of organisational vulnerability to IIT, 
interrogation of the demographic data provided further insights. Whilst this study did 
not hypothesise any relationships or influence of demographic data it certainly 
provided an understanding of the sample group. The frequency and descriptive 
statistics of this thesis provides an overview of what IIT looks like in the Australian 
context.  
 
Based on the current research findings, there are two particularly significant findings 
which were extracted around insider threat expertise and organisational 
complacency. 
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Insider threat expertise 
Based on the data available in the current study it was interesting to note that the 
majority of participants (79.6%) had at least some level of insider threat expertise. 
This may be a function of the sampling technique and the large number of survey 
participants (38.5%) being from the Defence, Security, Intelligence, and Law 
Enforcement industry. However, it does suggest a high level of insider threat 
awareness among the participant group. There appears to be a growing 
understanding and appreciation of IIT and based on this research, awareness is broad 
and not just targeted at senior management level.  
 
Organisational complacency 
Given the above result, that there is a high level of awareness and expertise in insider 
threat amongst the survey participants, it is interesting to note that the organisations 
to which these participants belong are engaged in a level of complacency. Given there 
is a lot of information on the costs (not just monetary) of insider threat it appears 
organisations are not prepared or participating as vigorously against the threat. So 
whilst individuals within organisations may be alert to insider threat potential, this 
does not necessarily extrapolate or influence the organisations in which they work.  
Organisations appear to be increasing their vulnerability through a lack of 
engagement with, or employment of, trained professionals to identify and manage 
insider threat risks. Further, many organisations are not utilising insider threat 
initiatives. For example, nearly half of the organisations represented by the survey 
group are not employing psychological assessment as a measure of protection or 
mitigation. And, over 70 percent are making minimal effort to integrate insider threat 
mitigation as part of the enterprise risk management strategy.  
 
In addition, assessment of security culture is being overlooked with more than 30% 
of organisations rarely or never assessing security culture. An Australian study by 
Parsons et al. (2015) found that improving security culture can lead to positive 
employee behaviour, extrapolated to include compliance with security. As well, 
Renaud and Goucher (2014) found that security culture is tied with security 
behaviour. It appears that this Australian based sample falls in line with previous 
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reporting on the need for greater attention to insider threat and implementation of 
initiatives.  
 
The low rate of uptake when it comes to insider threat initiatives present a means for 
intervention. However, as already explored above, the Delphi panel raised concern 
about cost and the literature presented similar findings. The apparent complacency 
of the organisations represented by this sample, despite the awareness and 
experience of the individual respondents with insider threat, may be cost related. 
Regardless, it provides an avenue for further investigation into the main reasons of 
complacency. Given the cost of compromise there is worth in understanding the 
benefit-cost ratio and value-benefit of IIT initiatives, which is outside the scope of the 
current study.  
 
5.3.9 Phase Three – Contributions 
Theory 
 Present a model that operationalises organisational vulnerability to IIT 
 Plan and execute an Australian based study that expands the current knowledge base on IIT 
 Development of a quantitative diagnostic instrument measuring IIT 
 Statistical validation and establishment of the reliability of model of organisational vulnerability 
to IIT 
 Development of a measurement model which defines the construct of organisational 
vulnerability to IIT along with its dimensions and factors 
 Testing of a factorial structure operationalising the IIT concept 
Practice 
 Development of a measurement instrument that can be applied in the organisational context, 
providing a means of education, a way to demonstrate trends in organisations that can lead to 
IIT behaviour, and provide an organisation with information on its vulnerability to IIT 
 Providing professional practitioners a valid and reliable tool to detect and diagnose IIT 
 Description of the Australian context and what IIT looks like - frequencies and descriptive 
statistics 
Self 
 Enhanced objective judgment, analytical skills, and research techniques 
 Improved subject positioning, status and expertise in the field of insider threat 
 
5.4 Summary of Contributions 
5.4.1 Contribution to theory 
By the very nature of undertaking the current research project a contribution to 
theory and research pertinent to IIT has been achieved. It was clear from the 
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literature review that there is limited Australian contribution to the study of IIT, which 
is dominated by US and UK representation. Further until now there has been less 
emphasis on the organisational dimension of IIT in favour of technical and individual 
approaches. Certainly, there has not been an overarching approach where the IIT 
construct incorporates a holistic view of all three dimensions. 
 
The use of the Delphi method, and gathering of expert opinion, in the study of insider 
threat is not new (see Catrantzos 2012; Greitzer et al. 2013; Greitzer et al. 2009; 
Kraemer et al. 2009). However, this research has demonstrated its utility in the 
Australian context and in the development of survey and measurement instruments. 
Importantly the Delphi process resulted in an enhanced definition of IIT relevant to 
the Australian context which is proposed to be relevant to the international context. 
Further, incorporating the Delphi method established a mixed method approach to 
the research, enhancing reliability and validity indicators. The mixed method 
approach is also the first of its kind exploring organisational vulnerability to IIT in the 
Australian context. 
 
This thesis has elucidated the foundational concepts related to IIT and 
comprehensively expressed coverage of the individual, organisational, and technical 
aspects of the problem. Utilising literature findings and Delphi outcomes, the thesis 
provided a simple conceptualisation of the construct and related it to existing models, 
theory, and risk management methodology. The Delphi process also identified new 
variables for consideration not previously recorded in the extant literature. Phase 
three allowed for a more comprehensive understanding of the construct of IIT. A 
comprehensive model which reflects the overall construct, its three dimensions, and 
the factors underneath is a significant theoretical contribution. To the researcher’s 
knowledge this is the first validated quantitative diagnostic instrument to detect and 
diagnose organisational vulnerability to IIT. 
 
5.4.2 Contribution to professional practice 
Being a work-based research study, the usefulness of this project is in transforming 
the research, academic, and theoretical contributions in to usable, practical, and 
                                                P a g e  | 213 
 
applied outcomes. The current research was borne out of a desire to assist in the fight 
against insider threat in a manner that all organisations can benefit, whilst also 
maintaining a focus on ethical considerations and beneficence (see Section 3.8). 
Catrantzos (2012) discussed that to date there has been a dearth of content providing 
recommendations or practical tools as a means of countermeasure. Whilst many 
reviews and recommendations have been made in order to try and reduce potential 
espionage and other insider threat (Williams 2000), this current research addresses 
recommendations to include a more rigorous and holistic focus on organisational 
predispositions and vulnerabilities (Band et al. 2006).  
 
According to Hunker and Probst (2011) an integrated and multidisciplinary approach 
to insider threat, in a way that is useful to practitioners, has not been achieved. With 
other authors further claiming that the combination of technical controls, 
psychosocial considerations and organisational factors, hold the most promise for 
understanding, detecting, and preventing insider threat within organisations (Borrett 
et al. 2013; Gelles & Mitchell 2015; Greitzer et al. 2009; Kraemer et al. 2009). Here, 
with this exploratory research, three diagnostic inventories addressing IIT through a 
multidimensional focus and with input from a breadth of sources shows promise. The 
OVIT provides practitioners with a validated and reliable tool to detect and diagnose 
IIT. 
 
Whilst the current study is not focused on work-based product it is interesting in how 
the undertaking itself has contributed to increased knowledge of others. Delphi 
feedback indicated that simply reading the questions of the OVIT increased 
awareness. The OVIT, by its implementation, appears to provide a means of 
education to those completing the inventories. From a practical perspective this is 
one way to increase knowledge and awareness, creating a vigilant workforce, which 
is an excellent defence against insider threat (Gelles 2016). The administration of the 
OVIT may also provide a cost effective strategy for intervention noting that all three 
phases of this research identified the cost barrier as being influential.  
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Further, the OVIT may provide a means of initial discussion and education on IIT. The 
comprehensive working model presented, which clearly articulates the relationships 
amongst the construct, dimensions, and factors, provides a means for education and 
a basis for developing mutual understanding through shared language. The OVIT also 
provides practical guidance on organisational baseline vulnerability and potential 
areas requiring proactive intervention.  
 
5.4.3 Contribution to self 
As presented earlier in this thesis the integration of research and practice is an 
important career objective for many organisational psychologists. The development 
of knowledge and skills, through practice and work-based research, allows for the 
development of effective psychological service as well as broader research and 
intervention skills. Undertaking the current research has contributed to an approach 
to lifelong learning and is consistent with the scientist-practitioner model.  
 
Through each of the three phases of this research project there has been significant 
contribution to the self. The enhancement of knowledge and understanding of insider 
threat and risk management is evident. The development of high level qualitative and 
quantitative research skills has been established through utilisation of the Delphi 
method and multivariate statistics. The overall process presenting opportunity for 
developing greater objective judgment, analytical skills, and research techniques. The 
four years of effort culminating in the ability to demonstrate subject matter expertise 
in the field of insider threat.  
 
Participation in this research study has also created opportunity for dialogue, creating 
conversations with others to ensure that knowledge and learning are more than just 
a cognitive process (Corlett 2012). As a researcher it is important to create 
opportunities for reflexive dialogue (Corlett 2012) acknowledging that such can be 
achieved through informal or formal channels (Benozzo & Colley 2007). Reflection 
therefore provides the ability to examine attitudes and behaviour and learn from this, 
enabling better choices or responses in the future (Nilsen et al. 2012b). Relevant 
conversations and reflections has been achieved through interaction with Delphi 
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participants, supervision sessions, professional networking, presentation at 
conferences, and publication. 
 
Further reflection is achieved by revisiting the learning objectives associated with 
participation in this professional doctorate. From the outset the researcher 
acknowledged a level of competence across all learning areas, however, identified 
that improvement as a practitioner would be enhanced by focusing on 
methodological and personal/social capabilities. The learning objectives for this 
learning journey included: 
 
Intellectual capabilities 
1. Enhance theoretical knowledge by developing greater understanding of risk 
management and insider threat and use and apply this enhanced theoretical 
knowledge through practical application and articles. 
2. Enhance professional knowledge, tolerance for ambiguity and critical judgement 
by increasing understanding of insider threat through use of high level research 
skills and synthesise this knowledge into a survey for assessing organisational 
vulnerability to IIT. 
 
Methodological capabilities: 
Enhance objective judgment, analytical skills, and research techniques, to develop 
and validate a survey to help organisations assess vulnerability to IIT. 
 
Personal and social capabilities: 
Enhance collaboration and professional knowledge by developing greater networks 
in risk management and with experts in CWB/Insider threat and demonstrate subject 
matter expertise through superior communication skills including in-house 
presentations and articles for publication. 
 
Table 38 presents an overview of the learning journey and demonstrates how 
intellectual, methodological, and personal and social capabilities were enhanced 
throughout this doctorate research process.  
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Table 38: Achievement of learning objectives 
Year Task/Activity Learning objective/capability 
2014 Complete Candidature process Intellectual capabilities 1 
Personal and social capabilities 
 Complete Ethics approval process Intellectual capabilities 1 
 Complete course on Endnote Methodological capabilities 
 Literature Review - Gather literature relevant to insider threat and risk management Intellectual capabilities 1 and 2 
 Complete course Certificate III in Government (Security) Intellectual capabilities 1 
Personal and social capabilities 
2015 Synthesise relevant literature and research Intellectual capabilities 1 and 2 
 Delphi Study – review, understand, and develop Intellectual capabilities 1 and 2 
Methodological capabilities 
Personal and social capabilities 
2016 Delphi Study – launch, completion, distill relevant themes Intellectual capabilities 1 and 2 
Methodological capabilities 
Personal and social capabilities 
2016 Poster Presentation – 18th HCI International Conference - Canada Personal and social capabilities 
2016-2017 OVIT – development, pilot Intellectual capabilities 1 and 2 
Methodological capabilities 
2017 Panel member for Cyber in Business Conference - Melbourne Personal and social capabilities 
2017-2018 OVIT – refinement and full deployment Methodological capabilities 
2018 OVIT – completion of EFA and understanding reliability and validity indicators Methodological capabilities 
2018 Completion of Thesis Intellectual capabilities 1 and 2 
Personal and social capabilities 
2018 Completion of DPRS Intellectual capabilities 1 and 2 
Personal and social capabilities 
Source: Developed for this study 
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Undertaking the current work based research has produced several benefits and 
numerous contributions as outlined above. From an academic perspective this thesis 
has contributed to organisational knowledge and understanding of IIT. The outcomes 
demonstrate support for a multidisciplinary approach to insider threat and 
emphasise the importance of a holistic approach which incorporates individual, 
organisational, and technical considerations. Advancement for professional practice 
has been accomplished through the operationalisation of IIT and an enhanced 
understanding of IIT in the Australian context. The OVIT provides a comprehensive 
working model which clearly articulates the construct, dimensions, and factors of IIT. 
Finally personal development has been achieved against intellectual, methodological, 
and, personal and social capabilities, which is consistent with lifelong learning and 
the scientist-practitioner model. In summary, the contributions of this study are 
noteworthy and demonstrate the importance of work based research for positive 
outcomes of academic, professional, and personal significance.  
 
5.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The limitations of the current research, along with the limitations of the literature, 
has been discussed thoroughly throughout this thesis. The limitations to the current 
positioning of IIT was discussed in Sections 2.1.7 and 2.4.5. Further Section 3.7 
identified the confines of the current research along with relevant strategies to 
attempt to overcome methodological limitations. 
 
From the beginning, this study delimited scope by focusing on IIT. In some ways the 
distinction between IIT and non-malicious insider threat, when looking through a risk 
management lense, has been argued as arbitrary. This is because organisational 
protective measures and mitigation strategies are seen to be of benefit regardless of 
the insider’s intent (Cappelli et al. 2012; Pfleeger et al. 2010).  
 
It has been highlighted throughout this thesis that the study of IIT is considered 
complex and difficult, and that the overall body of literature has been referred to as 
biased, insufficient, and lacking (Festa 2012a). The dearth of Australian 
representation on the topic is evident. Hence, the current research provided a means 
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of filling this gap. In doing so, however, it is presented with its own limitation; that is, 
a lack of generalisability to a broader population. It is possible that Australian expert 
opinion and experience differs from that of experts in other countries. Given this, it 
would be unwise to suggest the findings can be generalised internationally without 
further comparative research. 
 
As Yin (1984) discussed, all research design and methods have advantages and 
disadvantages. In the current study an alignment with the pragmatic paradigm and 
mixed methods approach presents a rigorous research framework but also a 
recognised set of limitations. A common reference in the insider threat literature is 
that research has relied upon surveys and convenience samples raising questions 
regarding the generalisability of results (Hunker & Probst 2011; Randazzo et al. 2005). 
Here too, a survey design with a non-purposive and convenience sampling technique 
faces the same fate. As such, a broader qualitative enquiry, utilising interviews and 
real case studies, may have contributed further insights on IIT and helped alleviate 
some of these concerns. Still, the use of mixed methods in the research design 
contributes to the depth and breadth of research outcomes. However, the results are 
still limited by the exploratory and cross-sectional approach. The ability to generalise 
findings and assert causality is restricted and only overcome by capacity for future 
longitudinal research (Creswell 2014).  
 
For organisations, the ability to identify and assess their risk to IIT is important and 
the utility of the OVIT may be in providing a baseline for future comparison 
(Frangopoulos et al. 2013). However, the strongest validation for the OVIT would be 
in its ability to predict actual insider exploits. The capacity to assert that the variables, 
factors, and dimensions, presented by the OVIT are linked to IIT occurrence rates 
requires validation of the hypothesised relationships through a longitudinal study 
(Greitzer et al. 2009; Hunker & Probst 2011). This same research could also help 
further determine construct validity especially discriminant validity.  
 
Discriminant validity is the determination that conceptually similar concepts are in 
fact distinct (Neuman 2011). In the current study, the conceptualisation of insider 
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threat relies on some level of separation between individual, organisational, and 
technical dimensions. It is the overlap of vulnerabilities between these foci which are 
hypothesised to lead to insider threat potential. Given this assumption, it may be 
academically important to establish discriminant validity of the three inventories.  
 
As with many exploratory studies, the issue of sample size has arisen. The pilot 
numbers did meet recommendations by several researchers (Johanson & Brooks 
2010), however,  the pilot sample was not sufficient to satisfy minimum requirements 
for statistical analyses. Instead it allowed for pragmatic input including content, 
comprehension, and presentation. Also, the study aimed to achieve 200 participants 
for the final OVIT analyses but due to difficulty in recruiting management level 
participants and time poor responders, only 141 valid responses was achieved.  
 
The multivariate analysis of choice, the EFA, has been criticised for its subjectivity and 
heavy reliance on researcher decision making (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007; Williams et 
al. 2010). Reducing this bias is difficult but was attempted in the current research 
through ongoing expert, colleague, and supervisor input. Given that EFA is an 
exploratory procedure and is not designed to test hypotheses or theories, 
researchers caution against drawing substantive conclusions (Costello & Osborne 
2005). As such, further research is required to substantiate the findings of the current 
study. Future projects may include use of factor scores in a regression to predict 
behavioural outcomes or CFA to validate the factorial validity of the model derived 
from the EFA (Hair et al. 2010).  
 
Another caution of this work-based research related to sample size is the existence 
of a Heywood case in the OVIT-Individual sub-inventory. An Heywood case is 
represented by a communality equal to or greater than one (Harris 2001). Whilst 
there is debate about whether a Heywood case alone invalidates a solution, the 
absence of a Heywood case would present a more statistically robust representation 
of the individual dimension. Continuing to gather responses to the OVIT and increase 
the sample size may result in eradicating the Heywood concern (de Winter et al. 
2009).  
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Looking at the practical application of the OVIT moves beyond the methodological 
and statistical limitations. More recently there has been a focus on ethical and legal 
considerations of insider threat initiatives. This work-based research has not explored 
the potential legal and ethical constraints for organisations adopting the OVIT. As 
such, further consideration of the legal ramifications of employing formalised insider 
threat initiatives is encouraged (Huth 2013). Whilst this research and the resultant 
measurement instruments does not look specifically at how to implement 
countermeasures, it does highlight the areas of concern which may benefit from 
active mitigation. Proactive mitigation may be considered invasive and excessive 
(Hunker & Probst 2011) and therefore should be managed with consideration and 
care. 
 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the ever-changing landscape of IIT and the 
importance that the OVIT remains current. The inventories are based on literature 
review, expert opinions, and statistical analyses conducted between 2014 and 2018. 
The inventories are therefore limited to what was known about IIT at the time or 
what the Delphi experts were able to forecast. In order to remain relevant the OVIT 
will require ongoing review and change is expected. As new technologies arise and 
the landscape of insider threat changes the OVIT, without updating, could become 
obsolete. Certainly IIT will be affected by the fast paced technological and social 
changes in the workplace (Colwill 2010). Insider threat motivation has demonstrated 
change. Initial and early studies highlighted the financial drivers, with more recent 
research identifying a shift to ideological and mixed motivations (Fischer 2000; Herbig 
2008; Randazzo et al. 2005; Shaw et al. 2009) Therefore, maintaining a focus on IIT 
trends, changes in the IIT space, new research, ongoing commitment to infusing 
expert knowledge, and ongoing research will help maintain relevance. This approach 
is also consistent with pragmatic paradigm which encourages change for better utility 
and real world application.  
 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the research findings, implications of results, limitations 
of the study, and suggestions for future research. The pragmatic paradigm provided 
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the opportunity to explore IIT from a practical and applied perspective but within a 
rigorous approach to academic research. As such, this exploratory research has been 
able to investigate and operationalise organisational vulnerability to IIT in a manner 
which was able to contribute to theory, practice, and the self.  
 
This work-based research was borne out of a professional interest to investigate the 
construct of organisational vulnerability to IIT. Gaining a deeper understanding of IIT 
through the review of current literature and insights from Australian experts 
provided the opportunity to develop statistically derived, robust, reliable, and valid 
inventories aimed at diagnosing organisational vulnerability to IIT. This study has 
produced three inventories assessing different dimensions of IIT (Individual, 
Organisational, and Technical) as well as a working model conceptualising and 
operationalising organisational vulnerability to IIT.  
 
Undertaking the Doctorate of Professional Studies has provided the opportunity to 
study organisational vulnerability to IIT through a rigorous approach to research. 
However, the outcomes and contributions go beyond the academic sphere. The 
success of this exploratory research is evident, not only in the research outcomes but 
also in the professional and personal contributions and achievement. Certainly the 
additional contributions to theory and methodology through use of the Delphi 
approach, underpinning risk management principles, and assumed pragmatic 
worldview have enhanced the broader utility of the study. Furthermore, applied and 
ancillary contributions, including an Australian definition and embryonic contribution 
to foresight and futures studies cannot be overlooked. Beyond the academic and 
practise contribution there is also recognition of oneself as a research practitioner 
with the capacity to contribute to the field of IIT.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A - Delphi Email Invitation 
 
Dear [name] 
 
ORGANISATIONAL VULNERABILITY TO INSIDER THREAT 
 
You are invited to participate in an important research project on the topic of 
organisational vulnerability to intentional insider threat. This is an exciting and 
important Delphi study (for more information on the Delphi method, please see 
below) aimed at gaining greater understanding of insider threats to organisations as 
distilled from the feedback from a panel of experts.  
 
This research is being conducted by Ms Justine Bedford, a Doctoral Candidate at the 
University of Southern Queensland under the supervisions of Dr Luke Van der Laan 
(University of Southern Queensland) and Dr Janson Yap (Deloitte).  
 
This study will extend the scope of insider threat research by examining broader 
organisational influences on intentional insider threat. The applied result of the 
project is to develop a comprehensive organisational assessment survey, in part, 
based on the Delphi method outcomes that can help assess how vulnerable an 
organisation is to intentional insider threat risks.  
 
You can find more details of this research project in the participant information sheet 
attached. You can also contact me via email at justine@jconsulting.net.au.   
We sincerely hope you agree to participate. To participate in the research project as 
a Delphi expert, please read the participant information sheet and consent form 
attached and respond via reply email, by the 20 November 2015, acknowledging your 
consent to participate.  
 
Once your consent email is received the first round of the Delphi will be emailed to 
you on the 24 November 2015. Your participation in this research is very important 
and much appreciated by the research team.  
 
Yours Sincerely 
 
 
Justine Bedford 
 
What is a Delphi study? 
The Delphi method gathers the opinion of experts through a series of semi-structured 
questionnaires. The Delphi method is an iterative process whereby the results of each 
round are summarised and fed back to participants for further contribution and to 
achieve group consensus or highlight key points of difference. 
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Experts respond independently and anonymously. In this study the Delphi will be 
administered by the research team using an email platform for ease of use and 
efficiency.  
 
Why have you been invited to participate? 
As an established expert in the field we are keen to get your views about intentional 
insider threat and specifically organisational factors that may give rise / constrain 
such risk. If you are aware of other experts that may be interested in participating, 
please let me know at justine@jconsulting.net.au. 
 
What will you be required to do? 
As you are an expert on insider threat, we are inviting you to participate in this 
research as a Delphi panel member. As a Delphi participant you will receive, via email, 
a pre-determined list of semi-structured questions. The questions may include scales, 
multiple choice questions and the possibility to comment on certain questions and 
statements related to insider threat. It is expected that there will be three rounds of 
the Delphi and that the time to complete each round will be approximately 20 
minutes.  
 
Please be assured that participation is entirely voluntary and you are able to withdraw 
from the process at any time. All data collected will be kept completely confidential 
and the identities of participants will only be known to the primary researcher. No 
results will be reported in any manner that would reveal identities of participants to 
other panel members or associate any participants with their answers. 
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Appendix B - Delphi Consent Form 
 
  
                                                P a g e  | 242 
 
Appendix C - Delphi Participant Information Sheet 
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Appendix D - Delphi Survey Round 1
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Appendix E - Delphi Survey Round 2
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Appendix F - Delphi Survey Round 3
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Appendix G - Final Delphi Report
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Appendix H - Ethics Approval
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Appendix I – Original 242 Questions of the OVIT 
1. Gender 
2. Age 
3. Education 
4. Job Level 
5. Industry 
6. APS Industry Sector 
7. Size of Organisation 
8. My level of expertise on Insider Threat issues is... 
9. does the organisation check civil records 
10. does the organisation evaluate employee behaviour outside of the workplace 
11. does the organisation have methods to assess sound and reliable behaviour of staff 
12. does the organisation have policy and processes to manage staff with a history of security violations 
13. does the organisation test for illegal drug use 
14. does the organisation assess past substance use/abuse 
15. does the organisation assess for problematic gambling behaviour 
16. does the organisation have policies describing unacceptable workplace interpersonal behaviours 
17. does the organisation have a good conduct policy 
18. does the organisation review credit reports 
19. is financial, credit, and bankruptcy history assessed by the organisation 
20. does the organisation have methods to identify financial pressures of employees 
21. does the organisation undertake a formal risk assessment of high risk employees/positions, determining level of risk and mitigation strategies 
22. does the organisation have a means by which employees can report suspicious contacts from other employees or outsiders 
23. does the organisation allow the hiring of employees with close connections to current staff (friends/family) 
24. does the organisation assess for positive support networks of employees 
25. does the organisation evaluate risk-related criminal associations 
26. does the organisation check criminal records 
27. does the organisation have policy/guidelines describing how to identify and respond to employees susceptible to social engineering (manipulation of people to get them to 
unwittingly perform actions that may cause harm) 
28. does the organisation monitor foreign contacts of staff 
29. does the organisation monitor staff travel 
30. does the organisation have policy/guidelines describing how to identify and respond to employees experiencing stress 
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31. does the organisation have clear procedures describing access to and benefits of employee assistance programs and other employee support services 
32. does the organisation monitor/assess staff after negative/stressful events 
33. does the organisation conduct performance reviews and is therefore aware of declining performance ratings 
34. does the organisation have policies and procedures for referring at-risk employees facing negative personnel actions to appropriate teams for evaluation 
35. does the organisation have branches, suppliers, subcontractors or other affiliates abroad, where differences in cultural beliefs and values may affect loyalty to the 
organisation versus other local groups 
36. is the organisation currently affected by economic or financial stressors that influence its treatment of employees  in a manner that could increase insider risk 
37. does the organisation have policies and procedures designed to improve loyalty 
38. do policy and processes of the organisation promote individual differences (gender, culture, ethnicity) 
39. are staff in the organisation educated on the different reasons behind insider threat actions 
40. is motivation for employment  assessed during recruitment processes 
41. are individual attitudes assessed by the organisation 
42. does the organisations structure allow for specific individuals to control majority of the power 
43. are specific individual's politics and power a problem for the organisation 
44. does the organisation assist staff/individuals to improve their communication 
45. does the organisation use methods to assess alignment between employee values and organisational values 
46. does the organisation utilise methods during recruitment processes to assess for ego/sense of entitlement 
47. does the organisation use methods to assess for ethical flexibility of staff 
48. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee resilience 
49. does the organisation have methods to identify changes in employee resilience 
50. does the organisation offer resilience training to staff 
51. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee sound judgment 
52. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee conscientiousness 
53. does the organisation conduct mental health testing/assessment 
54. does the organisation conduct personality testing to determine an employee's vulnerability to become an insider threat 
55. are trained professionals employed by the organisation to identify and manage employees vulnerable to becoming an insider threat 
56. does the organisation utilise methods to assess for employee self-awareness 
57. does the organisation have programs to develop employee self-awareness 
58. does the organisation have mechanisms in place in order to know of any pending sanctions of contractors and outside staff  
59. does the organisation carefully consider any vendors/partnerships etc. based on ethical conduct 
60. does the organisation assess moral development 
61. the organisation has methods to assess for addictions 
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62. workplace deviance is handled appropriately within the organisation 
63. the organisation encourages development of positive support networks 
64. the organisation has methods for identifying and managing potential disgruntlement 
65. the organisation actively manages employee expectation to minimise potential for unmet expectations 
66. the organisation understands the cultures of partner stakeholders 
67. commitment to the organisation is high amongst staff 
68. people in the organisation value differences in culture, race, & ethnicity 
69. the organisation has proactive initiatives and outreach to staff that may be at increased risk of insider threat actions 
70. the attitude of staff is a problem in the organisation 
71. positive individual attitudes are nurtured by the organisation 
72. the organisations practices and policies promote individual power 
73. the practices and policies of the organisation allows for individual specific agendas 
74. the organisation suffers from poor politics 
75. the organisation has a problem with individual communication 
76. people in the organisation maintain high ethical standards 
77. people in the organisation demonstrate high integrity &  honesty 
78. reporting procedures of the organisation allow staff to identify and report on the poor judgment of others 
79. does the organisation have policies and practices mandating security awareness training 
80. does the organisation offer specific training and education programs addressing policy and practice areas relevant to insider threat 
81. does the organisation structure security awareness training and education efforts appropriately to the needs of different employees groups such as managers, system 
administrators, human resources personnel, etc. 
82. does the organisation require attendees to demonstrate their competence in training and education programs as a condition of program completion 
83. does the organisation have a dedicated team and trained staff to undertake vetting and background checks of prospective employees 
84. are all staff (including vendor staff, contractors, and are outsourced roles) subject to vetting processes relevant to their level of access/role 
85. do staff in the organisation receive training on risk management 
86. does a specialised team (including HR, legal, employee assistance programs, physical and IT security, and behavioural science members) exist to evaluate the risk of insider 
threat 
87. are a variety of informal and formal staff consultation methods utilised by the organisation to understand staff views/opinions 
88. does the organisation have guidelines describing the organisations right to monitor and audit employee activity including their behaviour 
89. does the organisation conduct informal online searches of employees 
90. does the organisation use a variety of fair, ethical, transparent and legal means to monitor its employees 
91. are employees actively monitored for insider risk behaviour during the probationary period 
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92. does the organisation have policies facilitating preemployment screening 
93. does the organisation contact previous employers to understand the individual's competence and approach to dealing with workplace issues 
94. does the organisation conduct periodic or follow-up investigative actions to ensure that employees remain reliable and are not subject to compromising factors 
95. does the organisation utilise evidence-based recruitment and assessment methods 
96. does the organisation conduct its own research on insider threat 
97. does the organisation benchmark its processes and controls (technical and non-technical) against leading practices 
98. does the organisation have policies and processes to attempt to identify moles 
99. has the organisation identified moles in the past 
100. does the organisation promote integrated approaches to insider threat management 
101. does the organisation have a senior management position dedicated to security who answers to a Board member, with a dedicated security team to implement required 
measures 
102. does the organisation have an established insider threat contingency management plan 
103. are risk transfer methods (insurance, contracts, etc.) part of the organisations risk management 
104. are management security actions enforced without discrimination, recorded, and subsequently evaluated for effectiveness 
105. does the organisation have strong and positive leadership 
106. does management in the organisation communicate clear plans & objectives for the organisation 
107. does the organisation regularly use methods to identify and assess its own security culture 
108. does the organisation have clear, publicly available, and consistently enforced methods for investigating and penalising inappropriate security behaviour 
109. does the organisation track security compliance and take steps to confirm compliance 
110. does the organisation have measures and processes in place to measure organisational culture 
111. does the organisation have multiple means for tracking increases in counterproductive workplace behaviour 
112. does the organisation have principles, policies, and practices to help manage the risk of counterproductive behaviour in the workplace 
113. does the management of the organisation integrate insider threat mitigation as part of the broader enterprise risk mitigation strategy 
114. is the organisation committed to the prevention, detection, deterrence, and response to insider threats 
115. does the organisation undertake regular risk assessments as the environment changes 
116. does the organisation assess level of employee engagement through annual surveys and/or pulse surveys 
117. does the organisation actively assess job and organisational fit to ensure employee engagement 
118. does the organisation encourage staff to participate in all organisational activities and events 
119. does the organisation have processes in place to monitor at-risk employees after negative workplace events 
120. does the organisation monitor external factors (economic downturns, competition) that may increase employee's potential for insider threat activity 
121. is the organisation constantly/regularly undergoing some level of significant organisational change 
122. is the organisation structured to allow for open and efficient communication across all levels 
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123. are organisational policies ill-defined or loosely enforced 
124. does the organisation actively investigate reports of at-risk behaviours in a manner that does not deter future reports 
125. do people in the organisation report suspicious behaviour in the workplace 
126. does the organisation have obvious and declared security controls 
127. does confidential reporting exist so that employees can report suspicious events without fear of repercussion 
128. does the organisation have a whistle-blower protection policy 
129. does the organisation have policies that protect the security of organisational information and IT resources 
130. does the organisation have implemented security practices to prevent unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information 
131. does the organisation regularly review and update insider threat and security policy and procedures 
132. does the organisation have policy to conduct random reviews of exiting staff computer activities leading up the final date 
133. are policies and processes in place to ensure that the privileges and accesses of staff leaving the organisation are disabled 
134. does the organisation require that all staff, contractors, consultants, and vendors sign non-disclosure statements when leaving the organisation 
135. does the organisation have policies protecting the physical security of facilities 
136. does the organisation review physical access anomalies and denials 
137. does the organisation capture information on an employee's physical movements within and around the organisations facility/ies 
138. the organisation prevents unauthorised access to physical assets 
139. the organisation keeps abreast of best practice when it comes to insider threat 
140. the organisation is at risk of moles being placed within its ranks 
141. the organisation is good at addressing underlying systemic issues that may be linked to increased risk of insider threat 
142. the organisation integrates risk assessment into everyday business decisions 
143. the organisation is better equipped to cope with insider threat challenges when compared to other organisations in the same sector 
144. the organisation is able to learn from failures and mistakes 
145. the organisation is resilient 
146. the security practices of leadership in the organisation is poor 
147. management in the organisation are accountable and responsible to others 
148. management in the organisation lead by example when it comes to security practice 
149. management in the organisation do not hesitate to provide the leadership that is needed 
150. the organisation fosters an environment that is conducive to the success of insider threat initiatives 
151. the organisation has a poor security culture 
152. the values of the organisation are made explicit and help to build a strong security culture 
153. management in the organisation provide the support and resources needed to help staff meet their goals 
154. management in the organisation actively listen to problems of staff 
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155. management in the organisation take care to be informed about how others think and feel about things 
156. management in the organisation encourage staff to speak up about employee issues 
157. that, overall, staff of the organisation engage in poor security behaviour 
158. management in the organisation value the input of all staff 
159. staff in the organisation are treated fairly by management in the organisation 
160. there is a perception in the organisation that management do not value staff 
161. the organisation has a positive organisational culture 
162. both overt and covert messages are corrected to create a positive organisational culture 
163. the organisation regularly identifies and assesses its own organisational culture 
164. there is an increasing level of counterproductive behaviour in the organisation 
165. the organisation is prepared to respond to counterproductive workplace behaviour and enforce its policies 
166. when it comes to insider threat the organisation is complacent 
167. the organisation is aware of its risk tolerance level/risk appetite 
168. staff of the organisation are aware of its critical assets that are worth protecting 
169. there is a lack of management of potential insider threat issues at the emerging stages 
170. staff are aware of how insider threat concerns are managed in the organisation 
171. people in the organisation are willing to go above and beyond to achieve the organisations mission 
172. there is a high level of collegiality within the organisation 
173. the organisation increases its monitoring capabilities when significant organisational change occurs 
174. leaders in the organisation communicate a clear vision of the future of the organisation 
175. the organisation balances trust with the application of consistent employee monitoring 
176. there is a high level of undue secrecy in the organisation 
177. the organisation is open and honest with its employees 
178. management in the organisation promote open communication and sharing of information 
179. management in the organisation encourage staff to participate in important decisions 
180. in general, people in the organisation are clear on the objectives of the organisation 
181. policies and expectations are consistent across all levels of the organisation 
182. security reporting is encouraged in the organisation 
183. staff are aware of the security controls utilised by the organisation 
184. the organisation has a whistle-blower policy that has the confidence of all employees 
185. the organisation has relevant IT policies and procedures 
186. the organisation is committed to improving security in order to protect its information and resources 
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187. security controls of the organisation are adequate and applied whenever necessary 
188. the organisation is prepared to respond to security non-compliance and enforce its policies 
189. staff in the organisation can identify and report on red flags 
190. the organisation has a proactive and risk-based approach to mitigating emerging insider threats 
191. security awareness is high among staff and considered in the daily activities of all organisational members 
192. staff in the organisation are aware of and educated to support the insider threat program 
193. the organisation provides tailored and relevant insider threat education and awareness to all staff 
194. staff use relevant risk management and compliance considerations in everyday work decisions 
195. staff in the organisation are vigilant and able to monitor emerging threats 
196. the opinions and ideas of staff are important to the organisation 
197. the organisation has strict exit controls in place for all exiting staff 
198. does the organisation allow staff a variety of virtual work arrangements (including working from home) 
199. does the organisation have a well-documented on-boarding process for all new starters that ensures appropriate access controls are implemented 
200. does the organisation have guidelines to ensure that staff only have access to data, systems, and information required to perform their duties 
201. does the organisation implement multi-factor authentication (e.g.- a password plus a one-time code from a hardware token) 
202. do authentication procedures become more advanced with increasing access to critical information/data 
203. are processes in place to ensure that staff changing roles/jobs within the organisation only maintain relevant access 
204. is access to sensitive systems and areas enforced by authentication procedures monitored for anomalies 
205. does the organisation have guidelines on how duties are separated for privileged functions 
206. do staff with duties that require higher levels of access (such as administrative roles) have a separate account for more sensitive tasks (and not used for daily tasks such as 
checking email) 
207. does the organisation require multiple users to action all modifications to critical systems, network, applications, and data 
208. does the organisation restrict administrators from controlling auditing functions 
209. is routine auditing of privileged functions conducted by the organisation 
210. are advanced analytics tools used in the organisation to analyse and report on insider threat 
211. are privileged accounts monitored and audited regularly 
212. is random auditing of IT use implemented 
213. is auditing part of performance reviews 
214. does the organisation monitor common data exfiltration methods (e-mail, removable media) to identify anomalous behaviour 
215. is network traffic and associated security logs collected centrally and monitored for anomalies 
216. does the organisation monitor key databases, data access and movement 
217. does the organisation monitor IT behaviour of employees 
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218. does the organisation use modern technologies to assist insider threat detection, deterrence, prevention and reporting 
219. does the organisation have means to monitor trends in  IT policy breaches to inform corrective action 
220. does the organisation maintain pace with current technology lifecycles, with an organisation wide refresh every 5 years or so 
221. does the organisation have back-up and recovery processes in place to avoid disruption 
222. does the organisation have restrictions on hardware usage such that potential threats to unauthorised data removal are disabled (such as disabling all USB ports) 
223. does the organisation allows its staff to use their own devices for work (BYOD) 
224. does the organisation use regular penetration testing to strengthen defences 
225. does the organisation hire technically sophisticated system administrators or programmers 
226. do managers of IT/cyber employees have management training to improve their management of people not just technology 
227. does the organisation have a clear list of access privileges for all roles 
228. does the organisation review access request denials 
229. does computing equipment connected to the corporate network of the organisation reside in an area that has electronic access controls in place (i.e.- requires a swipe card 
to access) 
230. are special authentication procedures employed for database administrators 
231. IT administrative accounts are limited and regularly audited 
232. least privilege principles are enforced by the organisation 
233. there is a lack of electronic access controls in the organisation 
234. limited authentication procedures is a concern for the organisation 
235. unauthorised persons are prevented from accessing resources and information  
236. the organisation has well established access controls to ensure only authenticated users with the right permission can access information 
237. no one individual can complete a critical business process from start to finish 
238. targeted monitoring is increased when behavioural or technical precursors are discovered 
239. the organisation has an holistic approach to monitoring utilising IT, HR, and physical security information for a more complete risk assessment 
240. the sophistication of IT systems in the organisation is poor 
241. the organisation has limited hardware controls 
242. the organisation leaves insider threat responsibility to IT and information security sections 
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Appendix J – Ethical Decision Making Model 
 (https://www.psychology.org.au/inpsych/2013/december/ethics/) 
1. Recognise that there is an ethical issue present 
Learn to recognise potential ethical problems 
Check if there are any personal ‘clues’ that may alert you, such as: changing 
your usual professional practices; providing more self-disclosure than usual; 
avoiding certain topics; ruminating after a session with a client; or feeling 
uncomfortable or regretful. 
Ask yourself: “Would I be comfortable if my colleagues knew about this 
situation?” 
Reflect on whether there is anything adversely influencing your capacity to 
assess the situation objectively, such as personal needs, values or biases 
that may be distorting your perception. 
Consider discussing the issue with a colleague or supervisor to assess your 
initial response. 
Determine whether the problem is an ethical one that is your responsibility 
Articulate the problem as succinctly as you can and then consider the 
following questions:  
Are there any legal obligations that apply in this situation that are 
contributing to or may even override the ethical issues  
(e.g., a mandatory reporting obligation, a client’s right of access to his/her 
health record)? 
Is the problem based on information from factual material? 
Has the information come from a reliable source? 
Is the problem your responsibility or someone else’s, or perhaps a shared 
responsibility? 
2. Clarify the ethical issues 
Identify the ethical principles involved 
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Identify which of the three General Principles of the APS Code of Ethics is 
relevant to the issue: 
Respect for the rights and dignity of all people and peoples; Propriety; 
Integrity. 
Drill down to identify the ethical standards that are relevant and consult the 
Ethical Guidelines where necessary to assist with this task. 
Identify any competing ethical principles, e.g., the right to autonomy versus 
the right to confidentiality. 
Identify any aspects of the situation that are exerting pressure on you to act 
quickly, and think about how to claim more time to make the best possible 
decision. 
Evaluate the rights, responsibilities and vulnerabilities of all affected parties 
Identify who else is involved, implicated or affected by this issue (including 
institutions or the general public where relevant). 
Consider the rights and responsibilities of each of the people involved (e.g., 
the right to confidentiality, privacy, autonomy). 
Consider how this issue will affect the welfare of each of the people 
involved, keeping in mind your responsibility to ensure your client’s welfare 
takes precedence. Don’t forget to consider your own rights, responsibilities 
and welfare in this situation. 
Try to identify any gaps in your thinking and knowledge by talking with a 
colleague or supervisor. 
3. Generate and examine available courses of action 
Pause to consider all factors that might influence the decision you will 
make, including your level of competence. 
Reflect on any social or cultural factors that should be taken into 
consideration. 
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Consider the timelines and include the decision to wait and gather more 
information, where appropriate and possible. 
Identify possible alternative courses of action and examine the positive and 
negative consequences of each. 
Consult a trusted colleague, supervisor and/or your professional 
organisation. 
4. Choose and implement the most preferred option 
Decide on your most preferred course of action and implement it. 
Ensure that you document the issue and how you decided on the course of 
action, including any consultation with colleagues and reference to ethics 
resources, which may be required at a later date in the event of a complaint 
or legal action. 
5. Reflect on and review the process 
Reflect on your own role in the situation and ask yourself: 
Could I have prevented the issue from developing? 
Am I satisfied with the way I managed the situation and the processes I 
engaged in? 
Could I have done anything differently at any stage? 
Is there anything I can do differently in future to prevent such a situation 
(i.e., integrate my learning into my ongoing professional life)? 
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Appendix K – Ethical considerations of the current research 
Ethical consideration Definition Applied to the Delphi Method Applied to the Survey Method 
Requirement for USQ Ethics Approval Granting of ethics approval Human Research Ethics Approval 
received.  
Human Research Ethics Approval 
received. 
Right to Autonomy and Informed 
consent 
Benefits, rights, and risks of participation 
(Shariff 2015) 
• Participants in the study required to 
acknowledge consent.  
• Participation was voluntary and 
there was no pressure, coercion, 
payment, or inducements as part of 
gaining consent.  
• Participants are all adults. 
• Information explaining the purpose 
of the study was provided at the 
request for participation and at each 
subsequent round. 
• The contact details of the 
researcher, supervisor, and ethics 
committee was made available to all 
participants. 
• Participants in the study required to 
acknowledge consent. 
• Participation was voluntary and 
there was no pressure, coercion, 
payment, or inducements as part of 
gaining consent.  
• Participants are all adults. 
• Information explaining the purpose 
of the study was included on the 
landing page of the survey. 
• The contact details of the 
researcher, supervisor, and ethics 
committee was made available to all 
participants. 
Accessibility Ability to contact the researcher • All communication regarding the 
research provided contact details of 
the primary researcher, the 
supervisory team, and the ethics 
committee. 
• No concerns were received 
throughout the duration of the 
project.  
• Details of the primary researcher, 
the supervisory team, and the ethics 
committee were available on the 
survey. 
• No concerns were received 
throughout the duration of the 
project. 
Anonymity and Confidentiality Concealing the identity of participants 
(Shariff 2015) 
• In the Delphi process anonymity of 
participants was assured through 
use of re-identifiable data (The 
National Health and Medical 
• In the survey the participants were 
completely anonymous to the 
research team. 
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Research Council 2007 (updated 
March 2014)) 
• Identifiers were replaced by a code 
or pseudonym.  
• Original identifiers were kept to a 
minimum, (for example only using 
initials and industry).  
• The details of the Delphi experts 
were only known to the primary 
researcher.  
• The researcher did not reveal 
identities of participants to others 
(Shariff 2015).  
• Judgements, opinions, and specific 
answers were not attributable to a 
specific person and remained strictly 
anonymous (McKenna 1994) 
Recruitment of participants How participants were chosen for 
participation 
• Participation in the study was 
voluntary.  
• Approach to adult convenience 
sample requesting participation via 
email.  
• Suggestions for further participants 
generated from these initial 
participants (snowball).  
• Participation in the study was 
voluntary.  
• Approach to convenience sample via 
email.  
• Suggestions for further participants 
generated from these initial 
participants (snowball). 
• Convenience sample through 
LinkedIn network, USQ 
Master/Doctoral student network.  
Right to Self-Determination The entitlement of peoples to have 
control over their destiny and to be 
treated respectfully (Attorney General's 
Department 2018) 
• Participation was voluntary. 
• Participants were able to choose 
which questions they answered and 
what information they chose to 
share with the researcher.  
• Participation was voluntary.  
• Participants were able to choose 
which demographic questions they 
answered.  
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• Participants were able to withdraw 
at any time without penalty. 
• Participants were able to withdraw 
at any time without penalty. 
Intellectual property “the property of your mind or proprietary 
information” (IP Australia 2018) 
Before commencing the research the development of a clear understanding between 
the researcher, academic supervisor, and workplace supervisor/s was established. 
Information security and Cyber security The protection of Information from 
unauthorised use or accidental 
modification, loss or release (University 
of Southern Queensland 2014) 
• To protect research data/information from improper access, IT measures such as 
appropriate firewalls and software controls were in place (Desai & von der Embse 
2008). 
Disclosure Release of information • Data will be kept for the university minimum time of five years following 
completion of the research.  
• Participants in the Delphi were provided with a report of findings.  
• As participants of the survey were anonymous the provision of outcomes was 
not available.  
• Research outcomes may be available through publication.  
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Appendix L – Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic Std. Error 
Gender 140 1 2 1.46 .501 .145 .205 -2.008 .407 
Age 139 1 6 3.47 1.038 .384 .206 .460 .408 
Education 140 1 7 4.18 1.248 -.615 .205 .452 .407 
Job Level 139 1 6 3.32 1.532 .396 .206 -.821 .408 
Industry 139 1 4 1.61 .776 1.275 .206 1.354 .408 
APS Industry Sector 135 1 9 4.35 2.417 .327 .209 -1.500 .414 
Size of Organisation 137 1 4 3.31 1.020 -1.213 .207 .074 .411 
Location 39 1 7 3.41 1.666 .741 .378 .085 .741 
My level of expertise on Insider Threat 
issues is... 
137 1 5 2.93 1.279 -.304 .207 -1.266 .411 
IND does the organisation check civil 
records 
141 1 5 3.38 1.418 -.430 .204 -1.118 .406 
IND does the organisation have 
methods to assess sound and reliable 
behaviour of staff 
141 1 5 3.48 1.169 -.566 .204 -.467 .406 
IND does the organisation have policy 
and processes to manage staff with a 
history of security violations 
141 1 5 3.21 1.525 -.293 .204 -1.404 .406 
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IND does the organisation test for 
illegal drug use 
141 1 5 2.39 1.520 .553 .204 -1.273 .406 
IND does the organisation assess past 
substance use/abuse 
141 1 5 2.50 1.620 .515 .204 -1.381 .406 
IND does the organisation assess for 
problematic gambling behaviour 
141 1 5 2.41 1.586 .595 .204 -1.265 .406 
IND does the organisation have a good 
conduct policy 
141 1 5 3.96 1.206 -1.230 .204 .719 .406 
IND is financial, credit, and bankruptcy 
history assessed by the organisation 
141 1 5 2.63 1.684 .343 .204 -1.604 .406 
IND does the organisation have 
methods to identify financial pressures 
of employees 
141 1 5 2.41 1.440 .471 .204 -1.218 .406 
IND does the organisation undertake a 
formal risk assessment of high risk 
employees/positions, determining level 
of risk and mitigation strategies 
141 1 5 2.79 1.476 .145 .204 -1.372 .406 
IND does the organisation have a 
means by which employees can report 
suspicious contacts from other 
employees or outsiders 
141 1 5 3.72 1.300 -.644 .204 -.730 .406 
IND does the organisation allow the 
hiring of employees with close 
connections to current staff 
(friends/family) 
141 1 5 3.44 1.130 -.360 .204 -.378 .406 
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IND does the organisation assess for 
positive support networks of employees 
141 1 5 2.91 1.317 .026 .204 -1.144 .406 
IND does the organisation evaluate 
risk-related criminal associations 
141 1 5 3.01 1.645 -.031 .204 -1.629 .406 
IND does the organisation check 
criminal records 
141 1 5 3.82 1.499 -.867 .204 -.818 .406 
IND does the organisation have 
policy/guidelines describing how to 
identify and respond to employees 
susceptible to social engineering 
(manipulation of people to get them to 
unwittingly perform actions that may 
cause harm) 
141 1 5 2.47 1.427 .462 .204 -1.153 .406 
IND does the organisation monitor 
foreign contacts of staff 
141 1 5 2.43 1.475 .520 .204 -1.223 .406 
IND does the organisation monitor staff 
travel 
141 1 5 3.08 1.540 -.121 .204 -1.518 .406 
IND does the organisation have clear 
procedures describing access to and 
benefits of employee assistance 
programs and other employee support 
services 
141 1 5 3.72 1.306 -.709 .204 -.646 .406 
IND does the organisation 
monitor/assess staff after 
negative/stressful events 
141 1 5 3.43 1.232 -.435 .204 -.706 .406 
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IND does the organisation conduct 
performance reviews and is therefore 
aware of declining performance ratings 
141 1 5 3.98 1.124 -.998 .204 .257 .406 
IND does the organisation have policies 
and procedures for referring at-risk 
employees facing negative personnel 
actions to appropriate teams for 
evaluation 
141 1 5 3.22 1.219 -.167 .204 -.762 .406 
IND does the organisation have 
branches, suppliers, subcontractors or 
other affiliates abroad, where 
differences in cultural beliefs and 
values may affect loyalty to the 
organisation 
141 1 5 2.62 1.257 .372 .204 -.841 .406 
IND does the organisation have policies 
and procedures designed to improve 
loyalty 
141 1 5 2.89 1.274 .076 .204 -1.079 .406 
IND do policy and processes of the 
organisation promote individual 
differences (gender, culture, ethnicity) 
141 1 5 3.57 1.232 -.494 .204 -.730 .406 
IND are staff in the organisation 
educated on the different reasons 
behind insider threat actions 
141 1 5 2.49 1.234 .383 .204 -.822 .406 
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IND is motivation for 
employment  assessed during 
recruitment processes 
141 1 5 3.63 1.239 -.569 .204 -.735 .406 
IND does the organisations structure 
allow for specific individuals to control 
majority of the power 
141 1 5 3.13 1.212 -.053 .204 -.985 .406 
IND does the organisation assist 
staff/individuals to improve their 
communication 
141 1 5 3.19 1.062 .081 .204 -.473 .406 
IND does the organisation use methods 
to assess alignment between employee 
values and organisational values 
141 1 5 3.11 1.269 -.075 .204 -.981 .406 
IND does the organisation utilise 
methods during recruitment processes 
to assess for ego/sense of entitlement 
141 1 5 3.16 1.366 -.112 .204 -1.273 .406 
IND does the organisation utilise 
methods to assess for employee 
resilience 
141 1 5 3.18 1.300 -.157 .204 -1.055 .406 
IND does the organisation offer 
resilience training to staff 
141 1 5 2.82 1.099 .210 .204 -.311 .406 
IND does the organisation utilise 
methods to assess for employee sound 
judgment 
141 1 5 3.04 1.206 -.083 .204 -.822 .406 
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IND does the organisation utilise 
methods to assess for employee 
conscientiousness 
141 1 5 3.18 1.268 -.289 .204 -.876 .406 
IND does the organisation conduct 
mental health testing/assessment 
141 1 5 2.57 1.415 .406 .204 -1.165 .406 
IND does the organisation conduct 
personality testing to determine an 
employee's vulnerability to become an 
insider threat 
141 1 5 2.66 1.558 .365 .204 -1.417 .406 
IND are trained professionals employed 
by the organisation to identify and 
manage employees vulnerable to 
becoming an insider threat 
141 1 5 2.44 1.461 .609 .204 -1.052 .406 
IND does the organisation utilise 
methods to assess for employee self-
awareness 
141 1 5 2.83 1.347 .102 .204 -1.168 .406 
IND does the organisation have 
programs to develop employee self-
awareness 
141 1 5 2.60 1.164 .188 .204 -.882 .406 
IND does the organisation have 
mechanisms in place in order to know 
of any pending sanctions of contractors 
and outside staff  
141 1 6 3.81 1.989 -.156 .204 -1.610 .406 
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IND does the organisation carefully 
consider any vendors/partnerships etc. 
based on ethical conduct 
141 1 6 3.86 1.650 -.167 .204 -1.179 .406 
IND does the organisation assess 
moral development 
141 1 6 3.39 1.923 .146 .204 -1.509 .406 
IND the organisation has methods to 
assess for addictions 
141 1 5 2.73 1.241 .073 .204 -1.232 .406 
IND workplace deviance is handled 
appropriately within the organisation 
141 1 5 3.10 1.084 -.166 .204 -.931 .406 
IND the organisation has methods for 
identifying and managing potential 
disgruntlement 
141 1 5 3.20 1.030 -.488 .204 -.618 .406 
IND the organisation actively manages 
employee expectation to minimise 
potential for unmet expectations 
141 1 5 3.06 .994 -.085 .204 -.636 .406 
IND commitment to the organisation is 
high amongst staff 
141 1 5 3.52 1.032 -.601 .204 -.134 .406 
IND the attitude of staff is a problem in 
the organisation 
141 1 5 2.57 1.104 .247 .204 -1.038 .406 
IND positive individual attitudes are 
nurtured by the organisation 
141 1 5 3.40 1.035 -.446 .204 -.411 .406 
IND the practices and policies of the 
organisation allows for individual 
specific agendas 
141 1 5 3.00 1.028 -.120 .204 -.557 .406 
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IND the organisation suffers from poor 
politics 
141 1 5 2.84 1.240 .110 .204 -1.099 .406 
IND the organisation has a problem 
with individual communication 
141 1 5 2.86 1.169 .090 .204 -.946 .406 
IND people in the organisation maintain 
high ethical standards 
141 1 5 3.76 .909 -.657 .204 .261 .406 
IND people in the organisation 
demonstrate high integrity &  honesty 
141 1 5 3.74 .961 -.577 .204 -.139 .406 
does the organisation offer specific 
training and education programs 
addressing policy and practice areas 
relevant to insider threat 
141 1 5 2.53 1.251 .260 .204 -1.085 .406 
does the organisation structure security 
awareness training and education 
efforts appropriately to the needs of 
different employees groups such as 
managers, system administrators, 
human resources personnel, etc. 
141 1 5 2.71 1.234 .063 .204 -1.086 .406 
are all staff vetted 141 1 5 3.52 1.432 -.480 .204 -1.187 .406 
does a specialised team (including HR, 
legal, employee assistance programs, 
physical and IT security, and 
behavioural science members) exist to 
evaluate the risk of insider threat 
141 1 5 2.60 1.439 .272 .204 -1.331 .406 
                                                P a g e  | 318 
 
are a variety of informal and formal staff 
consultation methods utilised by the 
organisation to understand staff 
views/opinions 
141 1 5 3.26 1.045 -.454 .204 -.021 .406 
does the organisation have guidelines 
describing the organisations right to 
monitor and audit employee activity 
including their behaviour 
141 1 5 3.27 1.346 -.415 .204 -.988 .406 
does the organisation conduct informal 
online searches of employees 
141 1 5 2.67 1.205 .247 .204 -.757 .406 
does the organisation utilise evidence-
based recruitment and assessment 
methods 
141 1 5 3.48 1.211 -.730 .204 -.356 .406 
does the organisation conduct its own 
research on insider threat 
141 1 5 2.96 1.290 -.095 .204 -1.094 .406 
does the organisation benchmark its 
processes and controls (technical and 
non-technical) against leading practices 
141 1 5 2.32 1.244 .455 .204 -.927 .406 
does the organisation have policies and 
processes to attempt to identify moles 
141 1 5 2.23 1.280 .671 .204 -.654 .406 
does the organisation promote 
integrated approaches to insider threat 
management 
141 1 5 2.25 1.172 .637 .204 -.455 .406 
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does the organisation have a senior 
management position dedicated to 
security who answers to a Board 
member, with a dedicated security team 
to implement required measures 
141 1 5 2.83 1.554 .010 .204 -1.593 .406 
does the organisation have an 
established insider threat contingency 
management plan 
141 1 5 2.50 1.356 .365 .204 -1.181 .406 
are risk transfer methods (insurance, 
contracts, etc.) part of the organisations 
risk management 
141 1 5 3.05 1.261 -.138 .204 -.980 .406 
are management security actions 
enforced without discrimination, 
recorded, and subsequently evaluated 
for effectiveness 
141 1 5 2.94 1.226 -.066 .204 -.895 .406 
does the organisation have strong and 
positive leadership 
141 1 5 3.52 1.066 -.585 .204 -.082 .406 
does management in the organisation 
communicate clear plans & objectives 
for the organisation 
141 1 5 3.48 1.125 -.612 .204 -.297 .406 
does the organisation regularly use 
methods to identify and assess its own 
security culture 
141 1 5 2.89 1.181 -.081 .204 -.877 .406 
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does the organisation have clear, 
publicly available, and consistently 
enforced methods for investigating and 
penalising inappropriate security 
behaviour 
141 1 5 2.84 1.296 .089 .204 -1.125 .406 
does the organisation track security 
compliance and take steps to confirm 
compliance 
141 1 5 3.18 1.217 -.408 .204 -.763 .406 
does the organisation have measures 
and processes in place to measure 
organisational culture 
141 1 5 3.30 1.171 -.319 .204 -.578 .406 
does the organisation have multiple 
means for tracking increases in 
counterproductive workplace behaviour 
141 1 5 2.92 1.128 -.057 .204 -.795 .406 
does the organisation have principles, 
policies, and practices to help manage 
the risk of counterproductive behaviour 
in the workplace 
141 1 5 3.07 1.113 -.205 .204 -.672 .406 
does the management of the 
organisation integrate insider threat 
mitigation as part of the broader 
enterprise risk mitigation strategy 
141 1 5 2.62 1.240 .240 .204 -.996 .406 
is the organisation committed to the 
prevention, detection, deterrence, and 
response to insider threats 
141 1 5 2.86 1.339 .046 .204 -1.193 .406 
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does the organisation assess level of 
employee engagement through annual 
surveys and/or pulse surveys 
141 1 5 3.49 1.285 -.550 .204 -.737 .406 
does the organisation actively assess 
job and organisational fit to ensure 
employee engagement 
141 1 5 3.31 1.147 -.407 .204 -.471 .406 
is the organisation constantly/regularly 
undergoing some level of significant 
organisational change 
141 1 5 3.24 1.075 -.356 .204 -.364 .406 
is the organisation structured to allow 
for open and efficient communication 
across all levels 
141 1 5 3.33 1.053 -.518 .204 -.176 .406 
are organisational policies ill-defined or 
loosely enforced 
141 1 5 2.81 1.021 .067 .204 -.549 .406 
does the organisation actively 
investigate reports of at-risk behaviours 
in a manner that does not deter future 
reports 
141 1 5 2.94 1.094 -.019 .204 -.588 .406 
do people in the organisation report 
suspicious behaviour in the workplace 
141 1 5 3.11 1.119 -.244 .204 -.647 .406 
does confidential reporting exist so that 
employees can report suspicious 
events without fear of repercussion 
141 1 5 3.49 1.240 -.454 .204 -.726 .406 
does the organisation have a whistle-
blower protection policy 
141 1 5 3.08 1.435 -.139 .204 -1.319 .406 
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does the organisation have policies that 
protect the security of organisational 
information and IT resources 
141 1 5 3.96 1.176 -1.145 .204 .501 .406 
does the organisation have 
implemented security practices to 
prevent unauthorised disclosure of 
sensitive information 
141 1 5 3.94 1.160 -1.044 .204 .322 .406 
does the organisation regularly review 
and update insider threat and security 
policy and procedures 
141 1 5 2.94 1.305 -.096 .204 -1.097 .406 
does the organisation have policy to 
conduct random reviews of exiting staff 
computer activities leading up the final 
date 
141 1 5 2.72 1.267 .187 .204 -.963 .406 
are policies and processes in place to 
ensure that the privileges and accesses 
of staff leaving the organisation are 
disabled 
141 1 5 3.90 1.173 -1.179 .204 .694 .406 
does the organisation require that all 
staff, contractors, consultants, and 
vendors sign non-disclosure statements 
when leaving the organisation 
141 1 5 3.38 1.477 -.389 .204 -1.286 .406 
does the organisation have policies 
protecting the physical security of 
facilities 
141 1 5 4.03 1.201 -1.235 .204 .658 .406 
                                                P a g e  | 323 
 
does the organisation review physical 
access anomalies and denials 
141 1 5 3.57 1.261 -.653 .204 -.608 .406 
does the organisation capture 
information on an employee's physical 
movements within and around the 
organisations facility/ies 
141 1 5 3.12 1.412 -.186 .204 -1.301 .406 
the organisation keeps abreast of best 
practice when it comes to insider threat 
141 1 5 2.89 1.243 -.076 .204 -1.001 .406 
the organisation is good at addressing 
underlying systemic issues that may be 
linked to increased risk of insider threat 
141 1 5 2.75 1.190 .107 .204 -.918 .406 
the organisation is better equipped to 
cope with insider threat challenges 
when compared to other organisations 
in the same sector 
141 1 5 2.95 1.155 -.241 .204 -.624 .406 
the organisation is able to learn from 
failures and mistakes 
141 1 5 3.39 1.151 -.582 .204 -.580 .406 
the organisation is resilient 141 1 5 3.75 .919 -.828 .204 .637 .406 
management in the organisation are 
accountable and responsible to others 
141 1 5 3.60 1.082 -.577 .204 -.307 .406 
management in the organisation lead 
by example when it comes to security 
practice 
141 1 5 3.39 1.027 -.362 .204 -.358 .406 
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management in the organisation do not 
hesitate to provide the leadership that is 
needed 
141 1 5 3.53 1.073 -.383 .204 -.525 .406 
the organisation fosters an environment 
that is conducive to the success of 
insider threat initiatives 
141 1 5 2.71 1.137 .268 .204 -.465 .406 
the organisation has a poor security 
culture 
141 1 5 2.34 .992 .341 .204 -.706 .406 
the values of the organisation are made 
explicit and help to build a strong 
security culture 
141 1 5 3.48 .990 -.491 .204 -.139 .406 
management in the organisation 
provide the support and resources 
needed to help staff meet their goals 
141 1 5 3.41 1.008 -.604 .204 -.101 .406 
management in the organisation take 
care to be informed about how others 
think and feel about things 
141 1 5 3.29 1.131 -.354 .204 -.817 .406 
management in the organisation 
encourage staff to speak up about 
employee issues 
141 1 5 3.40 1.159 -.420 .204 -.629 .406 
that, overall, staff of the organisation 
engage in poor security behaviour 
141 1 5 2.35 1.056 .521 .204 -.395 .406 
staff in the organisation are treated 
fairly by management in the 
organisation 
141 1 5 3.54 1.079 -.656 .204 -.113 .406 
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there is a perception in the organisation 
that management do not value staff 
141 1 5 2.63 1.161 .120 .204 -1.173 .406 
the organisation has a positive 
organisational culture 
141 1 5 3.48 1.073 -.339 .204 -.604 .406 
both overt and covert messages are 
corrected to create a positive 
organisational culture 
141 1 5 3.26 1.003 -.059 .204 -.805 .406 
the organisation regularly identifies and 
assesses its own organisational culture 
141 1 5 3.39 1.054 -.392 .204 -.537 .406 
there is an increasing level of 
counterproductive behaviour in the 
organisation 
141 1 5 2.47 1.046 .143 .204 -1.010 .406 
when it comes to insider threat the 
organisation is complacent 
141 1 5 2.85 1.088 .099 .204 -.828 .406 
the organisation is aware of its risk 
tolerance level/risk appetite 
141 1 5 3.43 .904 -.363 .204 -.099 .406 
staff of the organisation are aware of its 
critical assets that are worth protecting 
141 1 5 3.70 .971 -.637 .204 -.174 .406 
there is a lack of management of 
potential insider threat issues at the 
emerging stages 
141 1 5 2.94 1.002 -.217 .204 -.502 .406 
staff are aware of how insider threat 
concerns are managed in the 
organisation 
141 1 5 2.74 1.078 .145 .204 -.809 .406 
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people in the organisation are willing to 
go above and beyond to achieve the 
organisations mission 
141 1 5 3.76 .970 -.450 .204 -.114 .406 
there is a high level of collegiality within 
the organisation 
141 1 5 3.64 .951 -.481 .204 -.029 .406 
the organisation increases its 
monitoring capabilities when significant 
organisational change occurs 
141 1 5 3.04 1.017 .011 .204 -.559 .406 
the organisation balances trust with the 
application of consistent employee 
monitoring 
141 1 5 3.14 1.018 -.001 .204 -.579 .406 
there is a high level of undue secrecy in 
the organisation 
141 1 5 2.64 1.044 .199 .204 -.591 .406 
the organisation is open and honest 
with its employees 
141 1 5 3.32 1.098 -.367 .204 -.557 .406 
management in the organisation 
encourage staff to participate in 
important decisions 
141 1 5 3.35 1.057 -.163 .204 -.794 .406 
policies and expectations are consistent 
across all levels of the organisation 
141 1 5 3.21 1.092 -.085 .204 -.934 .406 
security reporting is encouraged in the 
organisation 
141 1 5 3.60 .999 -.571 .204 -.123 .406 
staff are aware of the security controls 
utilised by the organisation 
141 1 5 3.48 1.004 -.382 .204 -.396 .406 
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the organisation has a whistle-blower 
policy that has the confidence of all 
employees 
141 1 5 3.01 1.159 -.056 .204 -.847 .406 
the organisation has relevant IT policies 
and procedures 
141 1 5 3.88 .982 -1.041 .204 1.072 .406 
the organisation is committed to 
improving security in order to protect its 
information and resources 
141 1 5 3.78 .879 -.642 .204 .161 .406 
security controls of the organisation are 
adequate and applied whenever 
necessary 
141 1 5 3.54 .953 -.516 .204 .043 .406 
staff in the organisation can identify and 
report on red flags 
141 1 5 3.46 .982 -.532 .204 -.126 .406 
the organisation has a proactive and 
risk-based approach to mitigating 
emerging insider threats 
141 1 5 3.04 1.101 -.215 .204 -.596 .406 
security awareness is high among staff 
and considered in the daily activities of 
all organisational members 
141 1 5 3.40 1.020 -.290 .204 -.437 .406 
staff use relevant risk management and 
compliance considerations in everyday 
work decisions 
141 1 5 3.55 .929 -.542 .204 .225 .406 
staff in the organisation are vigilant and 
able to monitor emerging threats 
141 1 5 3.28 .911 -.061 .204 -.253 .406 
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the organisation has strict exit controls 
in place for all exiting staff 
141 1 5 3.52 1.112 -.598 .204 -.369 .406 
TECH does the organisation allow staff 
a variety of virtual work arrangements 
(including working from home) 
141 1 5 3.17 1.183 -.152 .204 -.836 .406 
TECH does the organisation have 
guidelines to ensure that staff only have 
access to data, systems, and 
information required to perform their 
duties 
141 1 5 3.82 1.030 -.949 .204 .664 .406 
TECH does the organisation implement 
multi-factor authentication (e.g.- a 
password plus a one-time code from a 
hardware token) 
141 1 5 3.40 1.127 -.365 .204 -.540 .406 
TECH do authentication procedures 
become more advanced with increasing 
access to critical information/data 
141 1 5 3.45 1.143 -.525 .204 -.461 .406 
TECH is access to sensitive systems 
and areas enforced by authentication 
procedures monitored for anomalies 
141 1 5 3.41 1.153 -.404 .204 -.477 .406 
TECH does the organisation require 
multiple users to action all modifications 
to critical systems, network, 
applications, and data 
141 1 5 3.30 1.067 -.264 .204 -.338 .406 
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TECH does the organisation restrict 
administrators from controlling auditing 
functions 
141 1 5 3.33 1.072 -.297 .204 -.328 .406 
TECH is routine auditing of privileged 
functions conducted by the organisation 
141 1 5 3.38 1.086 -.321 .204 -.323 .406 
TECH are advanced analytics tools 
used in the organisation to analyse and 
report on insider threat 
141 1 5 2.87 1.188 .043 .204 -.846 .406 
TECH is random auditing of IT use 
implemented 
141 1 5 3.19 1.177 -.380 .204 -.617 .406 
TECH is auditing part of performance 
reviews 
141 1 5 2.70 1.235 .287 .204 -.847 .406 
TECH does the organisation monitor 
common data exfiltration methods (e-
mail, removable media) to identify 
anomalous behaviour 
141 1 5 3.21 1.218 -.272 .204 -.790 .406 
TECH is network traffic and associated 
security logs collected centrally and 
monitored for anomalies 
141 1 5 3.24 1.218 -.330 .204 -.688 .406 
TECH does the organisation monitor 
key databases, data access and 
movement 
141 1 5 3.28 1.197 -.388 .204 -.573 .406 
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TECH does the organisation use 
modern technologies to assist insider 
threat detection, deterrence, prevention 
and reporting 
141 1 5 3.04 1.186 -.043 .204 -.738 .406 
TECH does the organisation have 
means to monitor trends in  IT policy 
breaches to inform corrective action 
141 1 5 3.26 1.199 -.345 .204 -.608 .406 
TECH does the organisation maintain 
pace with current technology lifecycles, 
with an organisation wide refresh every 
5 years or so 
141 1 5 3.37 1.111 -.361 .204 -.633 .406 
TECH does the organisation have 
back-up and recovery processes in 
place to avoid disruption 
141 1 5 3.94 .977 -.865 .204 .459 .406 
TECH does the organisation have 
restrictions on hardware usage such 
that potential threats to unauthorised 
data removal are disabled (such as 
disabling all USB ports) 
141 1 5 3.35 1.326 -.398 .204 -.912 .406 
TECH does the organisation allows its 
staff to use their own devices for work 
(BYOD) 
141 1 5 2.85 1.287 .058 .204 -1.146 .406 
TECH does the organisation use 
regular penetration testing to 
strengthen defences 
141 1 5 3.10 1.197 -.118 .204 -.723 .406 
                                                P a g e  | 331 
 
TECH does the organisation hire 
technically sophisticated system 
administrators or programmers 
141 1 5 3.45 1.130 -.408 .204 -.596 .406 
TECH do managers of IT/cyber 
employees have management training 
to improve their management of people 
not just technology 
141 1 5 3.01 1.146 -.086 .204 -.713 .406 
TECH does the organisation have a 
clear list of access privileges for all 
roles 
141 1 6 4.23 1.311 -.545 .204 -.243 .406 
TECH does the organisation review 
access request denials 
141 1 6 4.11 1.661 -.392 .204 -1.005 .406 
TECH does computing equipment 
connected to the corporate network of 
the organisation reside in an area that 
has electronic access controls in place 
(i.e.- requires a swipe card to access) 
141 1 6 3.98 1.466 -.611 .204 -.623 .406 
TECH are special authentication 
procedures employed for database 
administrators 
141 1 6 4.29 1.457 -.618 .204 -.449 .406 
Valid N (listwise) 37         
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Appendix M – Inventory Percentages
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